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ABSTRACT

Yvor Winters' early poetry, from 1920 to 1928, was
written in free-verse; the aesthetic principle governing
it centered on the image "purified" of conceptual content,
and consisting of a "fusion" between the natural object
being described and the poet's own mind.

The result is

a kind of naturalistic mysticism, destructive of judge
ments and evaluations of the conscious intellect.

The

early poetry also registers the effect of certain scien
tific theories on Winters' mind; these theories were
mechanistic and deterministic in nature, and they turned
Winters' world into one in which moral and intellectual
values had no reality.

Other themes that appear in the

early poems are the absence, or non-existence, of God,
the fear of death, and the apprehension that the ultimate
nature of the universe might be demonic.
In the late twenties Winters underwent an artistic
and intellectual reformation in reaction to the free-verse
and the stylistic violence which that verse finally de
generated into.

He embraced a classicism that respected

and acted upon the powers of the conscious mind.

Writing

in conventional meter and employing a style both imagistic
iv
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and abstract, he wrote poems dealing with the possibil
ity, and the realization, of morai control and intellec
tual order.

His new poetics rested on the philosophical

assumption that absolute truth exists.

In order to safe

guard that truth and save himself from subjective rela
tivism, he was driven by what: he viewed as philosophical
necessity to a theistic position.

He was influenced in

this process by Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas.

Only the

existence of God could guarantee and validate truth and
assure its independence of the human mind.
Winters most reluctantly admitted theism.

He had

an instinctive fear of the supernatural; he was afraid
the supernatural, its ineffability and absolute foreign
ness, would generate intellectual confusion in the human
realm, which he wanted protected at all cost.

Conse

quently, he defined God in the most intellectually re
spectful terms at his disposal.

God becomes Pure Mind

or Perfect Concept, existentially neutral and nonprovidential as far as the human is concerned.

Such a

"perfect mind" becomes the absolute standard by which
everything is judged.

We see the effects of this defini

tion and the subsequent standard in Winters' view of the
natural world, the body-soul composite in man, and the
"giant movements" working in society at large.

Since

the natural world, as well as man's own body, does not

v
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participate in the reality of the Pure Mind, it was viewed
by Winters with some distrust as a possible impediment
to man's realizing his moral and intellectual good.

Since

Winters believed so much of modern society was noted for
thoughtlessness, he viewed it suspiciously and recommended
detachment and isolation as the means of saving oneself
from moral and intellectual contamination.

"To the Holy

Spirit," a poem written in his late forties, summarizes
all themes related to theism and is his most complete
statement on the subject.
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INTRODUCTION

In 1947 Yvor Winters brought together and published
in a single volume, entitled In Defense of Reason, three
books of criticism he had previously published separately.
In those books are to be found the major critical state
ments on which his reputation as a critic is based.

They

are Primitivism and Decadence (1937), Maule's Curse (1938),
and The Anatomy of Nonsense (1943).

Earlier, in 1940,

he had issued from his own private press a volume he
simply called P o e m s this book contains all the poems he
wished to save from his previous volumes, to which only
a handful of later ones would be added when the book was
commercially published by Alan Swallow in 1952.^

In fact,

by the time he came to write the Foreword to In Defense
of Reason, all but four of the poems that make up his
total work had already been written and published.

It

was consequently a time of summing up; for all practical
purposes he had finished his poetic career, and the two
remaining books of criticism he would write, The Function
of Criticism (1957) and Forms of Discovery (1967) , would
be only further, though perhaps deeper, applications of
the principles already to be found in In Defense of Reason.

1

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

2

In the Foreword he takes a comprehensive view and
surveys in summary fashion all other theories of litera
ture to which his own can be contrasted.

The essential

feature of his theory, which he sees as separating it
from the others, is its commitment to the proposition
that the mind through concentrated study and discipline
can apprehend some degree of truth about human experience
and can then express that truth in poetic language which
realizes it both emotionally and intellectually.

He also

sees that the effect of such apprehension and expression
is not just intellectual, but also moral: the mind is
enabled not only to recognize in truth what a particular
good is, but also to define, and then avoid, those things
that would interfere with the realization of the good in
question.

The value of poetry is that it achieves this

end in a more inclusive manner than philosophical or
scientific discourse by utliizing both aspects of language,
the connotative and the denotative, and by appealing to
and engaging both the emotional and the intellectual
faculties of the human being.

Poems should be judged and

evaluated, then, according as they do or do not realize
this end.
He then states, at the very end of the Foreword, and
as if in an aside, that a further and final consequence
of his theory of literature is that it rests on a theistic
basis, which the moral absolutism of that theory would
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inevitably necessitate.

He states this position reluc

tantly, and in such a tone that the reader soon realizes
that only the rigor of the argument could have compelled
him to such an uncomfortable position.
Finally, I am aware that my absolutism implies
a theistic position, -unfortunate as this admis
sion may be. If experience appears to indicate
that absolute truths exist, that we are able to
work toward an approximate apprehension of them,
but that they are antecedent to our apprehension
and that our apprehension is seldom and perhaps
never perfect, then there is only one place in
which those truths may be located, and I see no
way to escape the conclusion.2
It will be the purpose of this dissertation to study
the causes and consequences of the theistic position
Winters here summarizes,

we shall see that one of the

major causes is located in his free verse and the aes
thetic principles, formulated in a very early essay, The
Testament of a Stone, according to which the free verse
was written.

These principles restricted him to a severe

form of imagism and exposed him to forces over which he
could finally maintain no control; the poems themselves
are records of a mind often on the point of hysterical
fragmentation.

We shall see that it was in reaction

against them, and the anguish they caused him, that he
began in the late twenties the intellectual and artistic
reformation that eventually issued in the 1947 "confes
sion" of theism.

The first part then will be a study of

the major themes of the free verse, all of which was
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written in his twenties and published in the following
four books, The Immobile Wind (1921), The Magpie's Shadow
(1922), The Bare Hills (1927), and The Proof (1930).
(The contents of all four of these books can be found in
the 1978 Collected Poems, and all references to poems in
the text will be to it.)
But the major part will be devoted to a study of
the consequences of Winters' theism, especially as these
appear in his poetry, which I consider greater than the
criticism.

As I have said, he most reluctantly, almost

unwillingly, admitted the existence of God, against which
he had earlier maintained strong humanistic suspicion
and distrust.

It is not surprising that he should then

define God, once he was forced by the logic of the argu
ment to reckon with Him, in the most intellectually
respectable terms at his disposal.

For Winters these

terms are always rational, and God then becomes the Pure
Mind of "To the Holy Spirit," his most complete poetic
statement on the subject, and one which I shall discuss
in some detail in the last chapter.
Such a definition is of the greatest importance.
Since the formulation of a first principle is the basis
on which everything else depends, we should not be sur
prised then if we discover that the effects of Winters'
definition of God are extensive and touch crucial areas
of his thought.

These consequences appear most tellingly
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in those poems of his which deal with the mind and its
relationship to either the body or the natural world, a
relationship that in both cases, for Winters, is fraught
with ambiguity and peril.

The degree of intellectual

reality, if any, which either the body or the natural
world possesses is a theme that preoccupied him from the
beginning to the end of his career, and his solution to
the problem is a direct result of what led him to think
of God in terms of "mind."

I shall also treat how such

thinking affected his political and social thought in
certain of his poems that are concerned in an impersonal
way with the public issues of his day.
Winters lived a quiet life, devoted almost exclu
sively to poetry and the teaching of it at Stanford
University, with which he was connected, either as a
student or teacher, from 1927 to a short time before his
death in 1968.

As Donald E. Stanford has noted in a

review of the 1952 Collected Poems, "Winters * career has
not been sensational enough to catch the public eye, nor
fashionable enough to interest the elite.

He has not

visited Paris, gone insane, joined the Communist party,
3

become converted to Catholicism, or committed suicide."
Yet two events of more than an ordinary nature occurred
during the early part of his life.

Since they had a

rather profound effect on his poetry, perhaps it would
not be inappropriate if in this introduction I briefly
4
list and discuss them.
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In 1918, when he was seventeen and a student at the
University of Chicago, Winters discovered he had tuber
culosis.

His family first sent him to California, the

home of his childhood, then to the drier climate of
Santa Fe, New Mexico, where he entered a sanatorium some
time in the late autumn of 1918.

He remained there as

a patient for almost two years, spending most of his
waking hours following the mistaken medical practice of
the time and lying flat on his back in a state as im
mobile as possible.

Nearly all of his first two books

of poetry, The Immobile Wind and The Magpie's Shadow,
were written in the sanatorium.

The disease produced in

him a state of mind, at times hallucinatory in its in
tensity.

His senses were rendered feverously active and

the resulting clarity caused him acute pain.
the effects of such a state in the poems.

We can see

Their ima-

gistic vividness and disconnectedness are so startlingly
apparent that the reader, even without any knowledge of
his biography, is forced to posit some abnormal state of
mind as their cause.

In fact, the single-minded intensity

with which Winters devoted himself to the image in both
the poetry and criticism of the period must be intimately
connected with the whole "psychology" of tuberculosis.
It surely has to be reckoned as one of the chief factors,
I think, in his later reaction not only against free
verse, but against Romanticism in general, which, as
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Susan Sontag recounts in Illness as Metaphor, often
glorified the disease and made it an infallible sign of
spiritual and poetic authenticity.^
He was released from the sanatorium in October,
1921.

For the next two years, and before he resumed his

academic career, first at the University of Colorado,
then at Stanford, he taught school in two or three small
coal-mining towns south of Santa Fe.

This experience

forms the background of a great deal of the free verse
written after The Magpie's Shadow, as well as some of
the later traditional poems.

Its main importance lies

in the concrete instances it gave him of a primitive
irrationalism which he spent the rest of his life defining
and opposing.

As he says in the Introduction to The

Early Poems, "Accidents, many fatal, were common in the
mines, from which union organizers were vigorously ex
cluded and sometimes removed; drunken violence was a
daily and nightly occurrence in both towns; mayhem and
g

murder were discussed with amusement."

It was also

during this time that he experienced in an acute form
what we might call a metaphysical state of imprecision
and indeterminacy.

Noting the moral aimlessness of the

men who inhabited these isolated towns, Winters saw in
actual human terms what the absence of a regulating
principle can cost the human being.

As he says in a

prose poem which deals with the experience:
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Then I withdrew to an empty room I shared with an
indeterminate consciousness. There was no head,
and the soiled blankets were thin.
I did not believe in the existence of precision.
It was no matter whether I sat behind my desk or
behind the window of my room. Often I heard the pale
Slavs stamping and shouting below me, and one night
a man wept with drunkenness.
The cinders in the moonlight were the same; I
saw nothing but perpetuity.7
For his remaining years Winters committed himself
to opposing this "indeterminate consciousness," and his
definition of God as Pure Mind directly results from his
realizing the pain and anguish such a consciousness can
cost the human being.
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NOTES

I am indebted for this fact, as well as all other
bibliographical information concerning Winters,to Kenneth A.
Lohf and Eugene P. Sheehy, Yvor Winters: A Bibliography
(Denver: Alan Swallow, 1959j^
“
2
Yvor Winters, In Defense of Reason (Denver: Alan
Swallow, 1947), p. 14.
Donald E. Stanford, "A Note on Yvor Winters,"
Talisman, 9 (1956), 46.
^ My information is derived from the autobiographical
Introduction Winters wrote to his The Early Poems (Denver:
Alan Swallow, 1966), pp. 7-16.
See especially Susan Sontag, Illness as Metaphor
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1978), pp. 26-36.
£

Winters, Early Poems, p. 11.
^ Winters, Early Poems, p. 102.
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CHAPTER I
THE FREE VERSE OF YVOR WINTERS:
GROUNDS FOR REACTION

1.

Solipsistic Mysticism

The aim of poetry, according to the early Yvor
Winters writing in The Testament of a Stone, is the
obliteration of differences existing between subject
and object, so that the two can become fused into one.^
The subject in this case is the poet's own mind, a mind,
it is important to note, deprived of reason and re
stricted to just sensory impressions; its corresponding
obj ect is any fragment or detail found in a natural
world from which all intelligible order is as absent as
it is from the poet's own mind.
The means by which this fusion is conveyed in
poetry is the unique and unparaphrasable image, purified
of concept and consisting of only the poet's naked per
ception and the thing perceived.

In the ideal situation,

of course, the two are so blended they are indistinguish
able.

The poet becomes what he perceives; what he per

ceives becomes himself.

When he is successful at this

in a poem, the result is what Winters calls, in a

10
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2
startling phrase, "waking oblivion" --a state of mind,
all but mystical in nature, in which the poet loses his
identity as he becomes one with the object, and yet
still impossibly enjoys the consciousness of his own
annihilation.
In some of the early poems Winters emphasizes the
outwardness of this movement, and the resulting oblitera
tion of the human mind as it fuses with the external
object.

Since extreme sacrifice and renunciation are

involved in this process, the language of these poems
inevitably has religious connotations to it.

In a poem

entitled "The Priesthood," first published in 1920, four
years before The Testament of a Stone, he states
We perish, we
Who die in art,
With that surprise
Of one who speaks
To us and knows
Wherein he lies.3
The last stanza is difficult to understand--the
reader does not know if the verb in the last line means
"to reside in" or "to express a falsehood."

Perhaps

the ambiguity is intentional; so often in these early
poems one senses a calculated obscurity on the part of
the poet.

In any case, the drift of what Winters is

saying in these lines is that the intensity of the poetic
experience, involving as it does what we might call a
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naturalistic mysticism, is inexpressible in conceptual
language.

The "surprise" of the speaker is occasioned

either by his speaking at all, and thus shattering the
mystical trance he is caught up in, or by his attempting
to express that trance in language which will only dis
tort it and be false to its uniqueness.

But the dominant

idea of the poem is sacrifice, of the poet's surrendering
himself either to the experience itself or to the attempt
to express the experience in language, both requiring,
though, a loss of mind and consciousness.

And the poem

is the earliest example of a theme that will occur re
peatedly in Winters' poetry, namely the intimate relation
ship he saw existing between art and death.
Another poem with much the same theme is "The Chapel,"
written about the same time as "The Priesthood" and con
tinuing its religious connotations:
Like hour of death
I entered in,
Before I knew the cost.
The altar's form,
Though seen of men,
I polished until lost.
And I shall not
Turn eyes again
Toward my own face of frost.
"The altar's form" in the second stanza I take to
symbolize the poet's medium, language, which, apart from
its transformation at the hands of the poet, is "seen of
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men," that is, is public and accessible in its denotative
and practical nature.

But the poet transforms it by-

polishing it until it becomes an effaced transparency
through which the fused image can become arrestingly
apparent.

What is to be noticed again, though, is the

awareness of the human cost this involves— the poetic
act is an "hour of death" and the poet's own face, insub
stantial as frost to begin with, is rubbed out in the
exigencies of the fusion.
Another poem on the subj ect is "Song."

In it the

poet speaks of running disembodied both outside and be
fore himself, and falling into a silence within silence,
mystical in its quiet and brief intensity.

Since he is

rapt outside himself, he can speak of the experience as
belonging essentially to another person:
I could tell
Of silence where
One ran before
Himself and fell
Into silence
Yet more fair.
If at times the movement is outward and calls for
an almost inhuman sacrifice on the part of the poet, at
other times it becomes inward and involves an equally
inhuman assimilation.

The poet's mind becomes fragmented

and dispersed in the process of receiving into itself
non-human elements.

In The Testament of a Stone Winters

speaks on a theoretical level of the poet's absorbing
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the "milieu" surrounding him, which is, as he says,
"infinitely variable."

Recognizing the dangers of a

"plastic nature," he insists upon the necessity of the
poet's possessing "a more or less immobile nature," one
which will render him resistant to being invaded and
destroyed by that same milieu.

4

Yet such resistance is

seldom encountered in the poems themselves dealing with
the theme.

Instead one finds first absorption, then

fragmentation and dispersion.

Consider one of his best

early poems, "Alone” :
I, one who never speaks,
Listened days in summer trees,
Each day a rustling leaf.
Then, in time, my unbelief
Grew like my running-My own eyes did not exist,
When I struck I never missed.
Noon, felt and far away-My brain is a thousand bees.
Howard Kaye in his unpublished dissertation, The
Poetry of Yvor Winters, discusses the poem at some length
and gives an account of its thematic content:
This (i.e. "Alone") seems about as close to
Whitmanian pantheism as to solipsism which views
the world as a projection of the self. In
either case, there is no clear distinction be
tween subjective and objective, self and the
external world. Perceiving an object may not
be separable from being that object. The
speaker is what he sees, and his own eyes do
not exist. Such a state will result in, or
threaten, the extinction of personality.5
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The assimilation of such inhuman swarms, as we see
in "Alone,” can only result in "extinction of personality.
The "unbelief" of the fourth line of the poem, as Kaye
goes on to say, is "a lack of confidence in one's own
conscious existence."

This absence the poet approves of,

though one senses an incipient hysteria working under
neath the surface, and conditioning the approval in a
radical way.

Yet the poet grimly maintains his aesthetic

principles to the extent that he is forced to designate
belief in separate consciousness as a "lie."

We see this

definition operating in "I Paved a Sky," the first stanza
of which follows:
I paved the sky
With days.
I crept beyond the Lie.
This phrase,
Yet more profound,
Grew where
I was not: I
Was there.
As in ail monistic systems of thought, there is
here no distinction between subject and object, nor is
there one between "here" and "there"--the hunter and the
hunted of Emerson's poem are one and the same, as the
line from "Alone," "Where I struck I never missed,"
suggests.

In "I Paved a Sky" Winters in eliminating his

own separate consciousness locates himself beyond such
distinctions, and conceptual language is destructured in
the attempt at describing the experience.

The poem verges

on impenetrability.
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The drift of all this is toward what the mature
Winters will call "solipsistic mysticism."

At the time

he could not see it as a consistent philosophical posi
tion-all he knew of philosophy then, as he says, was a
smattering of Plato, Emerson, and Herbert Spenser; in
stead "it struck me as a kind of revelation in early
childhood, and stayed with me for some years; I had to
think my way out of it."^
The mystical nature of this "revelation" is apparent.
Though the object of its contemplation is not God, but
fragments of the natural world, yet Winters' naturalistic
mysticism shares all the essential characteristics of
the transcendental variety.

As we have seen in the dis

cussion above, in both there is a fusion of two entities,
a blurring of all objective distinctions found in "out
side" reality, a loss of separate consciousness and a
trance-like state of being that is, because of its unique
ness, inexpressible in conceptual language.

In fact,

Winters, in trying to render it in language, an attempt
that can only fail, is forced to rely on extreme associa
tions and connotative intensities that result oftentimes
in total obscurity.
Yet the solipsistic nature of such a mysticism is
not so apparent at first, primarily because the mystical
obliteration dramatized in these poems renders the sur
vival of the solus ipse problematical, to say the very
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least.

What can be left of the mind after it has become

a thousand bees?

But there is a curious double vision

in Winters' early poetry.

Not only does he have his eye

so riveted on the outside object that he becomes that
object, at the same time he has another eye, as it were,
blindly locked inside his own mind, that is equally
riveted on the process of his perceiving and absorbing
the object, and watching quite dispassionately what it
is doing to his own mind.
ipse of solipsism.

The other eye is the solus

According to its vision, the world

is seen, as Kaye says, only as a projection of the self.
The first stanza of "The Morning" affords us a useful
example of this kind of thing:
The dragonfly
Is deaf and blind
That burns across
The morning.
The insect in these lines is real.

Without explicit

descriptive detail, one has the unaccountable impression
that it is there and is being observed.

One is also just

as aware that the dragonfly is becoming the mind of the
observing poet in a way that traditional symbolism can
not account for.

Like the solipsistic eye that can only

study its own internal surfaces, the insect is "deaf and
blind" to everything outside itself.
the poet is the same.

The situation of

Consequently the whole poem, as

Kenneth Fields has noted, "is dominated by the obscure
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feeling of the inability to get beyond one's own private
Q

and hallucinatory perceptions."

The poet himself is

locked inside his own perceptions, and everything apart
from them, for the moment, becomes unreal.
It is important to note that this "solipsistic
mysticism" is more a state of mind than anything else.
It is not a philosophical system for which Winters was
able to provide any sort of rigorous, technical justifi
cation.

He fell into it, as he says, as children do,

and it resembled for him an emotional state which he
later thought himself out of.

It does, of course, have

philosophical implications, as any state of mind has
for one observing and evaluating it. but Winters was
insufficiently aware of them on an intellectual level.
In fact, his aesthetic principles made such an under
standing impossible--his mind had been made an intel
lectual void in order to create the fused image.
Perhaps a few biographical details will help clarify
9

the situation.

Nearly all the poems dealing explicitly

with "solipsistic mysticism" appear in Winters' first
book, The Immobile Wind, published in 1921 and written
for the most part while he was recovering from tubercu
losis at a sanatorium in Santa Fe, New Mexico.

He was

eighteen when he entered the sanatorium, twenty-one when
he left it.

Facing the possibility of imminent death,

he lay for hours flat on his back, following the mistaken
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medical practice of the time, in a state as immobile as
the hitman body will permit.

In a passage in Forms of

Discovery devoted to another victim of tuberculosis,
Adelaide Crapsey, he has described the pain and fatigue
he suffered then as "poisonous and pervasive."^

As

with Adelaide Crapsey, as well as John Keats and others,
the disease caused in Winters a heightening and intensifi
cation of sensory impression to the point of acute clarity.
While undergoing such an experience the poet might well
have fallen into believing they were the only things real,
especially since they duplicated earlier childhood experi
ences of isolation in the natural world, and were further
more confirmed and justified by his current aesthetic
principles.
Two other observations are in order.

As we have

said earlier, the subject matter of these poems is mysti
cal and, strictly speaking, inexpressible in either
conceptual or metaphoric terms.

Most of them, such as

"The Chapel" and "The Priesthood," are more commentaries
that use, contradictorily enough, abstractions instead
of the images one would think more appropriate for
naturalistic mysticism.

The best of those which actually

attempt to "dramatize" the experience is "Alone," and
even it has to be, and is, only an approximation, though
it is surely close enough to the real thing for intel
lectual comfort.

The very nature of the situation makes
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approximation inevitable, and necessarily involves the
poet in an element of deceit--he attempts something
which from the beginning he says is impossible to ac
complish.

Winters will later recognize this fact, and

it will furnish him with the means of evaluating and
rejecting what he saw as spurious mysticism in both 19th
century Romantic poetry and modern poetry.

The proper

subject matter for the poet then becomes, not the in
effable, but the knowable, which he will locate, not in
the natural, but the human realm.
Secondly, there is on the part of the poet what we
might call an instinctive, involuntary objection to both
the mysticism and the solipsism we have been discussing,
an objection that will form the basis for the gradual
intellectual and artistic reformation that will begin
for Winters sometime in his late twenties.

The evidence

of this objection is found in such poems as "Where My
Sight Goes" and "Ballad of Men":
And all these things would take
My life from me.
from "Where My Sight Goes"
And all my life
And all my sight
Are scattered like green sea.
There is death in women walking.
Thus I come unto Thee,
from "Ballad of Men"
He is too much aware of what the mysticism cost in actual
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human terms to be able to celebrate it naively and
sentimentally.

Instead of enlarging his being, he will

discover the full extent to which it contracts and
diminishes it.

But at the time, he records it accurately

in language that registers at a level deeper, I believe,
than conscious intent, his protest against it.

He more

quickly became aware of the dilemma solipsism itself
was creating for him.

From the title poem of The Bare

Hills, written only a year or two after The Immobile Wind:
And he emerged
into the diningroom
with redveined eyes
that guttered
into sleep.
And he sat down
and ate the bread
as if he ate rock,
while he ground
his buttocks.
He got up and smiled
and went upstairs
to meet the monstrous
nakedness of
his own face. . . .
These lines are similar to a passage from "The Brink
of Darkness," a short story first published in 1932 in
Hound and Horn, after he had abandoned the techniques of
experimental poetry and embraced a poetics that included
and respected the evaluations of the conscious intellect.
The difference is that now he sees solipsism as a desperate
problem over which he possesses some kind of control,
even if it is only the control found in language itself.
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He

isdescribing himself in an empty house, staring out

a window at the smooth surface of the snow outside:
Again I had the illusion of seeing myself in
the empty room, in the same light, frozen to
my last footprints, cold and unmeaning. A
slight motion caught my eye, and I glanced up
at the darkened corner of the window, to be
fixed with horror. There, standing on the air
outside the window, translucent, a few lines
merely, and scarcely visible, was a face, my
face, the eyas fixed upon my own.-^-*The tone of both these texts is that of drastic,
even desperate, criticism.

Solipsism has become reduced

to nakedness and isolation with inhuman costs involved.
The poet's face, in "The Brink of Darkness," is disembodied
and turned against him as if it were a demon, existing
only in the element of air.

2.

The New Science

Solipsistic mysticism in its pure state soon dis
appears in the experimental poetry of Yvor Winters.

In

an undiluted form it appears only in certain poems of
The Immobile Wind (1921) and in some of the one-liners
that make up his second book, The Magpie's Shadow (1922).
What does remain, though, is the situation implied in
the remarks I have already quoted from The Testament of
a Stone: the rejection of the evaluations and judgements
of the human intellect, a literary technique that relies
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exclusively on the unparaphrasable aspects of language,
and, finally, an intellectually blind receptivity to the
poet's milieu, a word which, in Winters' case, is inter
changeable with the natural world.

It remains to ask

what Winters discovered in that world that brought him
close to a state he himself quite simply called "madness.'
It will become a fact of literary history, I think,
that the effect of the "new science" on poets and intel
lectuals during the first part of this century was far
more dislocating and more a source of anguish than was
the effect of the "new philosophy" on John Donne and his
generation.

The very nature of the universe itself, not

the arrangement of its parts, was at stake, along with
the identity of man himself.

The effect on Winters was

intensified by the fact that his interest in science was
more than just interest in the vague concepts which make
up what is rather innocently called "intellectual back
grounds ."

He studied it from an early age and knew it

"technically" in detail.

As Howard Kaye informs us,

"Winters taught biology in New Mexico mining camps, read
proto-zoology, and may at one point have considered coming
to Stanford to study ichthyology with David Starr Jordan."
And it was this "new science," working in conjunction
with the equally revolutionary "new poetry," which pro
duced his dilemma.
Kenneth Fields, in a review of The Early Poems,

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

24

which appeared in the Southern Review, gives a concise
account of the nature of this dilemma:
The physical universe that Winters seems to be
confronting in isolation, especially in the
later of the experimental poems, is very close
to the universe of atomic physics of the twen
ties as described by Whitehead and others. It
is marked by relativity of time and space which
renders relationships arbitrary; hence, perhaps,
something of the method of disparate associa
tion. It is marked by the interchangeability
of matter and energy in a kind of Heraclitean
flux, in which apparently solid matter is di
visible into atoms in constant motion. 14From the earliest times poets have always been preoccupiied with the theme of mutability, but the change
which Fields is describing here is radically different.
In the older way of thinking, in its terminology and
imagery, it is the surface, the external, the palpable,
that suffers change, while an inner core remains constant
and untouched, a notion influenced, of course, by the
Aristotelian and Thomistic definition of change as either
the actualization of potentiality or the development of
form.

In Winters the situation is reversed.

The "inner

core" is in such a state of utter flux that the surface
can appear relatively stable.
bitterly deceptive.

Yet such an appearance is

We see this external appearance of

"feigned rigidity" in "The Vigil,” one of the last of
the experimental poems and one in which time is "speeding"
the poet "to violence and death":
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The floor burns underfoot, atomic
flickering to feigned rigidity: God's
fierce derision.
The outside "rigidity" can only appear so because
the core itself of the thing, according to the vision of
the poet, is being so ceaselessly and constantly under
mined by atomic change.

From the title poem of The

Immobile W i n d :
Blue waves within the stones
Turn like deft wrists interweaving.
And from the last poem of the 1927 Fire Sequence, "The
Deep: A Service For All the Dead," a poem describing a
world in which, as Howard Kaye says, "thought and will
can no longer armor man against the ravages of time, but
the nostalgic longing for such means of transcendence is
as evident as the despair of the conclusion": ^
And in the bent heart of the seething rock
slow crystals shiver, the fine cry of Time.
The most moving poem on the subject is one from the 1930
The Proof, "The Longe Nightes When Every Creature."

The

title as well as the first four lines of the poem come
from Chaucer's "Complaint to his Lady," yet Winters bor
rows for the sake of bitter irony.

His "lady" is a naked

girl and his "complaint" is not concerned with her possib
inconstancy, but about a world that is moment by moment
falling apart.

In the poem he realizes, to his horror,
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the full scope of the confusion and anguish this sub
atomic flux, which modern science was revealing to him,
can cost the human being.

The whole poem follows:

Through the long
winter nights when every
beast turns steaming
in his sleep
I lie alone an eddy
fixed, alive with
change that is not I :
slow torture
this to lie and hold
to mind against the stream
with nought
tc seize on: the bed trembles
to my blood.
I break
the night, I break
the soundless flow, I
cry and turn and the cold
gathers round my hands
and thickened brain:
a girl lay naked
in my bed
with cold small arms
and wept. The humming tongue
burrows the nightwind
of the nightingale
that comes no more.
We have here a reversal of the mystical position
found in such poems as "Alone.”

Instead of fusion, there

is conflict and opposition between the poet and the nightworld surrounding him with its soundless flow of change.
He sees it as a force foreign and hostile to his own
nature, against which he is afforded no protection.

The

traditional symbolism of the nightingale, with its sug
gestion of human suffering transformed into art and song,
16
is inoperative in this world of "terrifying confusion,"
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as Fields characterizes it, and the naked girl in the
poem appears more as a fellow victim than as a consoling
lover.

Even the identity of the poet is threatened,

"insofar as the observer," as Fields notes, "is a par
ticipant in the flux.""^
The conclusion of such a scientific philosophy of
pure process is an irrationalistic monism, as Winters
soon discovered for himself.

It resembles in several

essential points, ironically enough, the solipsistic
mysticism discussed earlier, as well as the aestheticism
of The Testament of a Stone, so that Winters made no
intellectual progress, as it were, when he shifted to
science away from the solipsism and mysticism of his
first phase.

All three, as well as the aestheticism,

are noted for either the negation or the absence of the
intellect.

In the scientific theories change is so

radical that nothing remains constant long enough for
the intellect to know it and define it; the intellect
itself is in such a condition of flux that it cannot know
itself from one second to the next.

No intellectual

continuities can survive in such a world.

As we have

seen, both the solipsistic mysticism and the aestheticism
negate the intellect in favor of the fused image, so
that the distinction between observer and observed object
is deliberately destroyed and a monistic vision consciously
sought after, as far, that is, as this is humanly possible.
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The monism of the scientific theories is equally
apparent.

Robert Jungk in his Brighter Than a Thousand

Suns: the story of the men who made the bomb pinpoints
the dilemma the scientists were creating for themselves,
and one which Winters was grimly duplicating in poetry:
"In the act of observing subatomic processes it was no
longer possible to draw any clear distinction between
the subject (that which observed) and the object (that
18
which was observed)."
Another scientist, one whom
Winters, according to Thomas Parkinson, was reading at
the time, P. W. Bridgman, states the same problem in The
Logic of Modern Physics: "From the operational point of
view it is meaningless to attempt to separate 'nature'
19
from 'knowledge of nature. '"
With this loss of any
valid distinction between subject and object, a loss we
saw occurring in such a poem as "Alone" and in The Testa
ment of a Stone, all other distinctions immediately dis
appear.

The physical world, as a consequence, is plunged

into one undifferentiated state of pure flux.

There is

no other for the intellect to work with.
More was at stake than the physical structure of
the universe; the "new science" destroyed in the minds
of many thinkers any reality moral and intellectual values
might possess.

In this regard, Winters was influenced

by the theories of Jacques Loeb, "a biochemist with a
strict mechanical interpretation of natural phenomena,"
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who was at the Rockefeller Institute in Chicago when
Winters was growing up there.

Loeb was an uncompromising

materialist for whom, in time, the "inner life of man
should be amenable," as he predicted, "to physico-chemical
21
analysis."
The main outline of his theories can be
seen in the following typical passage from The Mechanistic
Conception of Life, first published in 1912:
If our existence is based on the play of blind
forces and only a matter of chance; if we our
selves are only chemical mechanism--how can
there be ethics for us? The answer is, that
our instincts are the root of our ethics and
that the instincts are just as hereditary as
is the form of our body. We eat, drink and
reproduce not because mankind has reached an
agreement that this is desirable, but because,
machine-like we are compelled to do s o . 2 2
If, at one level, Winters was repelled by this sort
of thing, nevertheless he saw it at the time as an ac
curate description of the universe.

The only alternative,

as he saw the situation, was the illusion of religion.
Nearly all the Fire Sequence and a great number of the
experimental poems in The Proof are heavily indebted to
Loeb, in particular to the idea of the crystal as being
23
intermediate between organic and inorganic matter.
Throughout his correspondence with Hart Crane and Allen
Tate in the twenties and early thirties Winters insisted,
at times dogmatically, on the validity of Loeb's theories.
His two friends, though, remained stubbornly skeptical,
Crane calling them "pure hocus-pocus"

and Tate viewing
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them as destructive of any coherent metaphysical, religious
system, the absence of which he saw then and for the rest
of his life as a severe handicap for the modern poet.
Yet Winters slowly became aware of the bleakness of
the alternatives confronting him.

Such an awareness is

implied in a letter Crane wrote Winters in August of 1927:
"I have . . . come to about the same conclusions regarding
the present cul-de-sac of modern science and their drift
25
that you voice in your letter."
By 1929 this objection
had become articulate in a poem first published in his
own magazine, The Gyroscope, in May of that year, first
titled "The Countryless: Refugees of Science," then re
titled "The Invaders" for Collected Poems.

The "invaders,"

as Winters informs us in a footnote to the poem, are the
m o d e m physical scientists:
They have won out at last and laid us bare,
The demons of the meaning of the dead,
Stripped us with wheel and flame. Oh, where they tread,
Dissolves our heritage of earth and air!
Till as a locomotive plunges through
Distance that has no meaning and no bound
Thundering some interminable sound
To inward metal where its motion grew-Grew and contracted down through infinite
And sub-atomic roar of Time on Time
Toward meaning that its changing cannot find;
So stripped of color of an earth, and lit
With motion only of some inner rime,
The naked passion of the human mind.
Yet during all his experimental poetry these demons
possessed Winters.

The cul-de-sac they were leading him
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into, without his knowing the name for it at the time,
was nominalism, the anti-intellectual doctrine which
says all universals, and consequently all knowledge, are
only names with no reference to reality.

We have seen

how no intellectual survivals are possible in a philosophy
or science of pure process.

All ideas, if they are ref

erential, hence true-to-something, presuppose continuities
in the real world.

When these "continuities" are consumed,

as they are in the Heraclitean flux of modern science,
then of necessity ideas collapse back into mere subjective
impressions, or else become, when they are articulated,
the flatus vocis of medieval philosophy.

This is certainly

true of such a poem as "The Longe Nightes When Every
Creature."

There the poet can have no way of understand

ing his dilemma, which necessitates the use of ideas; his
mind has nothing to hold onto, and he can only cry out
ineffectually against the night-world invading and consum
ing him.
Yet only to a certain extent is the designation of
nominalism an accurate one.

This is a world of violence

and extreme deprivation which Winters is describing.

The

"subatomic" change that is undermining it is so total
that the very identity and integrity of the res of nominal
ism are called into question.

In fact, the only "thing"

that seems to be real in such a world is the undifferen
tiated process of change itself, silent, constant, and
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seamless.

By the time he came to write Pr imi tiveness

and Decadence he will call this state, borrowing a term
26
from the criticism of Allen Tate, Pure Quality,
and
will give it, not an exclusively philosophical designa
tion, but a theological one as well, evil.
Behind all of Winters' later objections to roman
ticism lies his belief that its final conclusion is this
Pure Quality.

He thought its cultivation of the emotions

at the expense of the mind, its appeal to the irrational,
its abandonment of the human to the exclusively natural,
were all so many approaches to Pure Quality, which if
carried out and acted upon would result in disintegration.
The suicide of his friend Hart Crane became an emblem
for such a conclusion, and nearly all his latter essays
will be studies of approaches to and realizations of
some form of mental suicide.
kind of intellectual Inferno.

In Defense of Reason is a
One also thinks of the sea

in "The Slow Pacific Swell," "heaving and wrinkled in the
moon, and blind," and the swarming green world of "Sir
Gawain and the Green Knight," which would graft the thick,
rapid growth of laurel in the bone of the knight.

The

value of the classical poet, on the other hand, will con
sist in his possessing enough mind to save himself from
such a condition of blind change that was first revealed
to Winters by the m o d e m scientists.

Consequently, poetry

will be looked upon as a sort of spiritual discipline by
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which one's human identity can be protected and preserved.
Yet during the twenties, while he was writing his experi
mental poetry, Winters did not possess this mind.

His

aesthetic and scientific theories both made it impossible.
Since he was incapable of merely theoretically entertain
ing an idea--inevitably he lived it through--the result
for him was a nightmare that at times brought him close
to actual madness.

3.

Death

The alternative to sub-atomic flux for the early
Winters was the stasis of death, the only absolute he knew
at the time.

Images of fire, bees, and grass, symbolizing

life and change, alternate with those of stone, ice. and
bare hills, representing death.

He was obsessed with one

as with the other; consequently, death assumes almost a
palpable presence in the early poems, and weaves itself
into their very texture.
This obsession was not imaginary or literary.

As I

have already indicated, much of the early poetry was writ
ten under the threat of death from tuberculosis, a disease
that precipitated then the same terror as cancer does today
too frequently it was terminal or totally incapacitating.
His third book, The Bare Hills, comes out of the time he
spent as a schoolteacher, immediately after his release
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from the sanatorium in Santa Fe, in the coal-mining towns
of Madrid and Los Cerrillos, New Mexico, where death, as
we find out, was frequent and commonplace.

"Accidents,

many fatal, were common in the mines," Winters informs us
in the Introduction to the Early Poems; "Drunken violence
was a daily and nightly occurrence; mayhem and murder were
27
discussed with amusement."
This forms the background
for one of his later poems, "The Journey," written after
the experimental phase:
These towns are cold by day, the flesh of vice
Raw and decisive, and the will precise;
At night the turbulence of drink and mud,
Blue glare of gas, the dances dripping blood,
Fists thudding murder in the shadowy air. . . .
Facing the possibility of dying himself and surrounded
by murder and accident in these barely settled towns, of
the Southwest, Winters with reason became acutely sensitive
to death, which he saw as a presence always just beneath
the surface of things, a "brink of darkness," as he calls
it in his short story of that title.

It was an immediate

problem he had to deal with, in isolation, without benefit
of family, friends, religion, or any sort of philosophical
consolation, and it provoked in him some rather complex
emotions that have, I think, important philosophical im
plications.

Consider the following passages taken from

each successive phase of his experimental period:
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Death goes before me on his hands and knees,
And we go down among the bending trees.
Weeping I go and no man gives me ease. . . .
My hands are cold, my lips are thin and dumb.
Stillness is like the beating of a drum,
from "Death Goes Before Me"
My hair is smooth with death
And whirls above my brain.
from Two Dramatic Interludes for Puppets
The steady courage
of the humming oil drives back the
darkness as I drive back sweating death;
from out a body stricken by this thought, I
watch the night grow turgid on the stair-I, crumbling, in the crumbling brain of man.
from "Prayer Beside A Lamp"
Night. Night the terrible. Where niggers die
unseen and sink like stones,
from "The Passing Night"
I came down about seven, passed the coffin in
the first, gray of the dawn, moved through the
motionless cold, which seemed to be gathering
heavier about it and which was somehow identi
fied with the thin sweet odor, perhaps the odor
of death, perhaps of the flowers, of which the
casket itself, with its frosty tent, might have
been the visible core.
At noon I returned. As I opened the door
into the darkened hall, the casket awaited me,
the sweet odor deepening on the still air. I
was a trifle sickened; it affected me like the
smell of ether. I had lunch and returned to
my teaching. The casket awaited me in the
darkness at five o'clock. . . . I went up to
my room and lay down but could not sleep. I
was beginning to shudder a little as I passed
the body. . . . The thought of her inexpressible
solitude filled me with pity.
from "The Brink of Darkness"
The attitude revealed in these passages is a rather
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complicated one.

While recognizing death as natural and

inevitable, the poet opposes it, nevertheless, as some
thing insidiously foreign to the human being.

He sees

it both as a naturalistic phenomenon, the repulsive
details of which he faces and spells out, and a state of
spiritual deprivation.

In fewest words, for Winters it

is an evil, and its presence in the world, as we shall
see later, suggests actual demonic forces operating be
hind, and using, natural processes, an idea he took quite
seriously then as well as after his classical reformation.
At one and the same time death is natural and unnaturally
obscene, and the emotions it inspires in him are pity and
horror.

It is also important to note that this attitude

remains constant throughout all of Winters' career.

The

only thing that changes is the degree of control he has
over it.

In his youth he had no intellectual or stylistic

means of exercising much control; consequently, the at
titude often assumes almost hysterical proportions, such
as we see, I think, in "Prayer Beside A Lamp."
We can see further implications of Winters' response
to death by contrasting it to two philosophical attitudes
which he has been accused by some critics of totally em
bracing to the detriment of his poetry.

I mean specifi

cally the accusation that he is either some cold-blooded
rationalist or an emotionless "pagan" stoic, for whom the
plain style of the early Renaissance masters comprises
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the essentials of all good poetry.

The basic idea is

that of a mind exercising such a tight control that it
kills off all emotion.

Yet whatever he was--his philo

sophical position is at times extremely difficult to
pinpoint precisely--his attitude to death, the terror it
provoked in him, proves he is neither a stoic nor a
rationalist.
The basic tenet of rationalism is not only that the
mind is innately capable of apprehending truth, but that
the universe itself is so rationally arranged that its
essentially mechanical laws readily reveal themselves to
the enquiring mind.

The universe in Winters' early as

well as late poems is at best chaotic; in fact, in some
of the early ones, because of the presence of death, it
is demonic.

As far as the mind's apprehension of truth

is concerned, Winters held no such belief during the
first part of his career; it is true he changed his posi
tion after 1928, but the supposedly absolute claims he
makes for the mind, I think, have been exaggerated.

He

was too much aware of the "hard familiar wrinkles of the
28
earth,"
of the coarse and the intractable in human life,
of the mind's entanglement in such, to make naive pre
tenses for the human intellect.

But more to the subject

at hand, I would maintain it was his recognition of death,
the sense of the tragic it caused, the metaphysical horror
it inspired in him, that prevented him from taking seriously
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the glib ambitions and pretensions of a thorough ration
alist, for whom, after all, death caused no wrinkle on
the smooth surface of his thought.

One thinks of Hume

and the apparent fearlessness with which he anticipated
his own death, a state of mind that so baffled and
fascinated Boswell and so exasperated Johnson, who con
fessed "he never had a moment in which death was not
29
terrible to him."
In this regard, as in many ethers,
Winters is closer to Johnson than to Hume and his kind.
Winters' response to death also disproves the claim
that he is a strict stoic, both emotionless and archaic.
The stoic saw man and nature as bound together and
governed by the same inscrutable law, acquiescence to
which affords man his only happiness.

The essential

spirit of his philosophy is deterministic.

Since death

has been ordained by this law, and, more importantly,
since it liberates man from the impediment of a body, it
should, consequently, be no legitimate source of anguish
for the human mind.

We have already seen how Winters'

position is the opposite of such an attitude.

It is

true that the calmness with which he can write about
death toward the end of his life does resemble in certain
of its aspects the stoic ideal of "apathy," yet we shall
discover that the calmness is deceptive and that under
neath its surface are intense emotions Winters honestly
accepts.

Finally, he was, of course, no determinist.
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Notwithstanding earlier lapses into mysticism and scientism,
he maintained all his mature life an uncompromising di
chotomy between nature and human consciousness, and, fol30
lowing the lead of H. B. Parkes,
who influenced him
considerably during and after his transition from experi
mental to conventional poetry, he saw limited areas in
human consciousness where freedom was possible.
In fact, there is little or nothing of the "classical"
in Winters' attitude toward death, though there is a great
deal of it in other areas of his thought.

E. R. Dodds,

the English historian and classicist, argues in The Greeks
and the Irrational with convincing historical support that
31
the classical notion of death is puritanical.
He locates
the pre-philosophical source of this puritanism in the shamanistic

tradition of northern Greece, which ultimately

he says was Asiatic in origin.

The dissociation of the

soul from the body, which the shaman experiences in his
trance, led men to think of the soul as enjoying a limit
less, superior existence apart from the body, and suffer
ing a sort of shameful confinement when embodied.

Hence,

the "puritanism," since the whole experience presupposes
an opposition between body and soul.

The philosophers

take this notion further; in nearly all of them the soul's
union with the body is viewed as an intellectual and
spiritual disaster from which only death can extricate
man.

Death then is seen as a purgative discipline which
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frees an encumbered soul, and philosophy becomes, espe
cially in Stoicism and neo-Platonism, a preparation for
and a love of death.
Christianity radically reverses this situation.
The idea of a soul entombed in a body, or of a soul using
a body, as a workman his tools, is transformed into the
idea of the "person," created in the image of God and
containing within itself both body and soul so intimately
connected that Aquinas thought the soul separated from
the body suffered a state of deprivation.

The body then

became an essential part of the definition of man, and
its resurrection a matter of dogma.

Death, temporarily

breaking up the body-soul composite, is consequently
seen as evil.

As Martin P. Nilsson, the Swedish historian,

says in Greek Piety, "For the pagan, death was the in
evitable end of human life; for the Christian, it was essentially an evil, the wages of sin."

32

As I hope will be apparent later on, Winters looked
on the body-soul union ("mind" frequently replacing "soul"
in his vocabulary) as a source of potential disorder,
hence of evil.

So often in both his poetry and criticism

the mind is spoken of as attaining its end, not because
of the body, but in spite of it.

He never saw the body

as perfecting the soul, as Aquinas, for instance, does.
In this respect he is following the classical "puritanical"
tradition, but he radically departs from it in viewing
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death, not as a liberation or purgation of the mind,
but as its annihilation.

If, like the classical philoso

pher but unlike the Christian, he sees the entanglement
of the mind in a body as an intellectual liability, on
the other hand, he can only view its disentanglement in
death with the metaphysical horror mentioned above.

It

is a horror because it means the annihilation of the
mind, which for Winters is the single source of all the
gocd man can know or experience.
Winters' attitude to death is essentially Christian
in origin.

It resembles St. Paul more than Plato in the

sense of deprivation, even of violation, which death
suggests in his mind.

An air of evil always surrounds

it, an "unholy quiet," as he calls it in one of his late
33
poems,
which recalls, admittedly at some distance, the
Pauline notion that death results from sin.

And the

compassion it provokes in him, the "inexpressible pity"
of "The Brink of Darkness," is closer in spirit to the
New Testament than to the Phaedo.

This is apparent even

in such a poem as "Tragic Love" from the Fire Sequence,
which has an explicit, even violent, non-Christian context*

1.
The girl went out
and died amid a
cold that clung
like flame.
The God
was gene, but he
came back amid
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great splendor
and great heat
and leaves like shells
broke from the
earth and rang in
the thin air
about her black thighs
where no God had been
peering for this
stiff beauty under
cold invisible and
vis ible— periphery
of air and
globe of winter.

11.
Then between her thighs
the seeded grass
of airy summer-the slow hairlike flame.
The seeded grass of death, with its hairlike flame
working between the girl's thighs and therefore suggesting
sexual violation is the embodiment of evil.

The sense

of outrage and anguish underlying this vision is motivated
on the poet's part by the belief that a God should have
saved her.

But the only God present is the seasonal one

of pantheism whose "advent" only covers a blackened corpse.
The poem reminds one of Baudelaire's "Une Charogne,"
which most likely influenced Winters— he had mastered the
French 19th century by the time he wrote "Tragic Love,”
and Baudelaire dominated his thinking both before and
after the transition of 1928.

In Baudelaire's poem we

have the same exposed corpse, the same idea of death as
cette horrible infection:
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Rappelez-vous l'objet que vous vxmes, mon Ibne,
Ce beau matin d'ete si doux:
Au detour d'un sentier une charogne infame
Sur un lit seme de cailloux,
Les jambes en l'air, comme une femme lubrique,
Brulante et suant les poisons,
Ouvrait d'une faqon nonchalante et cynique
Son ventre plein d'exhalaisons.34
In both poems death is viewed as an obscene and
repulsive nothingness, connected in an intimate way with
evil.

This vision can only be explained by a prior

Christian context, one which Baudelaire accepted but
which Winters, for reasons of his own, rejected.

4.

The Absence of God

The world of The Early Poems we have been describing
is a fortuitous and meaningless one.

In the absence of

God or any kind of informing principle, philosophical or
otherwise, there is nothing to provide it with cause or
purpose.

Whatever "mind" there is in it is found only

in man himself, and he is so totally a participant, and
victim of, constant and violent change that his mind is
incapable of furnishing such a principle.

Besides, since

the early Winters considered intellectual concepts as
destructive of the imagistic stuff poetry is made of, he
would have rejected the principle even if it were available
to him.

Of necessity, then, his world must drift in a

nominalistic disorder, so that all the traditional answers
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and consolations from religion and philosophy become
inoperative in its atheistic purposelessness.

The situa

tion is described most movingly in a poem from The Bare
Hills, "The Moonlight":
I waited on,
In the late autumn moonlight,
A train droning out of thought-The mind on moonlight
And on trains
Blind as a thread of water
Stirring through a cold like dust,
Lonely beyond all silence,
And humming this to children,
The nostalgic listeners in sleep,
Because no guardian
Strides through distance upon distance,
His eyes a web of sleep.
Howard Kaye describes the theme of this poem as that
of "a nostalgic longing for a missing purpose, or God,
in the universe," and goes on to say of it:
The trains are blind because no purpose directs
them; they are pure mechanism. The thread of
water, glistening in the moonlight, evokes a
sense of beauty mingled with regret, because,
inhuman, purely physical, it is "blind." A
cold-like dust suggests a viscous, opaque cold:
intense, resistant, and featureless.35
In other poems dealing with the absence or non
existence of God, nostalgia is replaced by either ironic
contempt or desperate flippancy.

In "The Streets" the

poet first meets Christ, quarrels with Him over some
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trivial matter, then consigns Him "to the flame"; later
he meets God the Father in a streetcar, but both are too
embarrassed to speak, and each turns away from the other.
In "The Vanquished" Christ is discovered drunk in a gully
where, amid deathly white stones, he shudders mindlessly
into sleep.

As a wind-storm rages outside in "Midnight

Wind," the poet finds that the "naked fact" of his room,
with its brute passivity of wood, is more real to him
than God.

And in "To the Crucified" a slowly consuming

fire eats at the crucified God until He becomes one with
the flame, which finally shrinks and then only licks
into the surrounding blackness, the poet all the time
reading his newspaper by its glare; at the end, after
God has been annihilated in the fire, the speaker is left
alone in a "rushing wake of sound."
In fact, the ideas of God and non-existence are so
closely linked in Winters' mind that God often simply
becomes synonymous with death.

This is true of "Hill

Burial," the last poem of The Bare Hills, about which
Kenneth Fields says, "the quiet association, in two lines,
of water, stone, and air, gives a sense of finality to
the last line in which the lowered corpse sinks like a
drowned ma n " :^
Jesus Leal
Who aimed at solitude,
The only mean,
Was borne by men.
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Wet air,
The air of stone.
He sank to God.
The same association appears in "Strength Out of
Sweetness," which in the first edition of The Proof con
tains an inscription identifying the dead woman as
Elizabeth Reid, the one who figures in "The Brink of
37
Darkness" as "Mrs. Stone."
He is describing the ap
pearance of her face as she lies in her coffin, after
having died in an agony no one around her at the time
noticed:
Three nights I sat beside
your bier with two old women,
graying grimaces
now stiffening toward death—
I, cold with grief.
They drew the curtains
back to let me see—
it struck me
dumb that I should know you.
Your two sons
stood there with forearms
great
from tearing at the rooted
hills. They could not see.
But I
had known; had passed
your chair and had not
paused to speak— your face
aflow with agony. Now stopped.
And basic, clear. All
had passed over it. And this
lay bare: rock
rigid unto God.
I stood unseen.
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Thus, from the very beginning God, through His as
sociation with death, becomes linked in Winters' mind
with the Pure Quality to which the flux of the new
science, as we have seen, had reduced the material world.
Since the mystical monism discussed in the first section
similarly destroys distinctions and objectivity, and
makes the same reduction, all three concepts--death,
mysticism, and God— become intimately connected in his
mind.

Though he turned what has been called a "reluctant

theist" sometime after 1928 and viewed God as philosophi
cally dissociated from a merely subjective existence or
the non-existence of death, yet traces of the earlier
linkage persist to the very end of his career.

He had

an instinctive aversion to anything either below or
above the capabilities of the human mind; often identify
ing one with the other, he saw both as threatening
presences against which he felt compelled to protect
himself, even when he was forced philosophically to
recognize God as the guarantee for that mind's reaching
any truth.
To mitigate, as it were, the atheism of The Early
Poems there are incidental allusions here and there in
the book to what some critics have designated as actual
belief in pantheism.

We have already noted the seasonal

god of "Tragic Love" who returns in the heat and grasses
of spring, as well as the sort of "consolation" he offers
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the dead girl.

The same god figures in a beautiful line

in ’’Man Regards Eternity in Aging” :
Now rotting time again leaves bare the god.
He also appears in "The Crystal Sun":
. . . and my God
Lay at my feet
And spoke from out
My shadow, eyed me
From the bees. . . .
Some critics have taken this more seriously than I
think it deserves.

Kaye, for instance, sees "Alone” as

just as concerned with "Whitmanian pantheism as with . . .
38
solipsism."
Yet it seems to me Winters is dealing with
something different from pantheism in the poem.

It is

important to note that in those poems that do contain
explicit references to pantheism the context of each is
more often than not bitterly ironic and remote from actual
belief, even poetic belief, whatever that is finally.

If

this god does exist, Winters seems to be saying in such
a poem as "Tragic Love," he is evil because he resides
in, and causes, a world involving human pain and suffering
his non-existence, therefore, is the more acceptable
alternative.
Yet there are a few poems in the Fire Sequence and
The Proof, such as "Coal: Beginning and End," "0 Sun,"
"Remembered Spring," and "Wild Sunflower," that are almost
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Nietzschean celebrations of the Life Force, a most un
characteristic mode even for the early Winters, and an
argument, based on them, could be made for what I think
would have to be only a vague, metaphoric tendency toward
pantheism.

He does have a great deal of respect for the

apparent pantheism found in the "primitive" religion of
the American Indians.

Writing in a 1928 review of The

Path on the Rainbow and American Love Lyrics and Other
Verse and commenting on the practical nature of Indian
religion, he says of their gods: they "are not spiritual
qualities, but natural forces: they are not in any sense
abstractions, but are things one can lay one's hands on
39
and control."
Yet each of these gods is too limited
and localized to be the comprehensive god of pantheism
in any real sense of the word.

And Winters' respect for

them is an insufficient reason to suppose he thought them
applicable to his own situation.

That situation as he

saw it, at least until sometime after 1928, was atheistic.
Consequently, in the absence of any cause, final or other
wise, and because of the scientific theories already dis
cussed in the second section, the world of the early
poems is bound to be the fortuitous and meaningless one
Winters registered it as being.
He remedied the situation with a substitute religion,
one centered around a different sort of godhead, whose
worship he took seriously indeed.

Everything we know
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about him, judging both from his poetry and criticism,
as well as the few facts we currently possess about his
biography, suggests he had a kind of temperamental af
finity for the absolute.

"His sensibility," Kaye remarks,

"could not rest content in a universe where no final
answers were possible."^

He gives voice to this meta

physical restlessness in "Satyric Compliant," one of his
last free verse poems, marred by melodrama and an almost
hysterical conclusion, yet valuable in that it bluntly
expresses his state of mind prior to the 1928 shift in
thought and technique:
Bom
to die for man.
be believed.

Born to believe, to

Bora as he might have been with a desire for truth
and order, he nevertheless lived in a world which his
science and philosophy had reduced, with the exception
of one important area, to an appalling imprecision and
disorder.

That one area was poetry itself, and it is

around poetry that he constructs a religion of his own,
much in the fashion of so many of the Victorians before
him.

I am using Winters' own terms for the affair.

"The

artist whose deity is art," he writes in the 1924 Testa
ment of a Stone, "has a religion as valid and as capable
of producing great art as any religion of the past.

. . .

As a conscious and intelligent being, no other religion
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will be possible for him, and he cannot, because of his
religion, be called a heretic.
Another observation occurs in The Testament of a
Stone which confirms the religious nature of poetry for
Winters beyond any doubt.

Even allowing for the fervor

and hyperbole to which a twenty-four year old is admittedly
liable, it is, I submit, one of the most curious passages
in all of theoretical criticism.

It goes beyond any of

the most extreme pronouncements made by French artists
in the 19th century, including Flaubert.

Because of its

importance I should like to quote it in full:
A poem is a state of perfection at which a poet
has arrived by whatever means. It is a stasis
in a world of flux and indecision, a permanent
gateway to waking oblivion, which is the only
infinity and the only rest. It has no respon
sibilities except to itself and its own perfec
tion--neither to the man who may come to it
with imperfect understanding nor to the mood
from which it may originally have sprung. It
is not a means to any end, but is in itself an
end, and it, or one of the other embodiments
of beauty, is the only end possible to the men
of intellect.^2
It is almost as if Winters here considers poetry as
uncreated, so totally does he invest it with the aseity
of a godhead.

In fact, the attributes he gives it— per

fection, infinity, undeprived sufficiency in itself and
for those who submit to its study, or worship, as the
case might be--are identical with those found in any stand
ard Medieval discussion of the Christian God.

The only
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one missing is existence itself, a fact which will be
important for my argument later on.

We should also

notice what can only be called the tyranny of this god.
He, or one of his surrogate embodiments of beauty, is
the only end possible for an intelligent man.

All the

other liberal arts and sciences are to be discarded in
favor of this god before whom there are to be no other
gods.

One is reminded of Flaubert's famous statement

in the Letters: "Art, like the God of the Jews, feasts
/ Q

on holocausts."
It might be objected that he is being figurative
and rhetorical in the manner of one arguing intensely
for his point.

If so, it is the first and last time he

was so in a statement of principle such as this passage
is.

Both early and late, Winters is one of the most

precise users of language in our literature.

He knew

exactly what he wanted to say, and he said it with little
or no rhetorical embellishment.

I see no reason to

doubt he said exactly what he meant to say here.
We should take into account, though, the artistic
and intellectual background against which Winters was
working in the twenties when The Testament of a Stone
was written.

Throughout all of the 19th century, and

during the first part of the 20th, there occurred a
veritable profusion of excessive claims made on behalf
of poetry.

One thinks of Flaubert and the Symbolists
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in France, with Rimbaud insisting on the poet's ability,
magical in nature, to achieve supernatural epiphanies
through the derangement of the senses.

In America, there

was the idea of the poet as pantheistic seer, with ex
panded, and still expanding, consciousness, which Emerson
theorized about and Whitman, and later Hart Crane, put
into practice.

The movement was not restricted to avant-

garde poets; it affected the schools and traditions of
all artistic persuasions.

Poetry in the minds of many

of the intellectuals and artists became a sort of sub
stitute religion, and in the process became the "spilt
religion" of T. E. Hulme's famous remark.^

Winters

was bound to be affected by these trends; they were part
of the intellectual air he breathed.

Yet at the same

time he made of them something of his own.
It is true that Winters after 1928 modified this
extreme position, toning down its ardor and qualifying
its claims, but he never abandoned entirely its essential
spirit.

We shall see that when he became a theist, how

ever reluctantly, he defined God, not in terms of existence,
as Thomas does, but in those of thought, in the manner of
Aristotle.

He considered approximations to that divinity

possible on the part of man, notwithstanding the almost
monstrous discipline they would require.

These approxi

mations, he thought, were accomplished, not by means of
grace or of any of the other traditionally religious
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avenues, about which he always maintained a vigorous
suspicion, but by thought itself.

As we learn from his

criticism, the highest form of human thought for Winters
was embodied in poetry, primarily because all aspects of
language were incorporated in its making, the denotative
as well as the connotative, and because all the faculties
of man, the mental and the emotional, were involved in
its study.

It was, for him, the most complete form of

judgement the mind could make and through it man was
enabled in however a limited way to participate in the
only divinity he could know.

Thus, poetry became a

spiritual discipline and some connection between it and
divinity can be found in late Winters as well as early.

5.

Conclusions: A Note on Demonism

Allen Tate has described the main outline of Winters'
poetry in the following metaphoric terms: "the poet
stands perpetually at the edge of an abyss (or at the
'brink of darkness'), which he knows to be an abyss in
spite of the fact that everybody else is eagerly trying
to fall into i t . " ^

Years before Tate's remark, Agnes

Lee Freer used similar language.

In a review of The Bare

Hills, which appeared in Poetry in 1928, she said, "He
is full of the horror of death and the pain of history,
as indeed anyone must be who thinks sincerely."
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went on to speak of the flow of time as being "almost a
A

physical sensation of pain for him."

Winters himself

insisted on such a tragic vision as the proper subject
for the modern poet.

He does so most notably in a passage

in "The Extension and Reintegration of the Human Spirit,"
first published in 1929 and consequently a "bridge" essay
between the early and the mature Winters. He is speaking
in theoretical terms, but the remarks are particularly
applicable to himself:
The facts of life at best are disheartening;
the vision of life which man has little by
little constructed (or perhaps one should say
stripped bare) is all but crushing. To evade
the facts and attempt bluff vigor, as Browning
often seems to do, is not convincing to the
man who has experienced the imaginative facts.
The artist who is actually ignorant of the
metaphysical horror of modern thought or who
cannot feel it imaginatively— and there are
many such--is of only a limited, a more or less
decorative value.47
The "metaphysical horror of modern thought" is in
deed the subject matter of The Early Poems.

Yet one

aspect of that horror eluded his understanding at the
time, notwithstanding his comprehensive grasp of its other
aspects and the acuteness with which he rendered them in
language.

This particular horror consisted of Winters'

illusion that he possessed some degree of control over
his subject; whereas, in reality he was not possessing
anything, but was himself being possessed and, in the
process, spiritually and intellectually destroyed.
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aesthetics, and everything else we have discussed in
this chapter, made no degree of control possible for
him, so that his subject matter, because of its inevi
table tendency to invade and overwhelm, ended up con
trolling him, dictating extreme tension and violence.
The poems after The Bare Hills are especially charac
terized by hysterical fragmentation.

Their actual move

ment, as Fields has noted, had become nervously more
rapid, in contrast to the slower, more measured movement
48
of The Immobile Wind and The Bare Hills.
It is no
exaggeration to say that during the last phase of his
experimental poetry a kind of demon possessed him finally,
with Winters locked into an aesthetics that blinded him
to the possession.

Only gradually, beginning sometime

in 1928, did he become aware of the exact nature of his
situation.
Apart from such possession, there were times, both
early and late, when he considered the possibility that
the ultimate nature of the universe itself was partially
demonic.

It is a fact that the theological definition

of a demon as formulated by Thomas Aquinas became an
important concept in his criticism, particularly in his
understanding of the Romantic genius, such as Rimbaud
and Hart Crane, whom Winters thought of as not existing
more than existing, and only valuable in those restricted
areas where they do indeed exist.

I have heard from
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private sources that he had a demon in mind, such, I
suppose, as is defined by Aquinas, when he wrote the
49
1936 poem "An October Nocturne."
There is also the
rather cryptic note appended to the Swallow Pamphlets
edition of "The Brink of Darkness," written on the
authority of the author by the editor: "Winters says
that this story is a study of the hypothetical possi
bility of a hostile supernatural world and its effect on
the perceptions of a consideration of this possibility."

50

In the story itself, toward the end, there is the follow
ing statement made by the narrator who for all intents
and purposes is Winters himself: "I thought back over
the past months, of the manner in which I had been dis
turbed, uncentered, and finally obsessed as if by an
insidious power.

I remembered that I had read somewhere

of a kind of Eastern demon who gains power over one only
in proportion as one recognizes and fears him."**'*’
Grosvenor Powell takes this passage and in his study
of Winters, Language as Being in the Poetry of Yvor Winters,
qualifies it somewhat, then applies it to the whole of
his intellectual life:
Although Winters believed in a unified universe,
he also held a Manichaean position with the
regard to the influence of the supernatural on
human experience. He felt that we are belea
guered in some undefined way by evil. He could
not determine whether this evil is merely a
product of our minds or whether it is, in some
sense, demonic.52
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The Early Poems themselves furnish further evidence.
So often it is not to particular passages one can refer,
but to the overall tone of a specific poem, to its almost
preternatural vividness and specificity of imagery.

Yet

there are some explicit passages on the subject, all
from The Bare Hills.

In one of them, "Moonrise,M the

object of the demonic invasion is a dog, an animal Winters
was particularly fond of— he kept and trained Airedales
all his life, but literally lived with them during the
53
periods of isolation before his marriage:
Upon the heavy
lip of earth
the dog
at
moments is
possessed and screams:
The rising moon draws
up his blood and hair.
A dog also figures in "The Cold Room,11 but the human
presence of the poet has been added by implication, and
it is he who registers, and is affected by, the halluci
natory "dream" chat dominates the deadly quiet room.
About the poem Powell makes the following observation:
"The poem could hardly be more schematic in its explora
tion of the relationship between being and the invasion
of nonbeing.

The dog is relatively imperious to invasion;

possessing less than human consciousness, it is less
v u l n e r a b l e . T h e implication is, of course, that it
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is the poet's own human consciousness which makes him the
more proper object of the "invasion."

The whole poem

follows:
The dream
stands
in the night
above unpainted
floor and chair.
The dog is
dead asleep
and
will not move
for god or fire.
And from the
ceiling
darkness bends
a heavy flame.
Finally, "The Barnyard," with its background "the
western wasteland and mindlessness," as Powell charac
terizes it,"^ is permeated by the same ^indefinable evil
we saw operating in the preceding poems.

The child's

"short fierce cries" as it staggers into "the clotting
cold" is a terrifying image of non-human possession,
almost animalistic in contrast to the more spiritual
predicament of the old man, "wrinkled in the fear of
hell."

In its intensity it suggests not so much the

demonic as the diabolic, which moves in through ice to
kill the two creatures:
It was the
spring that left
this rubbish
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and these scavengers
for ice to kill—
this old man
wrinkled in
the fear of hell, the
child that staggers
straight into
the clotting cold
with short fierce cries.
His preoccupation with demonism persists just as
strongly in his mature poetry as in his early.

Two of

the most remarkable poems on the subject are ’’The Werwolf"
and "A Petition," which Winters included in Before Dis
aster but excluded from the Collected Poems he himself
edited in 1952, published by Alan Swallow.

(They have

now reappeared in the 1978 Carcanet-Swallow Collected
Poems.)

"The Werwolf" is a savage denunciation of his

mother, whom he calls the "wo If-bitch who suckled me,"
and who is seen as flooding the veins of her son with
the spume of sin, which "no living tears may dissipate."
Her actions, and "the hairy shadow" of her hate, are
only explained by demonic possession, the agent of which
is symbolized in the poem by the moon, a typical symbol
of the irrational for Winters, which "plays acid havoc.”
In "A Petition,” another autobiographical poem, as so
many of Winters' poems, in fact, are, the poet has com
mitted some unspecified act of cruelty against his wife,
for which he now asks her forgiveness. He explains the
cruelty as a result of an inherited evil over which he
has no control, an "unkindness from a past," a "bitterness
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of crime," which arises inexplicably in the night and
which has the power temporarily to possess him.

He can

not even assume moral responsibility for the act:
It was not I that spoke;
The wild fiend moved my tongue.
I shall go into this subject of demonism in more
detail later on, and discuss some of the philosophical
reasons for Winters’ preoccupation with it--it is not
the spiritualistic nonsense some readers might too hastily
judge it as being.

I only bring it up now because it is

one of the more important, though slightly foreign, fac
tors in the "metaphysical horror of modern thought,"
which is the subject matter of The Early Poems, and it
should be dealt with in any adequate discussion of these
experimental poems, even if it introduces a complicating
element of primitiveness into a desperate, peculiarly
m o d e m situation.
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NOTES

^ Yvor Winters, The Uncollected Essays and Reviews,
ed. Francis Murphy (Chicago: The Swallow Press), p. 195.
9
Winters, Uncollected, p. 195.
3

Except where noted, all poems quoted in this
chapter, as well as in all others, may be found in the
Collected Poems of Yvor Winters (Chicago: The Swallow
Press, 1978). As the volume is relatively short, and
has a table of contents, page references have been
omitted. Winters' only short story, "The Brink of Dark
ness," may also be found in this edition.
^Winters, Uncollected, p. 196.
^ Howard Kaye, "The Poetry of Yvor Winters," Diss.
Columbia University 1968, p. 37.
^ Winters, "By Way of Clarification," Twentieth
Century Literature, 10 (1964), 132.
^Winters, "Clarification," 132.
® Kenneth Fields, "The Free Verse of Yvor Winters
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CHAPTER II
TOWARDS A DEFINITION OF GOD

1.

The Abandonment of Free Verse

In a 1929 review of one of Louise Bogan’s books of
poems,

Winters writes, "The poet of the present age,

in

order to free himself from the handicap of the philo
sophical misconceptions of the age, has, I believe, to
turn metaphysician in a profound and serious way if he
is

not to be victimized by false emotions."

He goes on

to

say that once these misconceptions have been elimi

nated and a "more or less classical dignity of attitude
toward human destiny and human experience" has taken
their place, the poet’s task is not yet finished.

Be

cause of pervasive confusion and temptations he continu
ally faces, the poet maintains such an attitude only with
"a good deal of effort, suspicion, and trembling."^
Beginning in 1927, the year he started graduate
studies in English and American literature at Stanford
University, and continuing up to the 1930 publication of
The Proof, with 1928 as the decisive year, Winters him
self began the process of turning metaphysician in a
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serious and profound way.

The effect of the insights

and discoveries he achieved during those years was funda
mental and lasted for the rest of his life.

Further ex

pansions later on and a few modifications here and there
do not alter the basic "classical" pattern that was then
established.

He saw the benefits of such a pattern as

inestimable, even though its cost, as he discovered in
his own way, was indeed "effort, suspicion, and trembling.
The immediate result of these studies was the abandon
ment of free verse.

He came to realize the full extent,

as he saw it, to which free verse had restricted him to
a narrow emotional range, while at the same time that it
had excluded him from any understanding or mastery of
the particular emotions involved.

The concentration upon

specialized areas of human perception, usually those bred
in a kind of hallucinatory isolation, and unsupported by
any rational motivation, had cut him off, he discovered,
from the intellectual complexity he was beginning to ad
mire in such poets as Baudelaire, Valery, Hardy, and
Bridges, all of whom were irreproachably traditional in
their methods and subject matter.

He saw that he never

could write a poem like Valery's "Le Cimetiere Marin"
or Bridges' "Low Barometer" in free verse written accord
ing to the principles of The Testament of a Stone, and,
because he now wanted to attempt such poems, he saw no
way except to renounce his former methods and adopt others
which would make such complexity possible.
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At first he attended to the problem of metrics.
It is important to note the plural of this word, since
Winters considered free verse as having a metrical form
of its own, one which he defined and analyzed in the
concluding chapter of Primitivism and Decadence, and
consequently he never viewed his shift to conventional
2
meter as being one from formlessness to form.
Even
still, the "form" of his free verse presented him with
insurmountable difficulties.

Its basic metrical foot,

such as he saw employed also by poets like William Carlos
Williams, H. D. , Ezra Pound, and Marianne Moore, con
sisted of one primary accent with an indeterminate number
of secondary accents and an equally indeterminate number
of unaccented syllables, the position of which is random
and unfixed.

Since it was difficult, even at times im

possible, to distinguish primary from secondary accents
in such a meter, and since the number of unaccented
syllables could proliferate at will, as it were, no
clearly focused pattern could emerge that would immedi
ately assign some sort of metrical value to even the
least important syllable in a poem, so that all is metri
cally accounted for.

If there is no such pattern, sig

nificant variations become either impossible or else
extremely difficult to achieve.

Poetry then becomes an

inadequate medium for handling subtle distinctions or
achieving any kind of intellectual clarity.

The result
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inevitably, for the reader, is monotony and, for the poet,
a restriction to the initial emotion out of which the
poem "grew," an emotion that in the absence of intellec
tual control is apt to become exclusive and tyrannical.
The possibility for such tyranny is further enhanced
by a typical rhetorical device found in most free verse
poetry, especially in Winters 1. More often than not,
the whole poem will consist of only one sentence that
piles itself up, as it were, until it reaches a kind of
breathless climax.

The poet will attempt, of course, to

slow the movement down by varying his line-length or
breaking the sentence up~ into such units that either sur
prise or give pause, but usually the movement is irre
sistible and will have its own way.

Such a device

encourages neither development nor complexity, but instead
emotional consistency.

There can be no development in

the "space" which only one sentence gives a poet, nor is
there room for complexities.

Consequently, the exclusive

ness of the emotion is confirmed and given free rein.

I

do not mean to imply here that all free verse leads to
this situation, only that the tendency is there and that
Winters fell victim to it time and again.
But more was involved than just meter and rhetorical
devices.

As a graduate student at Stanford, Winters be

gan an intensive, systematic study of English poetry,
beginning with Chaucer and continuing up to the contemporary
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scene of his day.

He had already mastered French litera

ture, especially the 19th century, and he was also familiar
with a good deal of the Spanish and Latin as well.

Under

the guidance of William Dinsmore Briggs, his major profes
sor at Stanford and one of the chief influences on his
thinking at the time,"7 he augmented the poetic studies
with readings in the history of ideas, with special em
phasis on classical and medieval philosophy, which he saw
as still furnishing the background of English poetry up
until the first part of the 18th century.

All in all,

this study revealed to him the full range and power of
traditional poetry, and acquainted him with a body of
poetry written on assumptions radically different from
those operating in his free verse.

He also became aware

for the first time of the moral and philosophical implica
tions of certain poetic problems he had previously thought
were purely technical and aesthetic.

The final effect

was that the deficiencies of free verse became that much
more clearly focused in his mind after he saw its stark
contrast to a poetry that respected and acted on the
powers of the conscious mind, such as he found, for in
stance, in the masters of the plain style in the Renais
sance.

If at first he only instinctively knew something

was wrong in his poetry, now he could state reasons and
start applying remedies.
This study further enabled him to arrive at an
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interpretation of the origin of modern poetry, which
Harold Bloom says is his greatest single contribution to
critical studies.^

The dominant idea during the twenties

and thirties was that modern poets in their extreme tech
nical and stylistic innovations had achieved a radical
breakage with their Romantic predecessors.

If they felt

the need of legitimizing their poetry by connecting it
with a tradition, they usually went to the Metaphysical
School of the 17th century to do so--specifically they
had in mind John Donne with his irregular meter, his
brusque diction, and often violent conceits, all of which
they saw as similar to techniques of their own.'*

Winters

recognized these similarities, but at the same time he
saw radical differences which rendered the similarities
superficial and accidental.

For him the great dividing

line in English poetry occurred sometime toward the middle
of the 18th century, when certain ideas centered on Lockean
psychology finally predominated over the older traditional
conceptions of poetic composition.

Before the 18th century

poets attempted to organize their poems according to
rational principles; the progression from one idea to
another in a poem was logical; and the final cause of
poetry was conceived as being the moral and intellectual
illumination of human experience.
these basic principles changed.

During the 19th century
Then, and afterwards,

poetic organization became irrational, the progression
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from one idea to another being, not logical, but either
associational or imagistic, and the whole aim of poetry
became the self-expression of a poetic personality in
which the imagination, not reason, was considered the
supreme faculty.
Consequently, for Winters the 18th and 19th centu
ries were of the same piece of cloth.

And since he saw

the aims and methods of modern poetry as being in no
basic disagreement with the anti-intellectual tendencies
of the two previous centuries, he judged that poetry to
be essentially romantic in spirit, notwithstanding its
stylistic similarity, here and there, to certain of the
Metaphysical poets.

In other words, for Winters the

history of English and American literature from the Earl
of Shaftsbury to Hart Crane is continuous and unbroken.
He is quite aware that this history is various and com
plicated by extraneous factors that make one period some
what different from another, yet its basic unity is
assured for him by the one idea that remains constant
throughout it, the idea, namely, that reason is inimical
to the essential spirit of poetry.

What replaced reason

varies as the history of the three centuries unfolded
itself.

At first it was merely a distant, theoretical

admiration for the primitive and the uncivilized, but by
Winters' time it had degenerated into a sort of psychic
irrationalism that automatically assumed the superiority
of the unconscious over the conscious mind.
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Since Winters had lived out these ideas in his free
verse and had seen how they had brought him to a state
bordering on actual madness, he reacted violently against
them once he had traced their history and learned the
full extent of their consequences.

It would be no exag

geration to say the final consequence he saw quite simply
as suicide, terrifyingly illustrated for him by his friend
Hart Crane, whose death Winters interpreted as a direct
result of Crane's scorn for the conscious mind and his

6

deliberate cultivation of irrational impulses.

It cannot be doubted that the study of Renaissance
poetry, and its classical and medieval philosophical back
ground, helped him to this insight.

The poetry of Ben

Johnson and Fulke Greville especially should be noted.
But some critics, among them Allen Tate,^ have over
emphasized this debt to the Renaissance masters and have
overlooked who I think is the major influence at this
point in his career.

I am speaking of Charles Baudelaire,

whom Winters considered the first critic of Romanticism.
Baudelaire dominates the opening section of the 1929
essay "The Extension and Reintegration of the Human Spirit,"
Winters' first full critical statement of his reaction
against Romanticism and modernism.

The French poet is

praised as the embodiment of that kind of spiritual con
trol still possible for a poet who finds himself in a
disintegrating time and wishes to save himself from its
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influence.

What especially attracted Winters to Baudelaire

was a poetic history similar to his own.

Baudelaire also

had undergone the immersion in sensation, had experienced
what he felt to be its deprivation and evil, and had suc
cessfully recovered himself from it.

Such a recovery and

reintegration are precisely what Winters himself was at
tempting in the late twenties and early thirties.

Two

other poets should be mentioned in connection with
Baudelaire, T. Sturge Moore and Paul Valdry, both of whom
had made a recovery from a background quite similar to
Baudelaire's and Winters'.

For Moore, the background was

the English Romantics and the French Symbolists; for Valery,
specifically, the purified obscurity of Mallarme, who
had surgically removed all rational meaning from poetry.
These three poets afforded Winters examples of poetic
escape from "the metaphysical horror of modern thought."
They form a complex in his mind with the Renaissance poets
and certain medieval philosophers, especially Thomas Aquinas,
whose pages Winters was beginning to see as packed with the
density of human experience understood and illuminated.
Renaissance poetry, with its moral and intellectual content
and its rational organization of its subject matter, af
forded him a stark contrast by which he saw modern poetry,
that is, his own poetic inheritance, as coming out of,
and continuing, the irrationalism of the Romantic tradi
tion, which for Winters originated in the 18th century
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philosophy of associationalism formulated by John Locke
and popularized by the Earl of Shaftsbury.

Baudelaire,

T. Sturge Moore, and Paul Valery provided him with examples
of how a recovery from such a tradition was possible, but
a recovery, it is extremely important to note, that does
not return simply to the plainness and abstraction of the
older tradition, but one that, still insisting on intel
lectual content in a poem, attempts to retain and incor
porate the imagistic richness of certain Romantic poets,
especially the French.

In other words, Winters' reforma

tion is not as Draconian as some of his critics would
lead one to believe.

He still maintains a concern for

the image, so essential for Romantic and modern poetry,
but instead of cultivating it to the point of inscruta
bility, he attempts to incorporate it in a poetic struc
ture that is rational in its organization and treatment
of subject matter.

The result is not, strictly speaking,

classical poetry, but what Winters will later call in
Forms of Discovery "post-Symbolism."
By and large, what the preceding comes to is a new
awareness on Winters' part of how a poem can be enriched
and made more inclusive by the presence of the intellect.
He had seen how the earlier "fusion" of the poet with
the object, and the consequent obliteration of the two
in the image, had resulted for him in confusion and de
rangement.

With the mind brought into operation, value
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shifted from fusion to detachment and understanding, and
new areas of human experience were opened for him that
hitherto had been sealed off.
mediately follow.

Three consequences im

One we have already dealt with, the

shift from experimental to conventional meter as the
subtler instrument for handling these new areas of ex
perience.

The other two concern diction and what Winters

calls "poetic convention."
His free verse had been built up of perceptions of
sensory experience, the movement from one perception to
another in the poem being non-rational and associational.
Since it aims at an "untranslatable" originality which
mirrors the uniqueness of the particular perception in
volved, the diction of his free verse tends to be startlingly idiomatic, even at times impenetrably obscure.
The reader often has the unmistakable feeling that the
poet is straining after a new language, one peculiar to
himself and his experience, but that he is forced, as it
were, to form that language in the restricting mold of
conventional language.

Above all, abstractions are

avoided as trite substitutes for experience, as inevitably
leading to second-rate commentary and moralizing.

The

only justification for their presence in a poem is a
negative one.

They point out by contrast imagistic vivid

ness , and Winters calls them in The Testament of a Stone
"anti-images," as if their identity consists exclusively
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of what they are opposed to, not what they are in
themselves.
But Winters realized that the intellect cannot per
form any of its operations in those areas of the totally
original.

It will inevitably be aborted there.

By its

very nature it can only achieve its end by the recogni
tion of sameness in apparent diversity, and to do so it
must abstract common properties from discrete particulars.
Its purpose in doing so is not necessarily to devitalize
or denature the particular, as so many of the Romantics
thought and moderns still do, but to further illuminate
it and enrich our understanding of its nature.

As

Etienne Gilson says in The Unity of Philosophical Experi
ence, "To abstract is not primarily to leave something
out, but to take something in, and this is the reason
why abstractions are knowledge.

Before stretching mathe

matical methods to non-quantitative objects, one should
remember that our abstract notions validly apply to what
Q

they keep of reality, not to what they leave out."
To apply this principle to the situation in poetry,
as Winters finally saw it, we may say that the only
justification for abstractions in a poem is the degree
of reality they illuminate; that if one wishes to concern
oneself with reality, and not the stuff of fantasy, and
if one wishes to understand it, one has to use abstrac
tions of some sort; finally, that abstractions, because
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of their "common" nature, will inevitably rule out
"original" diction to the extent that they make poetic
statements accessible to other human beings.
As Winters began to see the validity of these ideas,
the diction of his own poetry began to reflect the
change.

It became less original and more conventional,

less obscure and eccentric, more accessible and abstract.
But in doing so it never abandoned, except in only a few
poems, the imagistic vividness of the earlier free verse
method.
The

Nor was there any necessity for it to do so.

ultimate purpose of abstraction for Winters, as for

Gilson, is the enrichment of our understanding of human
experience, not its cleavage into oppositions and dichoto
mies.

Above all, what he was aiming for was the combina

tion of the intellectual and the emotional, conveyed in
a language which possesses, as he says in his essay on
Edgar Bowers, a "gentle seriousness in the face of an
overpowering perception."

q

This change is best illustrated by comparing two
poems with somewhat similar thematic content, "Satyric
Complaint," written in free verse, and "The Fall of Leaves,
written in conventional meter.

Both poems take seasonal

changes and use them to symbolize interior states of mind,
the changes in both cases denoting loss and deprivation.
The interesting fact is that they were written within a
few years of each other.

From "Satyric Complaint":

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

78

Wood broken by new light. Dogteeth
of dawn. I live and
suffer, twist rootfooted from black
street to street, blurred in the brain.
Blunt boats all night
groan against granite surge.
wind strikes solid on
the flesh the cry starts
from the heels, on concrete,
shatters living bone.

Wet

The complete text of "The Fall of Leaves" follows:
The green has suddenly
Divided to pure flame,
Leaf-tongued from tree to tree.
Yea, where we stood it came.
This change may have no name,
Yet it was like a word
Spoken, and none to blame,
Alive where shadow stirred.
So was the instant blurred.
But as we waited there
The slow cry of a bird
Built up a scheme of air.
The vision of despair
Starts at the moment’s bound,
Seethes from the vibrant air
With slow autumnal sound
Into the burning ground.
The "quiet seriousness" of this last poem, its in
tensity and control, its accessibility and its peculiarly
effective combination of the imagistic and the abstract,
all of which is in contrast to the broken and obscure
diction of "Satyric Complaint," illustrate better than
anything else the exact nature of Winters’ "recovery"
from the free verse movement.
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We have seen earlier how the metrics of free verse
allowed the poet little or no room for significant varia
tion and forced him into maintaining at all cost the
initial emotion out of which the poem began.

The only

modulation available to him was either the diminishment
or the intensification of the emotion.

And in the absence

of any rational justification it was apt to become tyran
nical and assume hysterical proportions, especially in
the later free verse.

The initial emotion, or, as Winters

calls it, "assumption of feeling," whether justified or
not by a reason assigned to it, is what he designates as
"poetic convention."

Some poets become habituated to,

even imprisoned in, particular conventions and can think
of poems in no other terms than those of the convention
they feel committed to maintaining at all cost.

One thinks

of the ecstasy and despair of Hopkins or the visionary
hallucination of Rimbaud.

The emotional range of these

poets, intense as it may be in those particular areas of
human experience they are familiar with, is, nevertheless,
severely limited.

Their intellectual range is even more

limited, since the convention they are bound to rejects
as a poetic impurity any rational understanding of the
emotion involved, an understanding that would necessarily
mitigate it and act as a calming agent in the texture of
the poem.
Winters himself in his early poems was locked into
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such a convention.

One of the effects of his turning

"metaphysician11 in the late twenties was the recognition
on his part of the severe limitations, stylistic and
thematic, which the conventions available in free verse
had imposed on him.

Concomitantly, he realized the

existence of other conventions, ones more flexible and
inclusive of wider ranges of human experience.

Robert

Bridges seems especially important in this connection.
In Primitivism and Decadence Winters discusses Bridges'
"Eros," and notes how the convention Bridges chose allowed
for rational motivation of the particular emotion in
volved, and that the rational element in no way weakens
or destroys the emotion, but instead quietly strengthens
it.

The emotional range is also extended as a result of

such motivation.

One feels somehow that the feeling in

the poem is more "normal," less wilful and eccentric than
that in Rimbaud or Hopkins, that there is more in the
poems to which common readers can respond.
Winters calls this convention "tradition," and in
Primitivism and Decadence he fully defines it:
One may describe traditional poetry positively
by saying that it possesses these closely re
lated qualities: 1.) equivalence of motivation
and feeling; 2.) a form that permits a wide
range of feeling; 3.) a conventional norm of
feeling which makes for a minimum of "strain” ;
4.) a form and a convention which permits the
extraction from every unit of language of its
maximum content, both of connotation and of
denotation; that is, a form and a convention
which are in the highest degree economical, or
efficient.10
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It is this convention which Winters adopts sometime
in the late twenties.

Through it he is enabled to ap

propriate the powers of the conscious mind, and the effect
in his poetry is immediate and obvious.

A calmness and

complexity take the place of violence and hysteria:
Music and strength of art
Beneath long winter rain
Have played the living part,
With the firm mind for gain.
Nor is the mind in vain.

2.

Poetry and Truth

All the changes we have been discussing, the shift
from free verse to traditional meter, the positive use
of abstract language, the adoption of a traditional con
vention, possess in Winters' mind one underlying element,
common and essential to all of them, the idea, namely,
that the feeling in a poem should have a rational motiva
tion.

Without such a motivation, on the one hand, there

is nothing to safeguard the poet from the possibility of
emotional chaos, especially if his subject matter is as
explosive as Winters' was for him--the emotion the poet
arouses will necessarily tend to dominate him and even
tually cause obscurity and meaninglessness.

On the other

hand, in the absence of any serious, intelligible motive,
meter, abstraction, and a classical convention will
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degenerate into nothing more than brittle decorative
shells, devoid of what could properly give them life.
If there is an equivalence between the motive and
the feeling, as Winters began to assert so frequently
in his criticism, and if the poetic language is subtle
and complex enough to express both, then the poem not
only performs its proper task of understanding some aspect
of reality, but it also approaches poetic greatness.

Be

hind this, there is another equivalence, just as important,
though it often is only implicit in the former, an equiva
lence essentially philosophical in nature: before the
motive can adequately explain the feeling of a poem, it
must itself first correspond to some truth located outside
both the poet and his poem in objective reality.

If there

is no such correspondence, the emotion of the poem becomes
self-generated and factitious--it then will lack being and
can be said, in a certain philosophical sense, not to
exist.

But if such a correspondence does exist within

the poem, not only is there a reason for the feeling within
the poem, but some aspect of reality has been illuminated,
just as the poet’s mind itself, in turn, is illuminated
by the same reality.

It is, therefore, this presence of

truth which irradiates the poem's entire structure and
regulates all the various adjustments and equivalences we
have been noting.

Put more simply, the end of the mind,

as Winters saw it, is the apprehension of truth; so the
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greatness of a poem will ultimately depend upon the
quality of mind found within it and the degree of truth
it is able to convey in poetic language, language, that
is, "which permits the extraction from every unit of
language of its maximum content, both of connotation and
of denotation.
Once Winters admitted as essential for poetry the
existence of degrees of truth, even the least, most
limited of degrees, he immediately faced a philosophical
problem: what or who is to account for the validity,
even the bare existence, of that degree of truth?

On

the one hand, if there is truth, it must of necessity be
something other than a mere subjective impression rela
tive to the mind in which the impression occurs, for if
it were only that, there would be no correspondence
between any operation of that mind and anything in reality
outside it, and the mind would then stay locked inside
itself--solipsism and skepticism, the twin enemies of
Winters' thinking, would be the unavoidable conclusion.
On the other hand, if what we are concerned with is de
grees of truth, that is, a series more or less true, we
must get outside that series and arrive at some kind of
absolute standard according to which the more or less
can make even the barest of sense.

As Thomas Aquinas

states the situation, with Winters 1 entire approval, "But
more or less are predicated of different things according
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as they resemble in their different ways something which
12
is the maximum."
And there can be no regress of that
series into infinity, for then we could never arrive at
an absolute, original and self-generated, and there con
sequently would be no existence even of the most limited
truth for the mind to apprehend.

But ordinary experience,

so Winters believed, convinces us there is some degree
of truth--even the extraordinary experience of the "pure"
skeptic proves it, for in the most radical of his doubt
ing he is forced by necessity to admit the truth of the
existence of the mind performing the doubting.

Where

then is this absolute standard to be located?
As much as he might at one time have felt inclined
to do so, Winters knew it could not be located in the
human mind.

There are too many texts in both his poetry

and criticism to prove how limited he thought the mind
was, how slow and painful the process was by which it
achieved any truth, and how precarious and uncertain its
hold on that truth was.
No man can hold existence in the head.
I, too, have known the anguish of the right
Amid this net of mathematic dearth,
And the brain throbbing like a ship at night:
Have faced with old unmitigated dread
The hard familiar wrinkles of the earth,
from "The Moralists"
No matter how one leans
One yet fears not to know.
God knows what all this means!
The mortal mind is slow,
from "A Song in Passing"
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And from the Introduction to his last book of criticism,
Forms of Discovery:
I trust that I have not given the impression
that I believe the occidental mind to be pro
gressing by way of poetry or even by way of
language in general to some kind of universal
perfection. I am pessimistic about the human
race. Few men are born with sufficient in
telligence to profit by more than a small part
of the tradition available to them.^-3
Of all the Christian dogmas, as we have already
seen, the one he could most easily accept was Original
Sin, "a valuable doctrine in itself," as he calls it in
the 1929 manifesto, "Notes on Contemporary Criticism."^
The mind, for Winters, was mortal, contingent, and prone
to tragic error, and could never furnish of itself the
absolute.
The Absolute could only be located in God.

The

argument led Winters to posit a perfect, undeprived,
absolute mind, and then forced him logically to recognize
its existence.

For the more or less true to have any

intelligibility, and our common experience tells us that
it does have such (according to Winters, following Thomas
Aquinas, a belief ultimately derived from sensory experi
ence) , there must be absolute truth.

Perfect mind,

absolute truth are merely other names for God.

Therefore,

to complete the syllogism, God necessarily exists.
So Winters, in order to safeguard the existence of
truth in a poem, in order for his concept of the motive

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

86

and the feeling to have any intelligibility, was led in
evitably to a theistic position.

But he was led most

reluctantly, almost against the grain, and it was not
until the late forties that he admitted it publicly.

Be

fore that time, the argument exists only by implication
in the general critical position he had staked out for
himself.

Writing in the 1947 Introduction to In Defense

of Reason, he makes for the first time an explicit
statement:
. . . I am aware that my absolutism implies a
theistic position, unfortunate as this admis
sion may be. If experience appears to indicate
that absolute truths exist, that we are able
to work toward an approximate apprehension of
them, but that they are antecedent to our ap
prehension and that our apprehension is seldom
and perhaps never perfect, then there is only
one place in which those truths may be located,
and I see no way to escape this conclusion.
Winters nowhere spells out the argument in any
greater detail than he does in this passage.

He was, of

course, exclusively concerned with poetry and the criti
cism of poetry, not with philosophy, much less with
theology.

But he saw that problems raised in poetry and

criticism could only be solved in the extrapoetic field
of metaphysics.

And his desire for certitude in those

disciplines, for a solid basis for the insights possible
in them, is evidenced by his carrying out the argument
to its conclusion in that other field, however reluctant
his humanistic nature caused him to be.

In fact, he is
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admirable in the way he submits to the necessity of the
argument.

As is apparent from the preceding, Thomas

Aquinas is the decisive influence.

The argument of the

quoted passage from In Defense of Reason is almost an
exact duplication of the Thomistic proof of the existence
of God by way of the degrees of perfection.

This can

readily be seen once we cite the Thomistic text:
The fourth way is taken from the gradations to
be found in things. Among beings there are
some more or less good, true, noble, and the
like. But more or less are predicated of dif
ferent things according as they resemble in
their different ways something which is the
maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter ac
cording as it more nearly resembles that which
is hottest; so that there is something which
is truest, something best, something noblest,
and consequently, something which is most being;
for those that are greatest in truth are great
est in being, as it is written in the Metaphysics.
Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of
all in that genus, as fire, which is the maxi
mum of heat, is the cause of all hot things,
as is said in the same book. Therefore, there
must also be something which is to all beings
the cause of their being, goodness, and every
other perfection, and this we call God.f°
But profound differences exist between Winters' posi
tion and Thomas Aquinas'.

As we have already noticed,

Winters was forced, against his will, by the logic of the
argument.

He did not set out to look for God, nor did

he apparently have any desire to find Him.

Unlike most

men, for whom the problem is often a source of anguish,
Winters could have well done without God.

As we shall

soon discover, he had a sort of instinctive distrust,
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even at times actual fear, of the Absolute, especially
if it were defined in theistic, hence supernatural, terms.
He felt, once its existence was admitted, that it would
inevitably invade and overwhelm the human realm, which
he wanted protected at all costs.

Yet he needed God in

order to safeguard the existence of truth without which
that same human realm would be invaded and infected by
enemies far more frightening to Winters than God, namely,
relativism and skepticism.
He is somewhat like Descartes, who, as Pascal said,
only needed God to give the "fillip" to the operations
of his mechanistic universe.

Once God had accomplished

this task, Descartes could then dismiss Him, and, in the
manner of all clear-thinking Frenchmen, go on to the more
important job presented by the physical sciences.

But

Winters discovered he could not so easily dismiss God.
The human stuff poetry is made of is not as "pure" as
that of physics and mathematics.

As we shall see, he

will finally face the problem as honestly and straight
forwardly as he can in later life, sometime in his late
forties, and the idea of God will be seen as something
having both nagged and haunted his consciousness.

This

encounter produces what I think is one of his greatest
poems, "To the Holy Spirit."

The fact remains, though,

that his most urgent concern from the beginning to the
end of his life was the safeguarding of the human realm
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and the kind of truth that man's unaided mind can find
in it.
His arrival at theism was indeed gradual.

The most

explicit statement on the subject, the one quotad above,
he did not make until 1947.

The earliest statements of

philosophical principle after the "conversion," the ones
he makes in his own magazine, The Gyroscope, and in "The
Extension and Reintegration of the Human Spirit," con
tain no mention of it, though the existence of God is
admitted as a possibility in the former and it is implied
in the latter.
consolation— the

But such a possibility affords him no
God could just as likely be for Winters

a deity of evil as He could be the source of moral per
fection itself, as in Christianity, and nowhere does he
mention Him in connection with the philosophical problem
of truth.

Winters’ position in The Gyroscope essays and

in "The Extension and Reintegration of the Human Spirit"
is, on the other hand, defiantly humanistic and stoical,
insisting as he does on the unaided powers of the human
mind, the "effort, suspicion, and trembling" of the
Louise Bogan review, and, finally, unrelenting selfcriticism.

The following passage from "Notes on Contem

porary Criticism," published in The Gyroscope in 1929,
is typically defiant and dogmatic in its assertion that
the human mind can dispense with God and pursue its own
activities in philosophical isolation:
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We have ruled out the possibility of a firm
religious belief, and so are forced to define
the least comforting possibility; namely, that
God, if he exists at all, having no practical
connection with man, ceases to exist for man,
and, so far as actual human experience is con
cerned, the visible universe is the beginning,
middle, and end of human life. Man comes from
the earth and returns to the earth and makes
of the interim what he can, of his own unaided
powers. This does not imply of necessity a
belief in a mechanistic universe nor in any
system of determinism, I, personally, hold no
such beliefs. It is simply a bare statement
of the inescapable necessities, and nothing
more, of belief in existence. Anything beyond
this basis is inferential and subject to revi
sion and hence unsafe as a foundation for a
rule of living . ^
It is interesting to observe that the qualified ag
nosticism of these early statements resulted temporarily
in a relativistic position for Winters, a fact which might
have influenced the explicit statement he makes in In
Defense of Reason.

In the essay I have just quoted from,

he asks himself how he can account for the truth of what
he calls a "violation of equity"; he replies: "By a viola
tion of equity, I mean an act that seems unjust to the
actor after he has put himself as best and as honestly as
18
lie is able in the position of a disinterested observer."
But as disinterested as Winters' observer might possibly
be, if it only seems such, there is no absolute assurance
that it i£ such.

And Winters himself realizes what the

absence of an unmitigated theism is costing him: "This is
a dangerous standard, but it is the only one available
without religion." 19
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Likewise, the three volumes of criticism written
and published in the thirties and forties. Primitivism
and Decadence, Maule's Curse, and Anatomy of Nonsense,
contain no explicit reference to a theistic position,
though the allusions to God found in them have lost the
belligerence and sarcasm of the earlier remarks and have
become calmer and more receptive.

It was not until the

late forties when he came to collect these three volumes
together in the one volume In Defense of Reason and was
able to take an overview,

as it were, of his critical

principles that he realized the logical dependence of
those principles on the existence of God and so made,
however reluctantly, his "confession" of theism.
poetry, as we shall see, is a different matter.

The
There

the poet often "confesses" at levels deeper than planned
intent, fortunate or unfortunate as this might be.
However gradual it was, the theism originated in a
study of poetic styles and in a certain sense it remained
there.

Sometime in the late twenties he became acutely

dissatisfied with the frenzied, ejaculatory style of his
free verse.

He saw this kind of poetry as a severely

limited instrument, which allowed him to make only spe
cialized observations of sensory experiences.

He was

helped to this discovery by an intense, prolonged study
of Baudelaire and Valery, and a few poems by Hardy, Bridges,
and Stevens, supplemented by the extensive graduate studies
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in English and American literature he began at Stanford
in 1927.

What he admired in the poets mentioned was not

their theism— only Baudelaire among them had a consistent,
clearly focused notion of a deity— but certain stylistic
qualities.

The outcome of these studies was his realiza

tion that these qualities were the effects finally of
the presence of the mind in the poem, the judgements and
evaluations of which he had earlier rejected as poetic
impurities.

With the introduction of mind into poetic

theory and practice, the question of truth inevitably
arose, the solution of which was inescapably theistic.
It is probably the only instance in the history of re
corded human thought where a study of style resulted in
a proof for the existence of God.

But this is to take a

somewhat superficial view of the matter.

Style meant a

great deal to Winters. Writing in ’’Statement of Purpose"
in The Gyroscope, he once said, "Stylistic precision is
merely the ultimate manifestation of spiritual preci*'':m
and strength."

3.

20

l;:|"4

The Fear of the Absolute

I should like to return to remarks made in the pre
ceding section about Winters' fear and suspicion of the
Absolute and make further observations on the subject.
My purpose in doing so is to understand more clearly his
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reluctance in coming to a theistic position and his ap
parent embarrassment at stating it publicly.

And by

Absolute I do not mean philosophical or moral certitude,
but rather that Being, necessarily defined in super
natural terms, on whom such certitude depends for its
exis tence.
We should first note the equation existing in
Winters' mind between God and death, which we saw oper
ating in his free verse and which continues in his tradi
tional poetry as well.

As Winters saw it, death and

divinity are alike in that each shares with the other a
simplicity and purity of being, or non-being, which he
saw as actively opposed to the dualism and complexity of
the human composite.

Both are radically foreign elements,

in the presence of which the human being is reduced to
nothingness; they also transcend all known categories,
so that each is unthinkable for the human mind.

"Sonnet,"

one of the transitional poems which appeared in The
Proof, illustrates this equation quite well.

The rele

vant lines follow:
Real, the writhing grain
Means nothing, makes you nothing, and the room
Laid bare is God, the thinning saline Doom,
Intrinsic cringing of the shadowy brain.
*****
0 you were joyous when the doorbell rang
And God's pure presence froze your bony jaws.
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God here is defined in terms of the fatal effect He
has on the human being.

He is the salt of drowning in

the sea; the brain, overshadowed by His presence, cringes
in fear, and any joy it might have felt in anticipating
His approach is destroyed in His actual presence, which
spells out its instant annihilation.

Divine incompre

hensibility is emphasized in other parts of the poem;
God is connected with the meaninglessness and cacophony
of modern jazz, which "sucks" the human mind to "shrieking."
God and death are equally synonymous with each other
in another sonnet, "To Emily Dickinson."

Winters imagi

natively follows Emily Dickinson as she traces her way
to the brink of human comprehension; then he sees language
itself fail as, dying, she crosses that brink in the "hard
argument which led to God."

The "unholy quiet" which

death possesses in "A Fragment," though not exactly equated
with God, is, nevertheless, associated with Him.

The only

"peace" of God possible for man, the epigram says, is
dictated for him in death, and it is inscrutable and de
structive of his human nature.
Such a conception of divinity is related to that of
Pure Quality, which we briefly discussed in the first
chapter.

The term comes from an essay by Allen Tate,

"The Fallacy of Humanism," which he contributed to the
1930 symposium The Critique of Humanism, to which Winters
also contributed what later was revised into the first

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

chapter of Primitivism and Decadence.

It became an ex

tremely important concept for Winters, one he used in
both Primitivism and Decadence and in some of his poems,
especially in "The Grave," one of his most complete
statements on the subject of death.

Tate defines the

term in his essay as follows:
Pure Quality is nature itself because it is
the source of experience. . . . Pure Quality
would be pure evil, and it is only through
the means of our recovery from a lasting im
mersion in it . . . that any man survives the
present hour; Pure Quality is pure disintegration.
And from "The Grave," which appeared a year after
The Critique of Humanism in the 1931 The Journey:
There is no faintest tremor in that urn.
Each flake of ash is sure in its return—
Never to alter, a pure quality,
A shadow cast against eternity.
Tate locates Pure Quality in an undifferentiated
naturalism, and later in his essay contrasts it to the
exclusively quantitative point of view of modern science,
which he sees as its equally destructive opposite.
Winters, on the other hand, locates it in death and con
trasts it to the temporal realm with the "vibrant" light
"running in all ways through quick whisperings"; he sees
between the two realms the "absolute cleavage" he dis
cusses in his essay on Emily Dickinson--any supposed
interpenetration they might share is for him a dangerous
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illusion.

22

Though Tate and Winters use the term in

these different senses, yet both men agree in equating
it with disintegration as far as man is concerned, and
there is in both of them the desire to protect man from
immersion in such inhuman purity.

And if one considers

carefully the attributes Winters gives it--perfection,
eternity, purity of composition, changelessness— one can
immediately see that they are equally applicable in any
definition of God.

As far as the effects of both God

and death on the human world go, Winters insists the two
can be treated as one.

To approach the divine, all of

these poems seem to be saying, is to approach annihilation.
Winters furthermore thought the Absolute, because its
nature is ineffable and transcends all human categories,
becomes a source of intellectual confusion when it is
isolated from "human complications" and viewed as a subject
in and of itself.

Such concentration, Winters felt, would

blur the poet's perception and understanding of human
values, which he believed to be the legitimate subject
matter of poetry.

"In so far as one endeavors," he writes

in "The Morality of Poetry," the first chapter of Primi
tivism and Decadence, "to deal with the Absolute, not as
a means of ordering one's moral perception but as the
subject itself of perception, one will tend to say nothing,
23
despite the multiplication of words."
And in the title
essay of the same volume, in connection with the poetry

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

97

of T. Sturge Moore, he speaks of "the attempt to violate
our relationship with God, or with whatever myth we put
in his place, even with Nothingness . . . which leads
. . . to the minimizing of moral distinctions, that is,

24
of the careful perception of strictly human experience."
To the extent he concentrates on human experience and
the moral values of that experience, the poet is safe.
If he is forced by philosophical necessity to pay atten
tion to the Absolute, he may safely do so only as a means
of "ordering one's moral perception."

Once he pays any

attention to the Absolute as a subject in and of itself,
the poet risks intellectual contamination, and his per
ception of moral values becomes blurred and distorted,
even if that Absolute, we may suppose, is admitted as
the very cause of the existence of those same values.
Not only was this attempt to pursue the Absolute in
isolation a source of confusion, it was also for him
evidence of fraud and deceit, as is apparent in his
criticism of such Christian mystics as Crashaw and such
"secular" ones as Robinson Jeffers and Hart Crane.
Winters thought such poets were attempting to say some
thing about a Being about Whom they insistently maintained
that absolutely nothing could be said.

The attempt neces

sarily involved them in theologically suspect analogies,
usually concerned with human sexuality, that were tinged
for him with deceit and irrationalism.
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"Theseus: A Trilogy" is Winters' most complete poetic
statement on the dangers of man's relationship with the
Absolute.

Grosvenor Powell has written an excellent com

mentary on the poem, in which he classifies its characters
into three categories:
Within the poem, there are three classes of
characters, each class distinguished by its
relationship to the forces of divinity. In
the first class, we find characters such as
Theseus and Minos, mortal, political, and
civilizing.
In the second class appear figures
such as Artemis and Poseidon, divinities and
supra-human forces. In the third class are
characters such as Hippolyta, Ariadne, Pasiphae,
Phaedra, and the Amazons. These are humans
compromised by their dealings with divinity,
humans who in turn compromise the political
man. Significantly, they are all women. The
characters in the first class are tragic figures,
men attempting to master divine forces and to
civilize. The characters in the third class
are the priestesses or worshippers of divinity,
and they are compromised by their intercourse
with the gods„25
The initial error Theseus commits, fatal in its con
sequences, is the sexual union with the Amazon Hippolyta,
whose own humanity has been destroyed by the totality and
purity of her devotation to the goddess Artemis.

Out of

this union comes Hippolytus, the embodiment of the revenge
planned by Artemis and Hippolyta against the "male" intel
ligence of Theseus.

In one part of the poem we find

Hippolyta, pregnant with Hippolytus, brooding on the
"secrets" of her goddess:
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In Attica, the naked land, she strode,
Brooding upon the secrets of the goddess,
Upon the wet bark of the Scythian forest,
The wet turf under bare foot, and the night
Blue with insistence of the staring eye.
The trochees in the second, third, and especially
the last line of this passage, along with its two feminine
endings, work beautifully into the rippled smoothness and
quiet chill of these lines.

In them, we are in a frame

of mind remote from civilisation, dominated by a female
divinity infected with cold hate for the human world.
And it is Theseus' tragedy that he becomes tainted with
the irrationalism of this feminine moon and that he intro
duces it, as it were, into the sunlit world of Attica.
The second part of the poem is concerned with the
events on Crete, the "blood-stained island of the gods,"
representative of the mystical and the purely intuitive,
against which Attica, the intellectual and the rational,
is contrasted in the poem.

There Theseus becomes "com

promised" in the blood of the Minotaur, who is the off
spring of Pasiphae's mystical and sexual union with the
bull from Poseidon.

In killing him Theseus incurs the

pollution that is finally only expiated by the deaths of
Ariadne, Phaedra, Hippolytus, and, at the end, Theseus
himself, who, in the last section, is cast by Lycomedes
into the sea of Poseidon, the other offended deity in
the poem, beside Artemis.
The opposition that runs throughout the entire trilogy
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is that between the divine and the human.

The establish

ment of the realm of humanitas, which is the purpose of
Theseus' life, is at all times threatened by the invasion
and contamination of irrational forces, divine in origin
and mystical in nature, which would destroy intellectual
values and moral distinctions, and reduce the human vision
to a purely subjective, intuitive state of being, symbol
ized in the poem by the "insistence of the staring eye"
of Artemis.

Theseus fails because he is too much entangled

in these forces — "the taint of hell has eaten through my
skin," he says at one point--yet he does acquire in his
old age an understanding of human experience which none
of the other characters do.

Out of the tragedies he suf

fered himself, as well as those he caused in others, he
distils "the honey of calm wisdom," which in essence con
sists of the recognition of the vital distinction between
the divine and the human.

The other characters are only

victims from the beginning to the end.

All in all, the

poem is one of the most powerful meditations in modern
literature on what can be called the divine contamination
of the human sphere.
We are now somewhat in a better position to under
stand the reasons for Winters' attitude toward the Absolute.
It was equated or intimately associated in his mind with
death, and, as far as man is concerned, in its purity and
inscrutability, it was a source of confusion, even of
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contamination, as we have just seen in "Theseus."

With

such views in mind, Winters' attitude toward the Absolute
is necessarily going to be fearful and suspicious.
After this has been granted, it yet remains to ask
whether or not there are irrational elements in Winters'
attitude itself, which apparently he was not aware of.
By asking the question I do not mean to imply the exist
ence of a purely psychological explanation, though I
suspect there is one.

The evidence found in the auto

biographical "The Werwolf," which was briefly discussed
in the first chapter, suggests he must have been influ
enced by his mother in his objections against religion,
and the fear it instilled in him.

Yet we are in obscure

regions indeed when we talk about such matters, and in
doing so we neglect others equally important and more
accessible.

I mean, specifically, the philosophical and

literary, realms where he carried on his public life,
and where he is to be met, if he is to be met at all.
The legitimate side of Winters 1 attitude should
first be noted.

What he is opposing, and rightly so, in

much of his critique of the Absolute is the illegitimate
invasion of necessity into the moral realm.

The con

sequence of such an invasion inevitably is either some
form of determinism or what Etienne Gilson calls "theologism,"

a concept which influenced Winters a great deal.

Winters is above all protecting here Aristotle's sphere
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of the practical intellect, which presides over what
man makes and does of his own free will, and where, conse
quently, things can be other than they are, in Aristotle's
27
memorable phrase.
This sphere of the contingent moral
choice is contrasted to the realm of the theoretical in
tellect, where things can not be other than they are,
the realm of necessity, of those immutable laws such as
Aristotle thought discoverable in physics and natural
theology, over which man has no control.

They are the

Absolutes in every sense of the word, and if their "neces
sity" is allowed to encroach too far into the human world,
man loses freedom of will and becomes completely determined
by inhuman, or supra-human, forces.

He then cannot be

other than he is; he is forced to renounce all responsi
bility for his acts, and any moral judgement made on them
is meaningless.

For Winters the essential human act, the

act, that is, that makes one human, is the perception by
the intellect of moral law and the execution of that law
by the will.

Any system of thought that interfered with

this act, such as he saw in Calvinism, for instance, he
viewed as a violation of the human being, and his opposi
tion to it was uncompromising.
The other consequence which Winters rightly opposed
is "theologism."

Such a term characterizes those who are

animated by what we may call an excessive sense of divine
glory, which they allow in blind zeal to invade and
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dominate all conceivable areas of human and natural life.
Such persons are eager to regard the created world and
everything found in it, especially the mind itself, as
essentially invalid and meaningless in comparison to the
purity and perfection of divinity.

And in order to render

that divinity all glory, they take away any power and
validity the created world might possess, even as a gift
from its Creator, and refer all things to God alone, so
that He can then rule over a desert of unintelligibility.
The results are radical skepticism--what sufficiency can
the mind have when it totally and constantly depends upon
divine illumination for the least of its operations?— and
a denial of the divine power to create anything with an
efficacy of its own.

In "theologism" nature and grace

then are in active and unrelenting opposition to each other,
and the Thomistic understanding of grace as the perfection
of nature is rejected.

Jean-Pierre de Caussade, the French

mystic of the 17th century, states the situation with
brutal simplicity in his Abandonment to Divine Providence:
"When God speaks He uses mysterious words, and they are
a death blow to all that we are as rational human beings,
for all the mysteries of God destroy our physical sense
28
and our intellectuality."
One is tempted to say that
this extreme mysticism also issues into a variant of deter
minism, yet this would be inaccurate, for, after the divine
has done with its destroying, there is nothing left to be
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determined in the void that follows.

There is instead

only the silence, and the isolation, of the godhead.
Winters' criticism of these two dangers involved in
man's relationship with the Absolute is sound and legiti
mate, but there are times when he seems to exceed rational
limits, and his objections then become a sort of stubborn,
automatic reflex.

We begin to feel that he is. determined,

even if he has to proceed against reason itself, to re
gard any contact, even purely intellectual contact, with
God as harmful and irrational.

If this is true, if there

is indeed an irrational element in his attitude toward
the Absolute, then we must ask ourselves exactly what
philosophical error he commits that makes him open to such
a criticism.
We have seen how Winters was driven to admit the
existence of God as the cause of degrees of truth found
in a poem.

They are effects of an absolute cause.

Effects

have to resemble their cause in so far as the cause has
within itself that which actualizes the effect, unless,
that is, one, following Hume, sees the connection between
the two as "occasional" and fortuitous, a position Winters
himself objected to as destructive of reason itself.

A

cause also has either to equal the effect, or transcend
it; otherwise, one has the logical impossibility of a
greater thing coming out of a lesser.

If transcendence

is involved, the transcendence is such that in no way
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does it jeopardize the existence of the effect or anni
hilate the resemblance between it and the effect, because
the specific cause we are concerned with is a perfect one
whose will to create cannot be frustrated, nor can its
power to maintain the existence of the created thing be
questioned.

Besides, the mere fact that Winters can

refer to degrees of truth as existing, almost as if they
are empirical facts, means that the transcendence of their
cause, in and of itself, does not threaten their existence.
Otherwise, they would not be there for him to refer to.
The cause-effect we are dealing with here is God and
truth as apprehended by the mind, truth which for Winters
is most completely realized in poetic structures.

God

then either equals this effect or He transcends it.

Since

He is God, by His very nature, He necessarily transcends
it, but in such a manner that its existence, as we have
just seen, is not threatened.

Otherwise, both truth and

mind, since He is their cause, the very reason of their
existence, would immediately lapse into nothingness.

The

unquestioned fact that we continue to speak of them is
evidence that God, as their absolute first principle,
which Winters is forced by philosophical necessity to ad
mit that He is, continually safeguards their existence.
The error that extreme mystics fall into is assuming
automatically that transcendence of an effect means its
annihilation.

It is the same error that Winters himself
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falls into.

With them it is as if a cause, after having

created an effect, should then wish to turn against it
and destroy it, in the manner of a father against his son
God destroys our intellectuality, Caussade says quite
simply.

Much of Winters 1 critique of the Absolute is

animated by the same belief.

But the crucial fact to

remember is that if indeed transcendence means annihila
tion and God does destroy the human mind, then there
would be no mind to register the fact of destruction.
There would be instead the silence of a non-creative
godhead.
The mind that forgets this fact and sees instead a
destructive dichotomy between God and reason will even
tually view God as beyond intelligibility.

He then be

comes either Plotinus' One-Above-Being or Meister Eckhart'
29
"wilderness of godhead."
Such a God will be sought
by some mystics and embraced in ecstasy, no matter what
entangling contradictions and absurdities they have to
cut themselves free of.

On the other hand, for someone

like Winters--and this fact radically separates him from
the mystics — such a God will be both avoided and opposed
as threatening the existence of the only thing that gives
meaning to his life.
Winters, I think, frequently forgot this fact and
viewed any kind of transcendence as irrational, even the
sort of transcendence we have noted in the cause-effect
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relationship between God and reason.

Contradictorily

enough, he admits God as the cause and guarantee of
reason and then proceeds in other contexts as if God,
by His very nature, were opposed to reason, as if he,
Winters, were forced by a desperate situation to protect
reason from the very divinity that in other places he
says caused it and gave it being.

"The Absolute is in

its nature inscrutable," he says categorically in In
30
Defense of Reason.
But how can this possibly be true
in so far as that Absolute is admitted as the very cause
of reason itself?

4.

The Definition of God

What Winters does in view of the situation outlined
above is to define God in the most philosophically fa
vorable terms at his disposal, which in his case will be
intellectual, not existential.

God then becomes, not

pure existence as in Thomism, but pure intellect as in
Aristotelianism; that is, He is defined as an intellectual
essence in which what He is is given philosophical su
premacy over that He is.

"But thou art mind alone," as

he states it explicitly in "To the Holy Spirit," his
most important poem on the subject of theism.
Two philosophical possibilities are then open to
him that further mitigate the "irrationalism" of a
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theistic position, both of which Winters embraced at one
time or another during his career.

One is to extricate,

as it were, the Divine Essence out of God and set it up
in isolation as Concept, as a kind of theoretical ideal
which man himself might achieve at the cost of almost
inhuman effort and, finally, with the sacrifice of his
own individual existence.

The other is to eliminate

everything from the definition of God but that same in
tellectual essence, including existence itself, which,
as Kant has explained to all subsequent idealists, is
not essential to the definition of a thing.

The former

way is basically Platonic in spirit; the latter, Aristo
telian.

Both depart radically from Thomas Aquinas, who,

according to some critics, is the dominant influence in
this area of Winters' thought.

As Grosvenor Powell inter

prets the situation in Language as Being, "Yvor Winters

1

development as an artist and man can be best understood
as a development from . . . the romantic to the Thomistic.'
But the basic difference, and one so crucially important
that it ramifies through all other things, is that Aquinas
thought of God, not as concept or essence, but as exist
ence itself.

His God is the Ego sum £ui est of Exodus,

not the eternal thought of Aristotle's Unmoved Mover,
which only thinks of itself in an isolation purified of
the accidents of mere existence.
Winters' position, on the other hand, is best
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described as the "essentialist11 approach of classical
Greek thought, which, as Etienne Gilson describes it in
Being and Some Philosophers, is characterized by the
same inclination toward the "intellectualism" we see
operating in Winters.

In an essay on Paul Valery and

Edgar Bowers, Helen Trimpi has provided us with a con
cise definition of such an "essentialist" approach.

As

she admits, her definition is derived from Gilson’s book
mentioned above.
In the course of criticizing the philosophical
position which he calls "essentialism," the
contemporary philosopher and historian of
philosophy Etienne Gilson has described the
variations from Parmenides to Kant of the as
sumption that essence (what being or a being
is) is the first principle of being in reality,
contrasting this assumption with that of exist
ence (that being or a being is) as the first
principle in reality. It is such a philosophi
cal inheritance of essentialism in which some
near primary and essential aspect of being is
distinguished and held to be primary, as it
was developed and transmitted by Neoplatonic
thinkers from Plotinus to his eighteenth-century
translator Thomas Taylor and to the German
Idealists and American Transcendentalists, that
I see as furnishing the intellectual context
of Bowers' poems and as presenting him with
32
some of the problems that his poetry concerns.
For "essentialism," then, primary reality does not reside
in the fact that something is, i.e., the act whereby some
thing exists, but rather in what that something is, i.e.,
its conceptual definition as formulated by the mind, a
definition which, in Aristotle, then becomes the "essence"
of the thing defined.

Helen Trimpi sees this as the
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context of Bowers' poetry; it is also the context for
Winters', although the influence of the German Idealists
and the American Transcendentalists is inoperative in
his own poetry.

As we have seen, Winters' intellectual

discomfort with the idea of

God drove him to define God

as "mind alone," a definition more Aristotelian than it
is anything else.
Such "essentialism” can be approached, as I have
said, from two different, but closely related, points of
view when it comes to the subject of deity.

One is to

take the essence

out of God and view it as concept; the

other is to take

everything out of God but essence. To

illustrate the first of these approaches I should now
like to look at a group of poems in which the isolated
concept is thought of in divine terms.
The most complete statement on the subject is
"Heracles."

The Greek hero is treated in the poem, as

Winters' footnote informs us, "as a Sun-God," and al
legorically as "the artist in hand-to-hand or semiintuitive combat with experience."

The result of his

struggles with "the numbered Beings of the wheeling track"
is his total mastery of human experience, the understand
ing on his part of the Concept governing that experience,
and his subsequent deification in terms of that Concept.
It is important to note that this apotheosis occurs out
side time, in a non-human realm of perfect silence, and
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at the sacrifice of his own individual existence:
This stayed me, too: my life was not my own,
But I my life's; a god I was, not man.
Grown Absolute, I slew my flesh and bone;
Timeless, I knew the Zodiac my span.
This was my grief, that out of grief I grew—
Translated as I was from earth at last,
From the sad pain that Deianira knew.
Translated slowly in a fiery blast,
Perfect, and moving perfectly, I raid
Eternal silence to eternal ends:
And Deianira, an imperfect shade,
Retreats in silence as my arc descends.
The "god" mentioned in these lines is not the God
that appears, for instance, in "To the Holy Spirit"; he
is, on the other hand, the absolute concept we have just
outlined.

All the accidents of human existence and in

dividuality, symbolized in the poem, not only by the "sad
pain of Deianira," but also by the tragic entanglements
of Heracles himself, are "unreal" dregs in comparison to
this timeless concept, divine in its nature, which
Heracles realizes in the "fiery blast" of his apotheosis.
Its absoluteness is in tragic conflict with human exist
ence; in fact, man has to slay himself in order to become
the only thing "real" in such a universe, the form, the
concept, the absolute mind.

The same oppositions and

dichotomies we saw operating in Winters' criticism of
mysticism are operating also in this poem, but Winters
now sees them as necessary to, and productive of, an
intellectual good, even though the cost is still unthinkably
inhuman:
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Grown Absolute, I slew my flesh and bone.
All in all, the poem realizes the full consequences
of Valery’s gnomic and terrifying remark in Monsieur
Teste: "The essential is against life."

33

In few other

poems Winters wrote did he so starkly and unrelentingly
draw out, as here, the full implications of the conflict
he saw as inevitable between ordinary humanity and the
isolate concept presented as divinity.
The "crime" in "Socrates," another related poem, is
the philosopher's having raised up against the times a
"Timeless Form," against which the ignorant and the nonphilosophical react violently and senselessly.

In the

sacrifice of his own life, which is offered in atonement
for man's general stupidity, Socrates undergoes the same
intellectual apotheosis as Heracles and likewise becomes
himself the timeless concept:
Thus are the times transmuted: understood,
A Timeless Form, comprising my estate.
No such apotheosis occurs in "To Edwin V. McKenzie,"
a poem addressed to the trial lawyer who defended David
Lamson, a friend and neighbor of Winters, who had been
Q /

accused of murdering his own wife;

neither is there in

it the tragic conflict we have been noting in the other
poems.

But the essential situation still obtains: the

Intellect viewed as divine concept separate from man,
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but one which man can realize in his own way, though
still with considerable difficulty:
The concept lives, but few men fill the frame.

You filled the courtroom with historic power;
Yourself the concept in the final hour.
Immortal mind and the individual man, again, are
separate from each other in "Time and the Garden," just
as the Form is from the particular in the Platonic sys
tem.

As in the preceding poems, man has the opportunity

to reembody the Intellect, though the cost of this "un
broken wisdom" is his own life, and it is never achieved
in an existential context.
eternal.

The Intellect is divine and

The temporal realm is relegated to a philosophi

cally inferior position in the order of things; wisdom
occurs elsewhere, in death and eternity:
Though we know well that when this fix the head
The mind's immortal, but the man is dead.
The

same sacrifice is the subject of "To a Portrait

of Melville in My Library," in connection with which
Kenneth Fields in his unpublished dissertation reminds
us that "one should remember that the poem addresses a
portrait and that Melville himself is dead.
was buried, ere you (sic) rose
birth of

'What life

reborn', refers to the re

Melville's reputation long after his death and
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after years of obscurity. The balance is near perfection
35
only in art.”
The apotheosis here then is artistic;
the individual artist dies in the acquisition of Socratic
wisdom and becomes immortal only in art, from which the
idea of divinity is not absent.

And when the speaker

of "To a Portrait" meets, not so much the face of the
individual man, but the outline of the concept which that
man realized in death, and which is now "framed" in art,
times becomes inoperative for him, noon is immobile:
0 face reserved, unmoved by praise or scorn!
0 dreadful heart that won Socratic peace!
What was the purchase-price of thy release?
What life was buried, ere thou rose reborn?

*****
The lids droop coldly, and the face is still:
Wisdom and wilderness are here at poise,
Ocean and forest are the mind's device,
But still I feel the presence of thy will:
The midnight trembles when I hear thy voice,
The noon's immobile when I meet thine eyes.
The identical relationship between the concept and
the individual exists in a poem similar to the one on
Melville, "On the Portrait of a Scholar of the Italian
Renaissance."

In it existential life must also be de

stroyed and buried before the Form can be realized, and
the Form is, again, conceived of as philosophically
superior to the accidents and peculiarities of the human
personality, which are but "lees/Residual from this
clear intent" of the Form.

The important thing is the

"vision in a frame":
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The face is noble; but the name
Is one that we shall scarcely hold.
This is a vision in a frame,
Defined and matted down with gold.
Our names, with his, are but the lees
Residual from this clear intent;
Our finely grained identities
Are but this golden sediment.
Finally, the two minor academic poems, "For the
Opening of the William Dinsmore Briggs Room" and "An Ode
on the Despoilers of Learning in an American University,"
justify the existence of the university on the ground
that it can provide the framework for successive re
embodiments of Intellect, since, as "For the Opening"
states, "Our Being grows in Mind."

The struggle and

isolation involved in such an under taking, again, are
emphasized, and its religious overtones are pointed out,
especially in "An Ode on the Despoilers of Learning,"
in which the embodiment of mind is recommended as an
appropriate act of atonement for the stupidity and evil
of the majority of men.
We are now in a position to summarize. The essen
tial spirit of the passages quoted, as well as the poems
from which they are taken, is Platonic.

The relationship

that obtains between the concept and the individual at
tempting to realize it is the same one obtaining between
the Form and the particular in the Platonic system.

The

concept is the paradigm of Perfect mind, and is considered
as isolated from any phenomonological or existential
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context, which is the realm of "becoming," hence the
realm of error, ignorance, and evil.

The concept, on

the other hand, is located in Being, and, consequently,
it has philosophical supremacy over the individual man
who is in time and is "tangled with earth," to quote from
36
a poem by Janet Lewis.
The individual achieves reality,
in a philosophical sense, only in so far as he partici
pates and grows in Mind, which in Winters 1 thought is
deified, formed as it is by what he extricates from the
idea of God and sets up as a separate divine concept.
Such participation on the part of the individual rarely
results in his own deification, though this is possible
in the case of some men who possess tremendous powers of
will and intellect.

But when such men do eventually ac

complish such perfect realizations of concept, they then
cannot possess them, for the very perfection of the pro
cess finally necessitates the sacrifice of their own
individual lives.

Mind, or rather God-as-Concept, re

sides in a timeless realm, usually thought of in artistic
terms, purified of the "existentialism" of life as we
know it now; man is inextricably bound up in time, from
which there is for him no escape, though he is possessed
of the desire for transcedent perfection.
therefore, is ultimately tragic.

Human life,

Man "is so created,"

Winters writes in his discussion of Valery's Ebauche d'un
serpent in The Function of Criticism, "that he desires
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infinite knowledge, and he is so created that he cannot
have it.

The desire is his nature, his greatness, his
37
sin, and his torture, and it is inescapable."
Some further observations are in order.

As I have

said, Winters embraced the alternative of "conceptualism,"
or "essentialism," as Gilson would have it, in order to
mitigate the "irrationalism" of a theistic position he
was forced into by logical necessity.

Part of the

"rationalism" of this approach, apart from its exclusively
intellectual nature, is that it opens up the area of the
divine to human participation.

In fact, nearly all of

the poems we have just been considering are more concerned
with the human attempt at the realization of the concept
of perfect mind, than with the religious nature of that
concept in and of itself.

What Winters was in essence

searching for was a kind of rationalistic variant of the
Christian Dogma of the Incarnation.

He was, of course,

not Christian, and he rejected the belief that God became
man and so bridged the gulf that separates the divine
from the human.

Instead, he habitually thought of an

"absolute cleavage" as existing between the two realms.
Yet when the argument about degrees of truth led him to
theism and he was forced to deal with God, his intellectualism inclined him to define things in such a manner
that at least he would not have to deal with the "foreign
god" of undiluted mysticism.

Hence, the isolation of
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the divine essence as Perfect Mind, and the setting up
of that concept as a paradigm and model for human partici
pation.

His whole purpose in doing so, though, was not

so much to deify man as it was to rationalize and humanize
God.

He wanted to bridge rationalistically the gulf that

in Christianity is bridged dogmatically.
Yet the drift of these passages would suggest that
he failed in this attempt.

If we go back to the quote

from Caussade and compare it with Winters' position as
illustrated above, we can discover, I think, at least one
similarity between the two, though, otherwise, they are
quite different indeed.

Both the God of mysticism and

the conceptual God of Pure Mind, by their very natures,
are in active opposition against existential humanity and
the ordinary experience that humanity undergoes in time.
Each insists on an either-or situation that is nothing
short of tragic: either the perfection of themselves out
side time or a meaningless individuality in time that
only knows its own death.

If it would be too much to

say that they are both hostile to what we have called
existential humanity, at least it would be safe to say
that humanity itself is destroyed as it approaches or
approximates, in any really significant degree, the purity
of these models.

The starkly great line from "Heracles,"

"Grown Absolute, I slew my flesh and bone," states the
theme unambiguously and straightforwardly.

To approach
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this God is indeed to approach annihilation as far as
individual human life is concerned.
I do not want at all to give the impression that
Winters was happy at the prospect of humanity destroying
itself in the process of achieving intellectual perfec
tion.

His vision is tragic, as tragic as anything one

will find in the Greeks.

He saw no way out of this

dilemma; for him, it was built into the nature of things
To pretend that it was otherwise, he would say, would be
merely exchanging the bleak truth for guile and illusion
I have said that the spirit of this position is
Platonic, yet another philosophy seems hinted at in the
conclusion of "Time and the Garden."

The last line of

this poem, "The mind's immortal, but the man is dead,"
might strike the unwary at first as intimating a belief
in some form of personal immortality, if not that of the
individual soul, then that of the individual mind.

But

Winters never at any time entertained such a belief, and
he is quite clear on the subject.

Some might say that

the immortal mind in question is the figurative, collec
tive mind of the race. Yet the subj ect of the poem is
the individual acquisition of wisdom, and, besides,
Winters' opinion of the intellectual capabilities of
the human race as a whole would, I think, make such an
interpretation seem naive.

"Life is painful,” he writes

in In Defense of Reason, "if one expects more than two
or three men in a century to behave as rational animals . 1
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The mind involved has to be the conceptual deity
discussed above.

It is also almost identical to Averroes’

notion of a Separate Intelligence in which man thinks,
or, more accurately, which thinks for man.

Such an Intel

ligence is immortal, divine, and perfectly self-sufficient;
it is also totally and radically distinct from the indi
vidual human soul, which for both Averroes and Winters is
deprived and mortal.

Gilson has given us a summary of

Averroes* position on the matter; his account reads,
strangely enough, as if it were an explication of the
last line of ’'Time and the Garden":
. . . the intellectual operations observable in
man are caused in him by a separate intellectual
substance that is present in him only by its
operations. As separate, this intellectual sub
stance is, by the same token, incorruptible and
immortal; but its own immortality does not en
tail our personal immortality. We ourselves
have a soul, which is personal to each of us
and is the form of our body; but for this very
reason it perishes along with the body. To sum
up, that which causes intellectual knowledge in
us is separate and immortal, but it is separate
and immortal for the very reason that it is not
the form of our body; it is not our soul.39
The other alternative mentioned at the first of this
section remains to be discussed, though I shall only deal
with it briefly here, since I plan to discuss it more fully
in the fourth chapter in connection with "To the Holy
Spirit."

As I have said, if one is intellectually ill at

ease with theism, but is forced by the logic of one’s
argument to entertain it, one will tend to refashion it
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in the most intellectually respectable terms at one's
disposal.

The one alternative which extracts the divine

essence out of God and views it as separate concept we
have just dealt with and illustrated.

The other, which

Winters also embraced, leaves that divine essence within
God but eliminates everything else from Him, so that He
becomes exclusively whatever that essence is defined as
being, which, in Winters' case, is "pure mind."

Philo

sophically the most important of these eliminations is
"existence."

Like the concept of mind, which "exists"

more as a theoretical possibility than an actual existant,
the God of Pure Mind is existentially neutral, so much
so that the two really can be dealt with as if they are
one.

To view God as Concept or Concept as God is after

all much the same thing.
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CHAPTER III
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THEISM

1.

The Nature of Evil

Yvor Winters

1

recognition and treatment of the

problem of evil sharply separates him from the majority
of his contemporaries, along with their Romantic prede
cessors.

That he faced this problem and seriously dealt

with it in both his poetry and criticism is, by itself,
the most telling piece of evidence for his claim to
classical reaction against what he considered as the
persisting influence of Romanticism in modern poetry.
Paraphrasing Pascal, Allen Tate once noted that Winters
knew "the abyss" in spite of the fact that everyone else
"is eagerly trying to fall into it."'*' Winters himself
saw the problem as central in his poetry.

In the 1934

Foreword to Before Disaster, he writes with almost theo
logical rigor, "The matter of the following verses is
in the main the stress to which the permanent, or ideal,
elements of the human character are subjected by the
powers of disintegration, by the temptations of Hell,
which, though permanent in their general nature, usually
take particular forms from the age."

125
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As Winters saw the situation, the "general nature"
of Romanticism locates evil in the rational mind and in
those disciplines and institutions which are products of
that mind.

It views the problem of evil as remedial.

According to the Romantic myth, man in his primitive,
pre-civilized state enjoyed a monistic existence in which
"he identified God with the universe" and found his salva
tion in a surrender to impulse, which he interpreted as
the voice of God.

3

This state was disrupted by the

"satanic" introduction of reason, which broke man's unity
into duality and spawned those disciplines and institu
tions that stifle man and inhibit the free play of his
instinctual existence.

Yet the situation can be corrected.

Once reason is negated, and its products either purified
or destroyed, man will automatically revert to his origi
nal innate goodness.

Evil is finally an illusion, a

medieval encrustation that can be washed away in the
blood of revolution.
Winters opposed this view with intensity.

For him,

the identification of God with the universe and the sub
sequent surrender on the part of man to impulse can only
result in moral suicide and the destruction of human
values.

Far from locating evil in the rational mind, he

saw the proper use of that mind as the means by which
man can protect himself from evil and save himself from
disintegration.

He viewed rationally motivated disciplines
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and institutions, not as inhibiting the development of
man's nature, but as fostering it.

By introducing man

to the "collective wisdom of the race," which contains
the "norm of what humanity ought to be," as he calls it
in his essay on Robert Frost, these traditions make
human growth possible: "The poet is valuable, therefore,
in proportion to his ability to apprehend certain kinds
of objective truth; in proportion as he is great, he
will not resemble ourselves but will resemble what we
ought to be.

It becomes our business, then, to resemble

him, and this endeavor is not easy and for this reason
few persons make it."^
The reason for the difficulty of this endeavor lies
precisely in the presence of evil in man's nature.

The

extent to which Winters considered evil a part of the
very texture of that nature is best indicated by his pub
lic commitment to the Christian dogma of Original Sin,
a doctrine which Romantics view with particular abhorrence.
In his discussion of Robert Bridges' "Low Barometer," a
poem which had a great influence on Winters' view of
evil, he speaks of the various names given the "tenants
unknown," which in the poem symbolize evil: the "lower
nature" of St. Paul, the "unconscious mind" of modern
psychology, the "pre-human memory" of modern anthropology.
In his own poem "Heracles" he says, "Older than man, evil
with age, is life."

As Winters saw the situation, it is
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man's fate to be involved, and to an alarming degree,
in this ancient life, which is contaminated at its core
with evil.

It is this view which prompted Grosvenor

Powell to designate Winters' metaphysics as Manichaean.^
We may go further and ask ourselves where he specifi
cally locates the source of evil.

In answering the ques

tion, we shall discover an intimate relationship existing
between his theism and his view of evil.
As we have already seen in our discussion of the
early poems, Winters at one time located evil in a demonic
possession of the physical universe by an actual malignant
spirit.

In certain contexts he speaks of this spirit as

manipulating matter from the outside, as it were; in
others, as residing in matter itself as one of its con
stituent principles.

In either case evil and matter share

an intimate relationship in Winters' mind.

From the begin

ning to the end of his career, the vision of the universe
under its aspect of pure materiality inspired in him a
sort of fascinated terror.

Certain of the poems in The

Bare Hills, which we have cited, as well as descriptive
passages in "The Brink of Darkness," possess an hallucina
tory intensity barely controlled by the medium of language.
In his essay on Herman Melville in In Defense of Reason
he signals out the chapter in Moby Dick on the whiteness
of the whale for special attention, calling it "the most
extensive elucidation and defense of the notion of the
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demonism of Moby Dick, as well as of 'the demonism of
the world , " 1 and "equally one of the most astonishing
pieces of rhetoric and one of the most appalling speciQ
mens of metaphysical argument in all literature."
In
the third stanza of "At the San Francisco Airport," one
of the very last poems he wrote and one that summarizes
his entire life, he reverts explicitly to this earlier
view of evil as matter in that it causes the destruction
of his being:
The rain of matter upon sense
Destroys me momently. The score:
There comes what will come. The expense
Is what one thought, and something more-One's being and intelligence.
The demonism of The Bare Hills and "The Brink of Darkness"
has here undergone considerable modification.

It is ex

pressed in terms more abstract and philosophical, not in
the admittedly melodramatic ones of the earlier works.
Yet "At the San Francisco Airport" proves that vestiges
of "demonism," even if discarded at other points in his
career in favor of a more sophisticated philosophical
solution, persist even into Winters' late poetry.

Through

out all his life he thought of evil as some external
force to which man exposed himself by submitting to its
possessiveness to the end that

we become possessed by

an evil power which is great enough to control us and
diminish our own being.

Evil also was closely related
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to, even at times actually identified with, matter, so
that the redemptive activity of the human mind was seen
as the "pull against gravity, against earth and those
determined by it.""^

Finally, he always viewed the mind

as being actively opposed by inimical foreign influences,
and human life as essentially tragic in that "the rain
of matter" eventually destroys man’s being and his in
tellect.

All three of these attitudes, which we find in

both early and late Winters, point to the persisting in
fluence of "demonism" on his thought.
During the transitional period in the late twenties
and early thirties Winters shifted ground and located
the source of evil in man's emotional life.

In "Notes

on Contemporary Criticism," an essay first published in
The Gyroscope in 1929, he states categorically, "The
basis of Evil is in e m o t i o n . T h e good, on the other
hand, resides in the rational mind's tight control over
the emotions, even in the attempt of eliminating them
altogether, that is, as far as this is possible.

At

first this might appear as unmitigated stoicism.

Yet

Winters recognized, then and later, an element of what
he calls "irreducible emotion" in human nature, which
must be accepted, understood, and properly evaluated.

12

Such Stoics as Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus, Winters
says, failed in this endeavor.

"Because the Stoics de

nied the emotions completely, in favor of the intellect,
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they failed to make any provision for them and so became
13
easily their victims, as of an insidious consumption."
Besides, Winters at all times recognized the limits of
the mind.

There are areas in man's own life, especially

his emotional life, that are forever closed to the mind's
apprehensive abilities.

As Winters states concisely and

simply in "The Moralists," a poem written roughly during
the same time as "Notes on Contemporary Criticism": "No
man can hold existence in the head.”
Qualified as this might well be, such an explanation
of evil must soon have struck Winters as philosophically
inadequate to account for certain complexities he wanted
to express in poetry.

The central drive of his mind was

toward a synthesis of concept and image, thought and
emotion, as is apparent in his critical principle of mo
tive and feeling and in his formulation of post-Symbolist
imagery in which one finds a fusion of the abstract and
the sensory, a fusion that unavoidably calls for emotional
engagement on the part of the poet.

Furthermore, since

emotions are quasi-physiological reactions to external
stimuli, they lack by their very definition the independent
subsistence necessary for such attribution.

As Winters

makes abundantly clear in his criticism of T. S. Eliot's
objective correlative, to engage in such talk is to pre
suppose, for the moment, that emotions have no causes.
The moral issue lies precisely in the cause of the emotions,
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which in and of themselves are morally indifferent.

Con

sequently, the simplistic formula of "Notes on Contemporary
Criticism" was discarded in favor of one more philosophi
cally adequate to his own poetic purposes.

Henceforth,

the poet attempts not to eliminate the emotions altogether,
but to discipline, even to enrich, them.

And poetry is

valued and set apart from philosophical discourse pre
cisely because it provides an emotional equivalent for
thought.
It was Winters' philosophical theism which provided
him with the exact formula for the source of evil.

As we

have seen earlier, the mind's ability to apprehend certain
objective truths and then to live according to those truths
is man's proper good.

In order for such "good" thought

to exist and possess reality, there must exist by philo
sophical necessity, as Winters saw it, perfect thought,
which is another name for God.

Consequently, evil, will

be seen as a deviation from such a perfect standard and
will be located in the absence or imperfection of thought.
The formula occurs in a 1942 poem written in commemora
tion of William Dinsmore Briggs:
Because our Being grows in mind,
And evil in imperfect thought . . . .
Evil then essentially is deprivation, not of "exist
ence," in the Thomistic sense, but of "thought," in the
more classical sense.

We find a world of false fire and
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"thoughtless bodies" in "Sonnet to the Moon" suffering
from such a deprivation.

The whole poem, as Winters

himself notes, deals with "the de-intellectualized sensi
bility" specializing in "verbal hallucination.

In

other poems the vision becomes not hallucination but a
nightmare, as the mind encounters that which has no mean
ing and is consequently inexpressible in "name" or "word .1
This vision is most acutely rendered in two poems that
have the Second World War as their background; the poet's
private vision is duplicated on a worldwide scale involv
ing massive destruction, and so achieves greater density
and power.

From "Summer Noon: 1941":
With visionary care
The mind imagines Hell,
Draws fine the sound of flame
Till one can scarcely tell
The nature, or the name,
Or what the thing is for.

And from "Moonlight Alert: Los Altos, California, 1943,"
a poem much more successful in its imagistic intensity
than the preceding one:
The sirens, rising, woke me; and the night
Lay cold and windless; and the moon was bright,
Moonlight from sky to earth, untaught, unclaimed
An icy nightmare of the brute unnamed.
Moonlight, so described, is an appropriate image for
Winters' notion of evil as "thoughtlessness."

In its

brutality and intellectual deprivation, it indifferently
presides over a world of suffering and pain:
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In the dread sweetness I could see the fall,
Like petals sifting from a quiet wall,
Of yellow soldiers through indifferent air,
Falling to die in solitude.
It is apparent from Winters 1 designation of the
moonlight as "an icy nightmare of the brute unnamed" that
language plays a crucially important role for him in the
problem of evil.

In fact, Winters adheres to what we

might call a doctrine of the Word, which is comparable
to the theological doctrine of the Logos: the Word, in
dicating as it does meaning and definition, embodies
order and intellectual perception; whatever is beyond it,
or below it, is meaningless and consequently, for him,
evil.

The poem that best illustrates this is "A Spring

Serpent."

It is less dramatic than "Moonlight Alert,"

but in its calm definiteness it is, I think, artistically
more successful.

The poem is an indirect, even oblique,

criticism of Symbolist poetry and its pursuit of an in
human purity.

The poet Winters specifically had in mind

when he wrote it was Mallarme, who deliberately attempted
to rid poetic language of rational meaning and to achieve
in the process a de-intellectualized, purely connotative
state, which Winters saw as almost the essence of evil,
even though he was strongly attracted to it.

The entire

poem follows:
The little snake now grieves
With whispering pause, and slow,
Uncertain where to go
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Among the glassy leaves,
Pale angel that deceives.
With tongue too finely drawn,
Too pure, too tentative,
He needs but move to live,
Yet where he was is gone;
He loves the quiet lawn.
Kin to the petal, cool,
Translucent, veined, firm,
The fundamental worm,
The undefined fool,
Dips to the icy pool.
The best commentary on the poem is winters' own,
found in "By Way of Clarification," written in response
to Alan Stephens, who, in an earlier essay, had cited
the poem as an instance of what he called Winters'
"cultishness .
The grief and uncertainty (for their own sake)
are romantic traits, and so is the hedonistic
sensuousness throughout the poem; the snake is
a deceiver, and this is always true of the in
definable and shifting perception; his tongue
is too pure, and pure poetry, the extreme form
of romantic poetry, is poetry as free as possible
from concept, from definition; lines eight and
nine describe the snake but also summarize the
romantic doctrine to the effect that true being
can be found only in the moment of change.
. . . the last stanza continues with these
ideas, but its first two lines emphasize the
remoteness of the snake from all human concerns
or intelligence, and the remoteness is proper
to both vehicle and tenor.16
About the last line of the poem, Howard Kaye writes in
"The Post-Symbolist Poetry of Yvor Winters":
The last line of the poem sounds like pure de
scription, but in context has considerable
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abstract significance. It suggests something
more specific than a sense of strangeness or
death. The icy pool is associated with the
remoteness from human concerns which is a prop
erty of the Symbolist image, with the unimagi
nable world where Mallarme/,s swans float, and
with the fatal effect on the human intelligence
of following an aesthetic like Mallarme' s .
In its absence of thought, in its freedom from con
cept and definition, the serpent is Winters' coolest, most
effective image of almost pure evil, if such a thing can
be imagined.

Yet such purity is rarely encountered in

the human world; there, more often than not, man has to
deal with degrees of evil.

This fact raises the following

question: If evil is defined as the absence of thought,
what then is to be man's proper attitude toward the natural
world, which is necessarily "thoughtless," as well as to
his own body, which, taken by itself, is just as "thought
less" as nature itself?

2.

"The Brutal Earth"

Winters was attracted to nature as few other poets
are in the twentieth century.

He experienced pantheistic

trances in boyhood, in which he felt, as he describes
the experience in "On Rereading a Passage from John Muir,"
like "one forever by the dripping tree, / Paradisaic in
his pristine peace."

Not just the "religion" of nature,

but the science of it held his attention.

He thought
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seriously at one time of studying biology at Stanford,
and in later life, as Donald Davie points out in a per
sonal memoir of the poet, he could describe the migratory
18
habits of certain birds in bewiideringly minute detail.
In his poetry itself he has one of the clearest eyes
for natural detail of any poet in the twentieth century,
with only Thomas Hardy as a close rival.

In his criticism,

the formulation of the principles operating in postSymbolist poetry places the image drawn from the natural
world on an equal footing with abstract thought.

As he

says in a criticism of J. V. Cunningham, "We live in a
physical universe, and we have senses as well as rational
faculties, and the physical universe affects the lives
19
and understanding of most of us profoundly.
Yet for
all this attraction to nature, and the attention he gives
even to its minute detail, there is, nevertheless, in
both his poetry and criticism, a certain Manichaean
tendency to view the natural world as the domain of dis
order and evil.

"The ocean is the home of demons and

symbols of evil too numerous to mention," he says in his
20
essay on Melville.
He develops the same thought in a
passage of great rhetorical power in the same essay:
The sea is the realm of the half-known, at once
of perception and of peril; it is infested by
subtle and malignant creatures, bent on destruc
tion; it is governed by tremendous, destructive,
and unpredictable forces, the storms, calms,
currents, tides, depths, and distances, amid
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which one can preserve oneself by virtue only
of the greatest skill and then but precariously
and from moment to moment .2 1
A companion piece to the Melville essay is "The Slow
Pacific Swell," a poem in heroic couplets which is one
of Winters' greatest achievements.
everything distinctively human.
ticularly powerful.

In it the sea threatens

The conclusion is par

The sea there assumes an intention

of almost conscious and deliberate bestiality:
By night a chaos of commingling power,
The whole Pacific hovers hour by hour.
The slow Pacific swell stirs on the sand,
Sleeping to sink away, withdrawing land,
Heaving and wrinkled in the moon, and blind;
Or gathers seaward, ebbing out of mind.
In other poems the scene shifts from the sea to the
land, yet the idea persists of nature as meaningless and
thoughtlessly destructive.

Consider the following passages

from some key poems:
The calloused grass lies hard
Against the cracking plain:
Life is a grayish stain;
The salt-marsh hems my yard.
from "By the Road to the Air-Base"
This life is not our life; nor for our wit
The sweetness of these shades; these are alone.
There is no wisdom here; seek not for it!
This is the shadow of the vast madrone.
from "The Manzanita"
Small though its corner be, the weed
Will yet intrude its creeping beard;
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The harsh blade and the hairy seed
Recall the brutal earth we feared.
And if no water touch the dust
In some far corner, and one dare
To breathe upon it, one may trust
The spectre on the summer air:
The risen dust alive with fire,
The fire mads visible, a blur
Interrate, the pervasive ire
Of foxtail and of hoarhound burr,
from "Much in Little"
And where is that which made you just?
Which gathered light about the bone
And moved the tongue, in earth's despite?
from "The Cremation"
I could hear the farting toad
Shifting to observe the kill,
Spotted sparrow, spawn of dung,
Mumbling on a horse's turd,
Bullfinch, wren, or mockingbird
Screaming with a pointed tongue
Objurgation without word.
from "A Dream Vision," Part Two of
"Two Old-Fashioned Songs"
In some of Winters' poems, such as "Sir Gawain and
the Green Knight," natural detail symbolizes in an ob
viously allegorical way certain irrational forces in man
himself.

In others, such as "On a View of Pasadena from

the Hills" and "The California Oaks," the beauties of a
natural landscape are recognized as such, and their de
struction by modern technological society is protested
against.

Yet in the poems from which the above passages

have been taken, and they are the majority, nature is
relentlessly opposed to thought, and in this opposition
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it is viewed as containing in and of itself the principle
of disorder and evil.
Part of the explanation of such an attitude lies in
Winters' historical position.

He came after the Romantics,

whose claims for nature as a moral function Winters finally
saw as unrealistic and unintelligible.

To submit to nature,

as the Romantics recommended, was for him to submit to un
differentiated flux and to destroy one's humanity.

Since

he himself actively followed this Romantic procedure dur
ing the first part of his career, wrote poems about it,
and lived according to its principles, he knew the tempta
tion at a level deeper than the merely theoretical.
also knew its consequences.

He

As he is on public record as

having said, he came close to a state of clinical madness.
Consequently, his reaction against the moralism of nature
was bound to be intense, even at times extreme.

Howard

Kaye states the matter quite succinctly:
J. V. Cunningham, who called him a "congenital
romantic" despite Winters' notorious repudia
tion of romanticism, recognized that Winters'
concern with self-control arises out of a
specifically romantic context. The temptations
which the poet of "The Slow Pacific Swell" must
resist are the temptations which Wordsworth and
Crane invi t ed.22
"Where is the meaning that I found?" he asks himself
in "A Summer Commentary," a poem concerned with his child
hood experiences in the natural world.

It is a rhetorical

question, the answer to which is negative.

"The impersonal
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23
universe lying in sunlight1' is really an "old penumbra
of the ground," as he calls it in the poem, divorced from
intelligibility and foreign to human values.
The more significant part of the explanation lies in
his theism and his definition of evil.

The God Whom one

posits as first principle is bound necessarily to furnish
one with the absolute standard by which everything in the
intellectual and physical worlds is judged.

What partici

pates in that God or is analogous to Him in whatever de
gree becomes thereby good; what falls off from such
participation is evil, the degree to which it falls off
determining the degree of its evil.

Winters' God was

Pure Thought, Pure Mind, Who is activated by no providen
tial concern for preserving and ordering either the human
or natural world.

His isolation in this respect is as

absolute as Aristotle's Unmoved Mover's.

Since nature

by its very definition cannot participate in thought, it
inevitably will be sloughed off, according to Winters'
vision of things, into a penumbra of unreality.

Man may

do what he can with it, and the image of the garden becomes
crucially important in Winters' poetry.

But the "wilder

ness" of pure nature, inherently meaningless and indif
ferent to the human realm, finally will have the last word:
The drift of leaves grows deep, the grass
Is longer everywhere I pass.
And listen! where the wind is heard,
The surface of the garden's blurred--
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It is the passing wilderness.
The garden will be something less
When others win it back from change.
We shall not know it then; a strange
Presence will be musing there.
Ruin has touched familiar air. . . .
The great difference, from which everything else
follows, between Winters and Aquinas in this matter is
that Aquinas' definition of God, not as Thought, but as
Existence, enables nature in its own limited way to
participate by analogy in the Deity.

If nature cannot

think, it at least exists, and in so far as it does exist,
it achieves meaning and order in its admittedly restricted
resemblance to a God Who is defined, in what Gilson calls
in The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy "the metaphysics
of Exodus," as I-AM-WHO-AM.

Furthermore Gilson declares

in the same passage:
For St. Augustine, as for St. Thomas, coeli
enarrant gloriam Dei, and if the heavens de
clare His glory it is because they bear His
likeness; only, with St. Thomas, the divine
likeness sinks for the first time into the
heart of nature, goes down beyond order, number
and beauty, reaches and saturates the very
physical structure, and touches the very ef
ficacy of causality.24
Even matter itself cannot be construed as a cause of dis
order, much less evil:
. . . matter is not even the cause of the
possibility of evil, nor the reason for its
existence; in itself it implies no tendency
to disorder. As God created it the material
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world was excellent: valde bonum, and so it
would have remained had not a sin that came
to birth in the realm of the spirit, and not
in that of matter, brought disorder into
matter.25
I go into the differences between Winters and Aquinas
on this score in some detail to correct a view currentlygaining acceptance among certain of Winters * critics that
Aquinas was the decisive influence in his notion of the
ultimate nature of Being.
between the two.

No doubt there are similarities

Winters was bound to be attracted to

Thomistic intellectualism and its rather uncompromising
separation of faith and reason.

But Aquinas would never

have understood nature in any form as a "chaos of comming
ling power" or a "brutal earth," precisely because nature,
participating in the existence of Pure Existence, was for
him saturated with order and intelligibility.
Winters* position, on the other hand, is more like
the general drift of pre-Christian classical thought, for
which matter and the sensible world are tainted in varying
degrees with unintelligibility and disorder.

Plato often

speaks of the body as the prison or tomb of the soul.
He never thought knowledge of the sensible world was
possible because of the contingency and flux to which
that world was subjected.

Even Aristotle posits a "mis

chievous element" in nature, so that the potentiality of
matter in his system is the cause of corruptions, alterations, monsters, etc.

What is real for him is not so
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much, sensible reality as the intelligible form which
the mind abstracts out of the material object, and, as
many critics have pointed out, his position is not that
dissimiliar to Plato's.
There are also vestiges of Protestantism in Winters'
thought, which Howard Baker alluded to in a very early
27
review of Winters in the New Republic.
Luther and
Calvin, in a certain sense, revert to the classical view
of matter by totally rejecting the Catholic position as
expressed in Aquinas.

For both of them the effects of

original sin invade the very heart of nature and contami
nate it at its source, so that nature becomes "irreme-

°8

diably corrupted by sin."*1

As a result, an impassable

gulf exists between God and nature, just as in Winters'
vision of things, and the true Lutheran's retreat inside
his own soul to seek God is also similar in its general
outline to Winters' reversion to Mind to find there the
order and intelligibility that were horrifyingly absent
for him in the "burning ground" of nature.
I do not wish to give the impression that Winters
was a doctrinaire Puritan who cut himself off from the
contaminating influence of the natural world.

I delib

erately used the words "tendency" and "vestige" in de
scribing this strain in his thought.

And Kenneth Fields

is quite right in criticizing the view put forward by
Paul Ramsey and James Dickey, among others, that Winters
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divorced himself from imagistic richness and embraced an
arid classicism.

The poems themselves, with their own

particularity and feel, not only for the temptations, but
for the beauties of the natural world, are evidence
enough that such a view is wrong.

For Winters the rela

tionship of man with nature is complex.

It is true he

saw dangers in the natural world, but it is equally true
he saw intellectual and spiritual benefits from the poet's
temporarily immersing himself in sensory experience.
Following Melville in identifying the sea with the in
human and the half-known, and the land with the known
and human, Winters states:
The relationship of man to the known and to the
half known, however, is not a simple and static
one; he cannot merely stay on land, or he will
perish of imperception, but must venture on the
sea, without losing his relationship to the
land; we have, in brief, the relationship of
principle to preception, or, in other words,
the problem of judgement.29
"The Slow Pacific Swell" is concerned precisely with
such a relationship.

Fields points out how the two alle

gorical realms of land and sea interpenetrate each other,
correcting each's peculiar deficiencies, and how the poet,
after his

immersion in the sea in the middle stanza, situ

ateshimself in the last one near

the "limber margin" of

the sea, so that his "principle" may receive the benefits
30
of "perception."
And there is the hauntingly beautiful
late poem, "A Stammer Commentary," with nature smearing
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brandy on the trampling boot of the poet and "sending it
sweeter on its way."
Yet none of this contradicts what we have said earlier
about Winters' Manichaean view of nature.

Even in "A

Summer Commentary" the poet's boot is a trampling one and
he leaves the natural world because no meaning is to be
found within the circle of its "old penumbra"; if the two
realms interpenetrate each other in "The Slow Pacific
Swell," they nevertheless are kept distinct, and the sea
is still chaos.

However one may describe Winters' view

so that justice is done to its complexities, the following
are the facts one has to reckon with.

He was attracted

to the natural world and knew it in detail; he at one
time accepted the Romantic interpretation of it, but later
reacted violently against it, seeing at times evil where
the Romantics nearly at all times saw "morality"; if he
knew the poet must venture into the realm of perception,
he also knew he does so at considerable risk and peril;
nature in and of itself is meaningless and foreign to hu
man values, and man encounters in it evil and disorder.

3.

The Debate of Flesh and Spirit

One's attitude toward the human body is just as in
structive in determining the final consequences of one's
philosophical position as one's attitude toward nature
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or the mind itself.

We have just cited the Platonic no

tion of the body as the tomb or prison of the soul, whose
salvation depends upon its liberation from such a corrupt
ing confinement.

"Think nothing of the body," Marcus

Aurelius tells us. in the Meditations, "of its viscid blood,
31
its bones, its web of nerves and veins and arteries."
Remember, he states later on, to withdraw "into the little
32
field of self" where things "can never touch the soul."
Plotinus more insistently recommends separation from the
contaminating body, "slave to the corporal nature," as
he calls it, "which has barely preserved a trace of the
33
soul."
The union of the soul with the body is not es
sential or necessary in the definition of the person.

In

Plato's words, man is a "soul using a body," but he is no
more his body than a worker is the tools he uses or than
any of us is his own garments. ^

Later Avicenna, the dis

ciple of Aristotle, will never admit that the human intel
lect is the substantial form of its body.

"To say that

would be to suppose a dreadful confusion of essences," as
35
Gilson paraphrases him in Being and Some Philosophers.
In Christianity, with the Incarnation as its central
dogma, we see a reversal of this classical attitude toward
the body, which now enters into the human composition as
a necessary and essential element.

In the Gospels Christ

ministers to both body and soul, and promises salvation,
not to. the soul, but to the whole man.

All of St. Paul's
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dogmatic teachings revolve around the fact of the resur
rection of the body, so that henceforth the Christian
hope, in the words of St. Anselm's Cur Deus homo, is
"that the whole man shall enjoy a happy immortality both
36
in body and in soul."
No one goes as far as Aquinas
does in this matter.

For him the soul is united with

the body in order that the soul might perfect its nature.
Separated from the body, the soul is in a deprived state.
"It is clear then that it was for the soul's good that
it was united to a body," he emphatically states in the
37
Summa.
Thomistic intellectualism is partly the reason
for his elevating the body to such a high philosophical
position.

In Aquinas' epistemology the origin of man's

knowledge lies in the body's senses, which furnish the
mind with the essential material for its intellectual
operations.

Without a body the mind cannot know:

natural knowledge begins from sense.

"Our

Hence our natural

knowledge can go as far as it can be led by sensible
38
things."
In the Contra gentiles he speaks of "the hu
man intellect, to which it is connatural to derive its
39
knowledge from sensible things."
Protestantism reverses this attitude by returning,
as we have seen earlier in our discussion of nature and
sensory reality, back to what E. R. Dodds calls in his
important study, The Greeks and the Irrational, "classical
puritanism."^

It is no accident that Renaissance
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Protestant theology accepts Plato and so bitterly rejects
the Aristotle of Catholic Medieval philosophy.
Winters' attitude toward the body and its. union
with the mind is just as complex as his attitude to the
natural world.

Like Aquinas, he posits the senses as

the beginning point in the process by which the intellect
achieves abstract knowledge.

In his argument with John

Crowe Ransom over nominalism, he designates his own philo
sophical position as the moderate realism of Aristotle
and Aquinas.^

There is no doubt in his mind as to the

reality of things nor that their apprehension by the
senses is anything but a good.

A healthy relationship

between "things" and "ideas" is the condition of knowledge
itself.

And such a relationship presupposes the inter

mediacy of the body.

This position not only affords

Winters an escape from nominalism, but also from solip
sism, the dilemma that haunted him in his early poetry.
As Douglas Peterson states the situation,
It is only through a conceptual system, Winters
would maintain, grounded in scrupulous empiri
cal investigation that the world of particulars
can be rendered intelligible. For him idea and
thing are in ter dependant. For the observer,
ideas render things intelligible and things
confirm the reality of the ideas of which they
are instances. Such a system not only affords
the observer with a way of understanding the
world he experiences as extended to himself ;
it also enables him to perceive himself as a
part of that world rather than as isolated with
in it in the prison of his own consciousness.42
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In one of the most affirmative poems Winters ever
wrote, ’’The Marriage," he records actual delight in the
body and its sensuous apprehension of the physical world
outside it, a delight intensified in that its context is
sexual.
Incarnate for our marriage you appeared,
Flesh living in the spirit and endeared
By minor graces and slow sensual change.
Through every nerve we made our spirits range.
We fed our minds on every mortal thing:
The lacy fronds of carrots in the spring,
Their flesh sweet on the tongue, the salty wine
From bitter grapes, which gathered through the vine
The mineral drouth of autumn concentrate,
Wild spring in dream escaping, the debate
Of flesh and spirit on those vernal nights,
Its resolution in naive delights,
The young kids bleating softly in the rain—
All this to pass, not to return again.
The sexual union itself is described in the following
lines:
And when I found your flesh did not resist,
It was the living spirit that I kissed,
It was the spirit's change in which I lay . . . .
One might describe the spirit behind this poem as
that of a gentle, sensual Platonism.

Though the delight

in the particulars of the physical world is actual and
unmistakable, yet those particulars pass away or change,
and final supremacy is given the mind and spirit, which
are at all times kept distinct from the body.

The spirit

uses the body by "ranging" along the nerves in the ap
prehension and accumulation of rich sensory experience,
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and the mind is "fed" in the process as the ultimate
reality.

Even in the sexual union itself, the lovers

experience the same extra-physical ecstasy the lovers
do in John Donne's famous poem.

They so die out of their

bodies, to use the Renaissance pun, that they can dispense
with their bodies and say "it was the living spirit that
I kissed."
In other poems the union of the mind and body does
not result in the same sort of felicity as it does in
"The Marriage."

A philosophical hesitancy, bred ulti

mately of his theism, sets in and causes the poet to view
the body suspiciously as a likely impediment to the life
of the mind, even while Winters recognizes that the mind
depends upon the body for the material of thought.

In

"To My Infant Daughter" the poet anticipates with appre
hension the dangers and obscurities involved in the flesh
and the disasters which "earth" seems deliberately to be
preparing for his child:
Ah, could you now with thinking tongue
Discover what involved lies
In flesh and thought obscurely young,
What earth and age can worst devise!
In "Chiron" the "stallion body" of the centaur frus
trates and finally defeats the "scholar," so that Chiron
is driven at the end of the poem "to express the wise
man's preference," as Grosvenor Powell says, " . . . for
/1
death rather than life."
The body brings on the death
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of the mind, though between the mind's "magnitude in
violate” and "the stallion body" there is an absolute
cleavage.

The poem acquires further tragic dimensions

in that its total context is Chiron's admission of
another defeat: his failure to educate Achilles suffi
ciently so that the hero could have saved himself from
the destructive passions of the body.

I quote the whole

poem:
I, who taught Achilles, saw
Leap beyond me by its law,
By intrinsic law destroyed,
Genius in itself alloyed.
Dying scholar, dim with fact,
By the stallion body racked,
Studying my long defeat,
I have mastered Jove's deceit.
Now my head is bald and dried,
Past division simplified:
On the edge of naught I wait,
Magnitude inviolate.
One of Winters' most complete statements on the sub
ject occurs in "A Prayer for my Son."

He recognizes in

the poem the sensory origin of knowledge, but he empha
sizes the danger of spiritual and intellectual blindness
inherent in the mind's union with the body.

The epigraph

for the poem is a line from "The Earth-Bound," a poem
by his wife, Janet Lewis, in which, if I am not mistaken,
she gently criticizes her husband's severe position by
stating the body's case in more positive terms.
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is: ’’Tangled with earth all ways, we m o v e . " ^

The

significant portion of Winters' own poem follows:
To steep the mind in sense,
Yet never lose the aim,
Will make the world grow dense,
Yet by this way we came.
Earth and mind are not one.
But they are so entwined,
That this, my little son,
May yet one day go blind.
Finally, in "To the Holy Spirit," a poem which will
be treated in greater detail in the next chapter, the
poet addresses the Deity and contrasts the "simplicity"
of God’s Pure Mind with the impure "complexity" of his
own mind, mixed as it is with a body that eventually and
inevitably causes its death.

This entanglement is

lamented in unmistakably tragic terms as nothing short
of a complete intellectual disaster, and the desire for
disentanglement is as strong as anything in Plotinus.
In fact, the vision might be called gnostic with little
or no exaggeration: God is indirectly criticized for
the "blemish" of creation, to use Paul Valery's phrase,
especially the creation of the "irregular body," which
belongs to the "fallen sons," and the two realms of
sense and thought, time and eternity, are radically sepa
rated from each other.

There is none of the flexible

interdependence and interpenetration which we have noted
in other poems.

The scene of the poem is a deserted

graveyard in the Salinas Valley in California:
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These are thy fallen sons,
Thou whom I try to reach.
Thou whom the quick eye shuns,
Thou dost elude my speech.
Yet when I go from sense
And trace thee down in thought,
I meet thee, then, intense,
And know thee as I ought.
But thou art mind alone,
And I , alas, am bound
Pure mind to flesh and bone,
And flesh and bone to ground.
With the evidence here collected, one can say, I
think, that there is a marked tendency on the part of
Winters toward "classical puritanism," to use Dodds'
term again, and that he deviates rather sharply from
the Thomistic position on the matter.

He maintains a

philosophically tight dichotomy between the mind and
the body, and the union of the two in the human compos
ite, according to his vision of things, is a possible
source of intellectual confusion and disorder.

The

body, also, for him is involved with death, which, as
we have already seen, inspired in him a sort of meta
physical horror just barely controlled by the rational
mind.

It is true he feels none of the disgust and con

tempt with which the extreme Puritan dismisses the body
as corruption itself; there is, though, a sense of ap
prehension, a sort of philosophical hesitancy, which
quickly at times erupts into actual suspicion.

Man

achieves knowledge because of his body and its senses,
and yet, because of the potential disorder, even evil,
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inherent in the flesh, he can just as well go spiritually
and intellectually blind because of that same body.
The connection between this attitude and Winters'
theism is not fortuitous..
it.

It necessarily develops from

If God, as well as man's ultimate good, is defined

in terms of thought, and evil in terms of an absence of
thought, what else can one do but attempt to keep the
mind as distinct as possible from the necessarily thought
less body, if, that is, one wishes to achieve the good?
Yet Winters' terms are more tragic than this statement
indicates.

As we shall see in our later discussion of

"To the Holy Spirit," the achievement of the final good,
even though man has an intense desire for it, is completely
frustrated.

Mind and body cannot be kept distinct from

each other, and the body finally causes the destruction
of the mind.

4.

The Giant Movements

We see further consequences of Winters' theism and
his definition of evil in his poems dealing with the
larger context of society and the State.

Taken as a

whole, these are the most classical poems Winters wrote,
standing out sharply, as they do, from the imagistic and
post-Symbolist.

Their subject matter is impersonal, the

style plain and abstract, the point of view from which
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they are written uncompromisingly moral.

But certain

Romantic strains can be detected in their classical
texture.

The pattern occurring in all of them is that

of an isolated figure protesting, not just against
particular forms of political corruption, but against
the very nature of the State itself in the modern world.
Like the "scientism" of "The Invaders," the State is
seen as a destructive abstraction, sometimes merely de
void of human values, other times actively immoral;
He served that mathematic thing, the State.
from "On the Death of Senator Thomas J. Walsh"
And he who having power would serve the State,
Must now deceive corruption unto good . . . .
from "The Prince"
Fool and scoundrel guide the State,
from "Before Disaster"
The destructiveness of the abstraction is intensified
in those poems which have the Second World War as their
immediate background.

The individual is caught up and

blindly killed in the "giant movements" of the State:
Impersonal the aim
Where giant movements tend;
Each man appears the same;
Friend vanishes from friend.
In the long path of lead
That changes place like light
No shape of hand or head
Means anything tonight,
from "Night of Battle"
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The
And
Are
Now

private life is small;
individual men
counted not at all.
life is general. . . .
from "To a Military Rifle”

The private life of the individual poet or scholar,
working in isolation, would "reembody mind," as Winters
says in "Ode on the Despoilers of Learning," and hold to
. . . what men had wrung
From struggle to atone
For m a n ’s stupidity
In labor and alone.
But such redemptive activity is either ignored or
rejected by the "giant movements" of the State.

In one

of the most bitterly disillusioned poems Winters wrote,
"Defense of Empire," he speaks of this rejection and
isolation in personal terms:
The perils of immortal mind,
The core of empire in a word,
The worth of state grown hard to find
Because true meaning is unheard;
The deviation from the strength
Which forms our motion, and the phrase
Which cheapens thought and yet at length
Would simulate more honest ways;
This fine deceit, this perfect rift,
Dissociating thought from sense,
I traced in quiet; and the shrift
Of wrath was all my recompense.
The thought and feeling of this poem is echoed in a
moving passage from the Introduction to Forms of Discovery,
written immediately before his death by cancer in 1968,
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when the United States was undergoing the tragic disloca
tions of another war.

The passage occurs just before

Winters confesses he is pessimistic about the future of
the human race.
The practical mind, the mind which conquers,
rules, invents, manufactures, and sells, has
dominated every civilization and ultimately
destroyed every state. The great philosopher,
the great poet, the great painter or musician
has almost always lived precariously on the
fringe of the state, sometimes as the servant
or dependant of the "great," sometimes in
poverty, sometimes in the priesthood, in our
time as one of the most contemned members of
the academic profession. But he has created
and preserved civilization, often working in
the rubble of a collapsing state.
There are other poems not on the general nature of
the State, but on particular acts of political corruption
and injustice which the State has committed.

In the con

cluding section of "Theseus: A Trilogy" the hero in his
old age assumes the leadership of Athens and attempts to
establish "immitigable good" there, but, instead, is
betrayed by the State and exiled to Scyros where Lycomedes,
acting as the agent of Athens, pushes him to his death
in the sea.

In "Socrates" the philosopher, having asked

the crucial question, "What is the city?," is executed
by the State for having tried to answer his own question
in philosophical, moral terms.

The best of these poems

is "John Sutter," in which the innocent Sutter, on whose
land gold was discovered in California in 1848, is destroyed
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by an "evil with no human sense" in the form of greed
and rapacity.

It is true the poem does not have the

evert political context of "Theseus" or "Socrates," but
instead the inchoate social disorder existing in California
at that time; yet its final stanza alludes to the failure
of the United States government to perform any judicial
act of restitution for what Sutter suffered and lost at
the hands of the mob.

The State overlooked the evil and

made no attempt to assuage the "final drouth of peniten
tial tears."
The three poems on the David Lamson case deserve
special treatment in this connection, and I should like
/ 7

to go into that case in some detail.

Lamson was the

sales manager of the Stanford University Press and was
a neighbor of Winters in Palo Alto, although the two men
did not become friends until the case was well under way.
On Memorial Day, 1933, while Lamson was raking and burn
ing leaves in his backyard, his wife suffered a freakish
accident in the bathroom of their house, which resulted
in her death.

"There is every reason to believe,"

Winters states in a defense he wrote for Lamson in the
October 10, 1934 issue of The New Republic, "that she
slipped in the tub while bathing, struck her head on
the corner of the washbasin, turned in falling, hung
helpless over the edge of the tub, and bled to death."
When Lamson discovered her some forty or fifty minutes
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afterwards, there was no evidence on her body or in the
room itself of any attack or violent struggle on her
part.

The braids of her hair, intricately pleated, were

still in place, though the back of her head was bashed
in.

The walls of the extremely small bathroom had been

evenly and smoothly coated with her blood, which would
have been impossible had there occurred the necessarily
irregular movements of a violent struggle.

And there

were no bruises or any kind of marks on the rest of her
body apart from the fatal head lesion.

Yet when the

police, who were immediately summoned to the scene, ar
rived, they became suspicious of the distraught Lamson,
did only a ten-minute investigation of both the house
and the yard outside, and, on the basis of a nine-inch
length of pipe discovered in the rubbish Lamson had been
burning, concluded the husband had bludgeoned his wife
to death.

He was arrested on the spot for first-degree

murder.
On the basis of the police report, the State of
California committed itself, apparently at all costs, to
proving Lamson guilty and obtaining a death sentence, in
the face of evidence proving the man's innocence, evidence
which the State either tried to suppress or rule inadmis
sible in court.

In the words of a Time magazine report

of April 13, 1936, "It (i.e. the State) spent $60,000
to try him, retry him, mistry him, retry him again."
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At one time Lamson was found guilty and was sentenced
to hang (the trial was later judged a mistrial); during
the year spent on death row at San Quentin he wrote his
apologia, later published as We Who Are About to Die.
Winters visited him there and later wrote of his friend
Who, though human thought decayed,
Yet the dissolution stayed,
Gracious in that evil shade.
The whole ordeal lasted for three years.

When the third

trial resulted in a hung jury, the judge finally set
Lamson free.
Winters became involved in the case quite early.
In fact, a friend of his who knew him quite well at the
time has said that he became obsessed with it."*^

He

stopped all creative and critical work so that he could
concentrate all his time and energy on Lamson1s defense.
With Frances Theresa Russell of the Stanford English
Department, he co-authored a hundred page summary of the
case.

He helped in raising a defense fund and in organiz

ing expert witness, which he later saw used or not used
at the whim of the presiding judge.

All in all, the

whole affair was a decisive event in his life and exerted
an influence that went beyond the three poems he wrote
on the subject, poems which are not among his best work.
It caused him to become further disillusioned with the
academic community, his relations with that community
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being always at best uncertain and suspicious; as he
says in "To David Lamson," the "special intellect" of
the scholars who failed to come to Lamson*s defense
blinded them to "virtue in extremity" and brutalized
their feelings.

It also further confirmed his suspicions

of the modern "abstract" state, which here victimized
an innocent individual in a case which was described at
the time by August Vollmer, professor of Criminology at
the University of California, as "the most amazing situa
tion that has ever risen in American jurisprudence--a
man sentenced to hang for a crime never committed and the
evidence itself proving his i n n o c e n c e . E x p e r i e n c i n g
at first hand and in concrete terms "the brutal power"
of the state, Winters himself came close, as he confesses
in one of the three poems, to a complete nervous collapse.
In more general terms, the David Lamson case, along
with the suicide of his friend Hart Crane, which occurred
immediately before the Lamson affair, furnished Winters
with an instance of evil that assumed almost metaphysical
proportions in his mind, apart from its specific political
judical context.

"Lamson . . . was the victim of accident

Winters writes in summary at the end of his New Republic
article already cited, "and of the irreducible ugliness
52
and irrationality of the human mind."
Such a vision of "the irreducible ugliness and ir
rationality of the human mind” is bound to be extremely
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disturbing to one who, like Winters, defines being and
the good in exclusive intellectual terms.

In fact, a

moral system of "intellectualism" will thrust upon one
more instances of evil than a system which locates evil,
not in a corrupted intellect, but rather in a corrupted
will and its intention.

Peter Abelard is a good repre

sentative of the latter system.

He went to extreme

limits in the matter, and restricted the area of evil
to just the intention, so that an objective evil act can
easily be interpreted in his morality as a good if the
subjective intention of the agent is good.

Now, it is

a fairly safe statement to say that most human beings
have good intentions, but it is dangerously naive to
say they have such good intellects. Winters was acutely
sensitive to this fact..

"Few men are born with suffi

cient intelligence to profit by more than a small part
of the tradition available," he writes in the Introduc53
tion to Forms of Discovery;
elsewhere he says life
will be painful if one expects more than two or three
men to behave rationally in a given c e n t u r y . T h e con
clusion forced upon a moral intellectualist holding
such a bleak view of the race is that most human beings
are, or can easily become, morally ugly and vicious.
Of course, Winters would say that civilization provides
the race with habits and inhibitions that somewhat con
trol its evil possibilities, but he also thought this
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control was only uncertainly maintained and could easily
be dislocated.

In so many of his poems he speaks of the

rational mind holding on to itself only moment to moment.
Nowhere is this dislocation more likely to occur than
when men collect themselves together into a mob and be
come ruled by blind passion, such as we saw in "John
Sutter."

But what Winters faces in his political poems

is a far more frightening dislocation: the dehumanization
of the State itself into a morally vicious power.

And

the David Lamson case furnished him with an historical
example in his own backyard, as it were, of how easily
the State can become subverted into "brutal power, judi
cial and sedate," which defiantly refuses to understand
the logical deductions of expert witnesses defending an
innocent man charged with murder.
When I say that Winters' intellectual concept of
being provides him with more examples of moral evil to
deal with than does voluntarism, I do not at all mean
to imply that he projected evil where it did not exist,
nor that his criticism of the State is grounded, not on
fact, but on a neurotic 5.magination.

As for the latter,

the most cursory glance at twentieth century history
will quickly disabuse one of that notion.

Never before

has more massive evil been committed in the name of the
State than in this century; Moloch seems the enlightened
one in comparison to the State-god of the purges and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

165

the concentration camps.

I mean only to say that,

given Winters' principles, one is bound to interpret
certain situations as evil, which will receive slightly
different interpretations, as the case might b e , in a
voluntaristic moral system, which is finally based on
a more optimistic view of human nature.

Doubtless, in

most cases "intellectualism" and "voluntarism” will
agree on the moral verdict of a given act; the intellect
and the will are too intimately connected with each other
for one to become cleanly dissociated from the other.
And if "intellectualism" provides its followers with
more instances of evil, it is because its higher, more
rigorous standards demand more from human nature than
does the laxer "voluntarism" of someone like Peter Abelard.
But even if one ultimately disagrees with Winters’ posi
tion on the matter, one is forced, I think, to recognize
and admire its severe grandeur.
It is also a lonely grandeur.

The final consequence

of such a position for Winters was isolation.

He did

not make a gnostic retreat away from philosophical objec
tivity or personal political involvement--he remained
committed to liberal political and social causes to the
end of his life;*^ but in the philosophical and artistic
realm he felt compelled, on account of his allegiance to
the intellect, to maintain himself aloof from the irra
tionalism of those "giant movements" he saw undermining
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and destroying, not only the philosophical and artistic
life, but also the political and social life, of the
modern world.

The figure of the isolated poet confront

ing, usually late at night, a world on the point of dis
integrating into irrational madness, occurs over and
over in his poetry.

Heracles, who allegorically repre

sents "the artist in hand-to-hand or semi-intuitive
combat with experience,"

56

finally isolates himself from

the imperfect shade of Deianira and by himself "raids
eternal silence to eternal ends."

The young pilots,

whose cause Winters connects with his own, are alone as
they "learn to control the earth and air" in "Defense
of Empire."

There is also the isolation of Theseus,

Socrates, John Sutter, John Day, and Winters himself,
both early and late, who in various poems are left help
less at the end to confront and deal with, as best they
can, the "irreducible ugliness and irrationality of the
human mind."

In one of his last poems, "To the Moon,"

Winters addresses in his old age the intellectually
severe Muse he had followed all his life and says
Goddess of poetry,
Maiden of icy stone
With no anatomy,
Between us two alone
Your light falls thin and sure. . . .
In two occasional poems he recommends solitude as the
necessary condition of both moral and intellectual
excellence:
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Take few men to your heart!
Unstable, fierce, unkind
The ways that men impart.
from "To My Infant Daughter"
The angry blood burns low.
Some friend of lesser mind
Discerns you not; but so
Your solitude's defined,
from "To a Young Writer:
The best poem on the subject of this necessary soli
tude is "The Journey," perhaps because its treatment of
solitude is oblique and not immediately obvious.

The

poet's journey through the raw Western towns is both auto
biographical and allegorical.

The vision of moral chaos

and of an almost formless social order vitiated by the
irrational is rendered in detail:
And I remembered with the early sun
That foul-mouthed barber back in Pendleton,
The sprawling streets, the icy station bench,
The Round-up pennants, the latrinal stench.
These towns are cold by day, the flesh of vice
Raw and decisive, and the will precise;
At night the turbulence of drink and mud,
Blue glare of gas, the dances dripping blood,
First thudding murder in the shadowy air,
Exhausted whores, sunk to a changeless stare.
At the end of the journey, after he has dissociated him
self from those determined by earth and gravity, the poet
finds himself alone, "in naked sunlight on a naked world."
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CHAPTER IV
THE UNFLESHED EYE

1.

An Explication of "To the Holy Spirit"

"To the Holy Spirit" was first published in Poetry
magazine in 1946, just a year before he made his theistic
"confession" in the Introduction to In Defense of Reason.
It is his most complete statement on the subject, and
one that also summarizes a number of other themes that
preoccupied him all during his poetic career.

Metrically

and stylistically, the poem is a complex achievement.
Working in the iambic trimeter line, Winters varies the
pattern with a number of initial trochaic substitutions
that slow down the movement of the line, which in the
short trimeter line is apt to become too rapid for the
meditative tone the poem aspires to.

He also varies the

rhyme scheme of each of the four stanzas, with one time
as many as four lines intervening between the rhyming
words.

Stylistically, "To the Holy Spirit" combines ele

ments of both the plain style and the post-Symbolist
method which Winters "discovered" and analyzed in the
fifth chapter of Forms of Discovery.

The plain style is
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evidenced by the absence of rhetorical embellishments,
by the frequency of abstract statement, particularly in
those passages addressing the Holy Spirit directly, and
by the tone of disillusionment and resignation which
pervades the entire poem.

Donald E. Stanford has called

it "the impersonal style," with imagery reduced to a
minimum;^ yet the imagery that is there is post-Symbolist
in its combination of the sensory and the intellectual.
Such imagery is appropriate to a poem like "To the Holy
Spirit," since one of its themes is the intertwining in
the human being of mind and flesh.

As Kenneth Fields

has noted, "The descriptive details . . . are as important
as the abstractions because the theme requires us to
recognize that ’pure mind' is embodied in the flesh; it
takes the soul to the brink of the incomprehensible to
realize that man's spiritual and mortal natures cannot be
2
separated."
The procedure of the poem is also postSymbolist in that its transitions are effected, not by
strict logic as in the plain style poems of the Renaissance,
but by controlled association as in such modern poems as
Valery's "Le Cimetiere Marin" and Stevens' "Sunday Morning."
Intellectually the poem is no less complex.

It deals

with the greatest and most inclusive of subjects, the hu
man relation to divinity; yet Winters complicates this
basic theme by introducing others that impinge directly
or indirectly on it.

The relationship between God and
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man leads the poet to consider "the relationship between
mind and body, between flesh and spirit" in man himself,
as Stanford characterizes the theme;*' the perfection of
the divine mind, in turn, suggests as its opposite the
imperfection of the mortal mind.

The poem also deals

with the irreducible elements of illusion and deceit
found in human perception, which Winters contrasts to
the perfect intellectual vision of God.

The shifting

and indeterminate universe of m o d e m science, the illu
sive and error-producing object of human perception, is
subtly implied in the first stanza of the poem in much
the same way as the pigeons embody that same universe
in the concluding stanza of "Sunday Morning."

Finally,

"To the Holy Spirit" is a meditation on death such as
one finds more frequently in seventeenth-century litera
ture than in modern literature; in it the soul is taken
"to the brink of the incomprehensible" where it recog
nizes and accepts what for Winters was the tragic fact
of human annihilation.

The only consolation it offers

the reader is the severe control and moral dignity with
which the poet faces such a catastrophe.
Before we can begin a discussion of the poem in de
tail, we must first settle the question of the identity
of the Holy Spirit.

(It is curious at first that Winters

chooses the third person of the Trinity for his title;
the most likely reason for his choice is the frequent
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synonymy of "spirit" and "mind" and the fact that both
the Father and the Son would have been too personal for
his philosophical position.)

Some readers have inter

preted the Holy Spirit in a rather loose allegorical
fashion as a projection or idealization of Winters' own
mind, thereby depriving the Spirit of objective existence.
In part Howard Kaye commits himself to such a definition:
Although there are nostalgic connections, this
Spirit should not be identified with the God
of St. Thomas Aquinas. The uncertainties of
the fourth stanza seem to rule out the Spirit
as a God of redemption and resurrection— or at
least to cast these qualities into the area of
the undemonstrable. The Holy Spirit is pure
mind , the spirit of reason. He is a projection
of human reason, a kind of idealization of
Winters' own mind; but his existence is inde
pendent of Winters.4
Kaye is correct in saying that the Spirit is neither
the God of Aquinas nor the God of redemption and resur
rection; notwithstanding the title, the poem is nowhere
Christian.

But one may wonder how He can be both a pro

jection of the human mind and independent of it at the
same time.

It would be more correct, I think, to say

that reason itself is an attempted projection of God that
fails in the poem because of the mind's entanglement in
flesh.

The evidence found in the poem itself points to

a reality for the Holy Spirit external to the human mind.
At no place in it does Winters identify that mind with
God, nor does he idealize his own mind into a godhead--
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the human mind is always spoken of as mortal and contin
gent, God's as eternal and self-sufficient.

In fact, a

cleavage is found to exist between the two, even though
the human mind makes periodic and intermittent contact
with the divine mind.

Besides, the Holy Spirit is re

ferred to as the creator of both man and the universe.
Such ascription is implied in the first line of the third
stanza, "These are thy fallen sons," and stated explicitly
in another poem, "A Prayer for My Son,” written a few
years before "To the Holy Spirit":
Eternal Spirit, you
Whose will maintains the world,
Who thought and made it true. . . .
For once in m o d e m literature, we are dealing here with
a poem written from the point of view of theistic
absolutism.
I should now like to discuss each of the four stan
zas of the poem separately, going into them in some de
tail, and then I would like to draw whatever conclusions
seem necessary.

We should first note the italicized

words with which Winters introduces the poem, from a
deserted graveyard in the Salinas Valley. We shall dis
cover that deserted works on more than one level of mean
ing in the poem.

First of all, the graveyard is deserted

by human attention because it is located in the uninhab
itable area of the Salinas Valley in California, but in
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what other symbolic way it may be deserted will become
apparent as we discuss the poem.

The first stanza follows:

Immeasurable haze:
The desert valley spreads
Up golden river-beds
As if in other days.
Trees rise and thin away,
And past the trees, the hills,
Pure line and shade of dust,
Bear witness to our wills:
We see them, for we must;
Calm in deceit, they stay.
Beside introducing the poem and describing in some
detail its location, the first stanza develops through
that description one of the central ideas of the poem,
namely, the indeterminancy of the physical world, includ
ing man's body, and the ambiguity and uncertainty found
in the human perception and understanding of that world.
In fact, the poet seems to suggest that knowledge of the
physical world, in the Platonic sense of the word, is
not possible for the human mind.

The medium through

which that world is seen is "immeasurable haze," which
necessarily distorts all objects of human perception.
And in the poet's own mind, the illusory persistence of
the past, with its "golden river-beds," also interferes
with any objective vision of things as they are.

(The

fragmentation of man's temporal order into time present
and past can be contrasted to the eternal present of
God's Pure Mind in the third stanza.)

The poet's un

certain vision is like the trees, which "rise and thin
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away"; if he is only uncertain about the immediate objects
of perception, his uncertainty dissolves into total am
biguity when he directs his attention to the vision of
the "bare hills" which loom beyond the trees.

In the

early poems these hills are always associated with death;
here they are related to those inhuman elements of the
physical world that in the last analysis defy human ap
prehension and understanding.

Because of its innate de

sire for order, the mind is driven in their presence to
impose form and then to obtain some kind of meaning
through artifice.

As the poet sees the hills in the dis

tance, enveloped in "immeasurable haze," they possess the
"pure line" of a definable object.

But such a line does

not correspond to objective reality; it is an illusion
which exists only in the mind of the observing poet.

As

Kaye says, "The hills . . . are hills only through the
imposition of form by the poet's mind," a form which he
goes on to say partakes more of the imagination than of
reality."*

The imperfections of our senses render such

an imposition inevitable, given the human mind's insist
ence on form and its aversion to meaninglessness.

As

Winters states the matter in the Introduction to Forms
of Discovery, "We are told also that our senses deceive
us, and in some ways this is obviously true, for the
physicists and the mathematicians have discovered realms
of what appears to be reality beyond the apprehension of
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our senses."^

The "bare hills" of "To the Holy Spirit"

are located in this inaccessible realm.

They are "deceit"

in that the "pure line" which the poet's perception
creates and his mind accepts does not correspond to their
true shifting and indeterminate nature; yet the hills
"stay," mysteriously enough, and form permanently a solid
background against which man can test his unsteady will.
That the human mind has no alternative but "to ac
cept the evidence of our senses, to act as if it were
true"^ is indicated by a passage in Forms of Discovery
immediately following the one already quoted:
The realm which we perceive with our unaided
senses, the realm which our ancestors took to
be real, may be an illusion; but in that il
lusion we pass our daily lives, including our
moral lives; the illusion is quite obviously
governed by principles which it is dangerous,
often fatal, to violate; that illusion is our
reality.°
This passage further explains what Winters means
when he says that the hills "bear witness to our wills,"
for to assert that an illusion is a reality requires
more of the will than it does of the intellect, just as
more of the will is involved in seeing the "pure line"
of the hills.

We see it, "for we must."

Otherwise, our

world would literally become senseless, and no moral or
intellectual order in it would be possible.
The theme of perception and the indeterminacy of
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the perceived object is put aside in the second stanza
for a fact about which there can be no ambiguity:
High noon returns the mind
Upon its local fact:
Dry grass and sand; we find
No vision to distract.
Low in the summer heat,
Naming old graves, are stones
Pushed here and there, the seat
Of nothing, and the bones
Beneath are similar:
F.elics of lonely men,
Brutal and aimless, then
As now, irregular.
The "local fact" to which the mind returns is the
commonplace one of death and moral chaos in the human
realm.

The poet knows the fact at high noon, the shadow-

less point of clearest sight, and no vision, such as the
"immeasurable haze" produces, distracts him from its
immediacy and clarity.

As I have said, the fact is two

fold; physical death suggests spiritual death.

The con

fusion of the dislocated gravestones, "pushed here and
there," recalls to the poet's mind the aimlessness and
moral irregularity of the men buried somewhere beneath
them.

These men are the same as those who figure in

"John Sutter" and "A Journey," and their historical back
ground is the raw towns and bleak Western landscape of
the turn of the century and afterwards.

The men were

exclusively determined by the earth, as Winters says in
his note to "A Journey," and in the absence of any ra
tional principle to regulate their lives they were
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spiritually and intellectually dead before they were
physically so.

That no hope of resurrection is offered

them is indicated by the fact that the stones are now
"the seat of nothing."
human being.

Death is annihilation of the

There is consequently an element of compas

sion in Winters' judgement of them.

"Relics of lonely

men" he calls their scattered bones, as if the loneliness
of the men in both life and death were a mitigating
factor in the consideration of the brutality of their
existence.

As he says in "The Journey" about the towns

which these men, or others like them, once inhabited,
Nothing one can say
Names the compassion they stir in the heart.
Obscure men shift and cry. . . .
Their loneliness extended beyond the social to the
philosophical and the theological.

Because of their

thoughtlessness, the Holy Spirit, the God of Pure Mind,
could not participate in their severely limited existence;
consequently, they were as spiritually deserted in life
as they are now in death.

The dry grass and summer heat

are their inferno where they suffer the final loss of
being.

Existence provided them with not the barest trace

of similitude to God.

Between the mindlessness of their

existence and the perfection of His Pure Mind there had
to be the absolute cleavage which Winters' vision dictates,
even though God is credited with their creation.
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the deserted graveyard they only fall into the radical
divorce from God that in their lives they had already
prefigured.

It is in this sense other than the literal

that we are to understand the deserted graveyard of the
title.
In the third stanza Winters turns abruptly and ad
dresses the Deity Himself, at first as if in accusation:
These are thy fallen sons,
Thou whom I try to reach.
Thou whom the quick eye shuns,
Thou dost elude my speech.
Yet when I go from sense
And trace thee down in thought,
I meet thee, then, intense,
And know thee as I ought.
But thou are mind alone,
And I , alas, am bound
Pure mind to flesh and bone,
And flesh and bone to ground.
It is as if God had failed the fallen sons, for whom
He was morally responsible, or else as if He had failed
Himself and compromised the purity of His own unity and
essence by creating such multiplicity and moral irregularity.
The question is indirectly related to the oldest of all
philosophical problems, that of the one and the many, and
directly to the gnostic rejection of the Christian idea
of creation.

If I am not mistaken, Winters is here being

influenced by Valery's "Ebauche d'un serpent," which re
volves around the old gnostic belief that creation is a
blemish on the purity of non-being.

Winters considered

the poem the single greatest one ever written, and his
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analysis of it in the first chapter of The Function of
Criticism contains passages that clarify a great deal of
"To the Holy Spirit."

The relevance of "Ebauche d'un

serpent" to Winters' poem is apparent in the following
stanza, which contains the poem's thematic core.

The

speaker is Satan who is addressing God and criticizing
Him for what Valery's intellectual angel regards as the
tragic folly of creating something other than Himself,
which necessarily will be imperfect:
0 Vanite!
Cause Premiere!
Celui qui regne dans les Cieux,
D'une voix qui fut le lumiere
Ouvrit 1'univers spacieux.
Comme las de son pur spectacle,
Dieu lui-meme a rompu 1'obstacle
De sa parfaite etemit&;
II se fit Celui qui dissipe
En consequences, son Principle,
En etioles, son Unite.9
By the act of creation God broke the barrier of perfect
eternity, dissipated the Primal Cause into consequences,
and fragmented Unity into the multiplicity of stars.
The result is divine despair; the universe becomes the
Cieux, son erreur *. Temps, sa ruine.'; and creation bears
within its core "tan soupir de despoir," as the superior
intelligence of the angel most acutely realizes:
Devant votre image fun^bre,
Orgueil de mon sombre miroir,
Si profond fut votre malaise
Que votre souffle la glaise
Fut un soupir de despoir
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Strictly speaking, Valery's gnosticism applies only
to the third stanza of "To the Holy Spirit"; Winters men
tions it only in passing, as it were; but it is an impor
tant concept for him, and one intimately connected with
his idea of God as Pure Mind.

If being is intellectual,

and if God is perfect intellect and perfect being, then
it is philosophically appropriate to accuse Him of caus
ing the "fallen sons" and to wonder how such thoughtless
ness could come out of perfect thought.
The rest of this stanza is devoted to the nature of
God's essence and the poet's relationship to that essence.
We have here fully realized the second of the two approaches
to theism we discussed at the end of the second chapter.
Instead of the essence taken out of God and set up as con
cept, we have here God defined exclusively in terms of
His essence, which in this case is pure intellect.

"But

thou art mind alone," the poet states quite simply and
straightforwardly.

Existence as such is disregarded as

philosophically irrelevant to the "mind alone.”

As far

as the poet *s relationship with the Spirit goes, Winters
describes Him as bafflingly remote, even almost inacces
sible, for the human intellect which painstakingly attempts
to reach Him.

There is no possibility that such a meeting

can be accomplished through the senses, to which the in
tellectual essence of God is absolute foreignness.

There

are no philosophical traces of Him left, but still operating,
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in the physical universe He created, which might reveal
to the human mind studying them some limited, even nega
tive, knowledge about His nature.

In the terms we used

in the second chapter, none of the cause is to be found
in any of the effects of the created world, even though
these effects are admitted as coming out of the cause.
The Thomistic position that man possesses a ’’natural"
knowledge of God, and that it is rooted in his sensory
experience, is thus rejected.

The mind is the divine

element in man, and it is only in that element, as like
in like, that the Pure Mind can be traced down, met, and
known as He ought to be known.

The implication, if I am

not mistaken, is that in this union the two minds become
equated with each other, though Winters leaves undiscussed
the exact nature of the equation.
How such a meeting is possible, if the Holy Spirit
is to keep the transcendence which Winters gives Him in
the poem, is not clear; nor any clearer is how the Pure
Mind can both elude the "speech" of the poet, and yet be
effectively traced down in his "thought."

One might ask,

if He is ineffably beyond any of the categories of language,
how then can He be apprehended by the very intellect which
produces these categories and which operates only in them?
Perhaps Winters means no more than that the subject is
the most difficult of all and that language becomes inade
quate in attempting to express its complexity.
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though, Winters does not treat divinity as undermining
the human realm but as supporting it and grounding it in
truth in a manner that finally defies human analysis.
More simply put, Winters admits the reality, as well as
the validity, of a thought inexpressible in language,
which somehow makes possible for him a moral and intel
lectual life lived primarily through language.

"The poem

acknowledges mystery," as Howard Kaye says in his con
cluding remarks on "To the Holy Spirit.
But the union of the divine and human is brief and
uncertain.

God as Pure Mind enjoys a simplicity and self-

sufficiency which the poet finds tragically missing in
his own complex and deprived existence.

His mind is en

tangled with flesh, the breeding ground of error and imperception; the body is the impediment that interferes
with and eventually frustrates the attempt of the human
mind to reach and apprehend God.

The no uncertain terms

with which Winters here laments the possession of a body
are almost gnostic in their quiet intensity.

Further

more, it is the body's allegiance to the ground, its
leaning toward nothingness, as St. Augustine somewhere
expresses it, that drags the mind back to time and causes
its annihilation in death.

The only alternative to an

indeterminate universe rotten with change and death is
a transcendent intelligence to which man is mysteriously
related but from which he is at the same time excluded

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

186

because he is trapped in that universe from which he
would escape.

Man is literally caught between two in

finities, one below him, one above him, and he experi
ences, as in Pascal, the "grandeur et misere de l'homme."
The final stanza summarizes all previous themes and
draws the conclusions that given the poet's position
are inevitable:
These had no thought: at most
Dark faith and blinding earth.
Where is the trammeled ghost?
Was there another birth?
Only one certainty
Beside thine unfleshed eye,
Beside the spectral tree,
Can I discern: these die.
All of this stir of age,
Though it elude my sense
Into what heritage
I know not, seems to fall,
Quiet beyond recall,
Into irrelevance.
He returns to the men buried in the graveyard, con
siders their separation from the Pure Mind in "blinding
earth" and concludes against immortality for them.

Their

ghosts, enlightened at best by only a "dark faith," are
trammeled inextricably in matter.

The poet does not say

specifically that his fate will be the same as theirs,
but the implication of the last part is that it is: all
this stir of age, which would include his own, falls into
the irrelevance and meaninglessness of death.

His mind,

pushed to the brink of the incomprehensible, returns with
three certainties: the perfect intellectual vision of
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God's "unfleshed eye," the fact of moral choice between
good and evil for man, and the concluding fact of death
as annihilation.

(I take the "spectral tree" to refer

to Genesis's Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil,
whose "mortal taste" ended man's innocence and awakened
his consciousness to moral and intellectual activity,
death being somehow the inevitable by-product of such
consciousness.

Winters is following here, I think,

Valery's version of the Fall in "Ebauche d'un serpent.")
But the first two certainties are "beside" the last one
in its overwhelming emotional effect on the human being
facing it.

To know that God exists as Pure Mind, to

desire to reach Him and partake of His perfection, to
be able to do so, even if briefly and uncertainly, but
finally to be forced by the body to turn back from that
vision to where annihilation awaits the mind, all this
explains the sense of tragedy working beneath Winters'
tight lines.

As he says in "At the San Francisco Airport

The rain of
Destroys me
There comes
Is what one
One's being

matter upon sense
momently. The score:
what will come. The expense
thought, and something more—
and intelligence.

The terms of the tragedy are stated just as unrelent
ingly in his analysis of "Ebauche d'un serpent" in The
Function of Criticism. As Winters interprets the poem,
Satan is the embodiment of the human intellect.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Of him

188

he says, "He is so created that he desires infinite know
ledge, and he is so created that he cannot have it.

The

desire is his nature, his greatness, his sin, and his
torture, and it is inescapable."

2.

12

Conclusion

"To the Holy Spirit" is a summary of Winters 1 entire
poetic career, one which began in free-verse, imagism,
and atheistic relativism and which ended in traditional
meter, classicism, and theistic absolutism.

The universe

of the early poems, seething with constant change and in
tellectually ungraspable by the human mind, is the same
as the one which appears in the "immeasurable haze" of
"To the Holy Spirit."

The "bare hills" of the free-verse

are transformed into the later "pure line and shade of
dust," but they both refer to the same reality for Winters,
the presence of what we might call a death-principle in
the physical world, which is either indifferent or hostile
to the human attempt to create and then maintain moral
and intellectual cohesion.

The aimless and brutal men

buried somewhere beneath the irregular stones of "To the
Holy Spirit" summarizes a theme that remains conscant
throughout all Winters' criticism and poetry, the sense
that human life is threatened inside itself by what he
calls in The Bare Hills some horror "spined with rigid
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age,"

13

and that life will end in tragedy and the annihila

tion of the human being.
The difference separating "To the Holy Spirit" and
the rest of Winters

1

traditional poetry from his earlier

free-verse is not subject matter, as we have just seen,
but the kind of poetic treatment and intellectual under
standing he was able to give that subject matter after
his conversion in his late twenties to a peculiarly modern
version of classicism.

As we have noted in the second

chapter, the substance of the change resides in Winters'
theory of poetry based on the power of the human mind to
apprehend some degree of truth about human experience
and then to express that truth in poetic language which
permits "extraction from every unit of language of its
maximum content, both of connotation and denotation."^
The poem then becomes, as Donald E. Stanford has charac
terized the theory, "an act of contemplation rather than
an expression of personal f e e l i n g . A s

a result,

Winters' understanding of his subject matter becomes ra
tional, and his treatment of it governed by the principles
of traditional meter, which he saw as a more flexible
and complex instrument than free-verse for handling sub
jects now complicated by the introduction of reason into
the poetic process.
On account of such a theory, he was thus enabled to
achieve some degree of spiritual control over his subject
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matter, the moral and psychological benefits of which
were inestimable when the subject was as stark and tragic
as that of a poem like "To the Holy Spirit."

The bare

ability just to know and to name has anciently been a
part of every victory man has achieved over the chaotic
and the irrational.
"To the Holy Spirit" illustrates such control.

The

ultimate vision of the poem, which is also the ultimate
vision of Winters' poetry, is nihilistic, the one signifi
cant fact which makes him, I think, modern to his core.
(Irving Howe has said that the inner demon at the heart
CL

of modern literature is nihilism.

)

The definition of

life, as he gives it in "The Grave," is
To stand, precarious, near the utter end;
Betrayed, deserted, and alone descend,
Blackness before, and on the road above
The crowded terror that is human love;
To still the spirit till the flesh may lock
Its final cession in eternal rock.
To face this vision and to write about it with the calm
seriousness and stoic restraint with which he does so in
poems like "The Grave" and "To the Holy Spirit” require
a degree of moral and intellectual control that only a
few men are capable of.

The chief value Winters' life

in poetry possesses, I think, is the example it affords
us of such a control in an age and literature noted for
excessive self-pity and a pervasive tone of almost cosmic
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complaint.

This is true even if one disagrees with his

ultimate philosophical position.
Such rational control finally rests on a theistic
base.

The whole theory that regulates and governs his

traditional poetry depends, as we have seen, on the ob
jective existence of truth.

What Winters saw as philo

sophical necessity drove him to admit the existence of
God in order, first of all, to account for, and then, to
safeguard the existence of truth.
theism most reluctantly.

But he admitted his

A deeply rooted distrust and

suspicion of the transcendent remained with him from
the beginning to the end of his career; for reasons of
his own, he saw the transcendent as necessarily blurring
moral distinctions and generating intellectual confusion.
Consequently, when he was forced by his "hard argument"
to deal with God, he defined Him in those terms which
would be most congenial with his rationalism and which
would reflect his belief that ultimate reality, in the
philosophical sense, is intellectual in nature.
Only "thought" had real meaning for Winters.

As

Howard Kaye has noted, "Change, or motion, is for him
antithetical to human significance.

We can find meaning

only if we stop m o v i n g . W i s d o m is always associated
for him with a perfectly static and silent realm outside
time and change, which he most frequently characterizes
as "eternal."

Heracles is one of his symbols of the
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poet "in hand-to-hand or semi-intuitive combat with ex18
perience."
That hero achieves victory over that ex
perience only through intellectual mastery of it in a
timeless realm where he raids "eternal silence to eternal
ends."

Death and wisdom, then, are intimately connected

with each other in Winters' thought.

If we give "life"

a strict philosophical definition denoting, and involving,
phenomenological change, and thus contrast it to "being"
such as one finds in "essentialism," we then find Valery's
gnomic remark in Monsieur Testa peculiarly applicable
19
to Winters: "The essential is against life."
Conse
quently, God is defined as "pure mind alone," with "ex
istence" as such being ruled out as philosophically
negligible.

The "unfleshed eye" of Winters' God is thus

more like Aristotle's Unmoved Mover than He is like St.
Thomas Aquinas' God of Pure Existence.
"To the Holy Spirit" contains this definition of
God in its most complete form.

The poem also recapitu

lates all the crucial consequences of such a definition,
consequences which we discussed and illustrated in the
third chapter.

With "pure mind" as one's absolute by

which one is enabled to judge whether or not something
is real and good, these consequences immediately follow,
all of which we see working, either directly or indirectly,
in "To the Holy Spirit."

First of all, evil will be

defined, not as the deprivation of existence, but as the
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deprivation of mind; it will be seen as a kind of
"thoughtlessness."
follows.

From this the second consequence

The natural world, mindless as it necessarily

is, will be looked upon as source of evil and disorder;
Winters at times even suggests it is demonic; since it
exists only in a phenomenological sense, not in an in
tellectual one, there will always be an element of un
reality about it, because of which an absolute cleavage
exists between the natural world, on the one hand, and,
on the other, the human and the divine realms; while
recognizing its beauties, even at times responding to
its temptations, the intellect will separate itself from
the natural as far as it is able to do so in order to
realize its own end.

What has just been said about the

natural world applies also to man's own body; the thought
less principle in flesh is capable of unbalancing moral
control and causing spiritual blindness; consequently,
the relationship of mind and body is one that is fraught
for Winters with ambiguity and peril; in fact, it is the
source of tragedy, since the body's death, as we have
seen in "To the Holy Spirit," causes the annihilation
of the mind.

Finally, since the principle of evil found

in the human realm will be located, according to Winters'
vision, not in a corrupt will, but in an imperfect mind,
and since only a few men achieve intellectual excellence,
one will tend to view, as Winters does, the mass of men,
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whether collected together in a state or a mob, as capable
of erupting into irrational destructiveness; a form of
intellectual isolation will inevitably be the result.
As I have said, Winters’ vision of life is as tragic
as anything one can find in the Greeks.

He thought at

one time in his late forties of mitigating the rigors of
that vision by embracing Christianity, but he just as
quickly decided against it.

The whole experience is re

corded in an epigram titled "A Fragment," which was writ
ten immediately after "To the Holy Spirit":
I cannot find my way to Nazareth.
I have had enough of this. Thy will is death,
And this unholy quiet is thy peace.
Thy will be done; and let discussion cease.
His comments on Edgar Bowers in The Uncollected
Essays and Reviews are particularly applicable to himself;
speaking of Bowers' religious position, Winters says that
Bowers had "an inability, both temperamental and intellec
tual, to delude himself.

. . .

The words guile and

deceit recur several times as indicative of attitudes
which turn one from one's real beliefs toward something
one would like to believe, and hence toward spiritual
corruption.
He held on to his own "real beliefs" to the end and
never compromised them.

After "To the Holy Spirit" was

written, his poetic career was all but finished; he had
only three more short poems to write.

The real work
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which remained for him to do was two books of criticism,
The Function of Criticism and Forms of Discovery, and
the anthology of short poems which he co-edited with
Kenneth Fields, Quest for Reality.

A great deal of

Forms of Discovery was written while he was suffering
from terminal cancer; in fact, close to the very end, he
21
postponed an operation in order to finish the book.
Donald Stanford has the best epitaph for him, which suc
cinctly captures his peculiar combination of dignity and
stubbornness.

In the obituary notice which Stanford

wrote for Winters in the Southern Review, Stanford quotes
from a letter he received after Winters' death from a
friend who had known him since his youth: "There never
was anyone like Arthur [his name among his friends] .
22
He got his work done and he died."
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NOTES

^ Stanford, "A Note on Yvor Winters," 46.
^ Fields, "The Rhetoric of Artifice," p. 286.
^ Stanford, "A Note on Yvor Winters," 45.
^ Kaye, pp. 120-21.
^ Kaye, p. 119.

g

Winters, Forms, pp. xii-xiii.

^ Kaye, p . 119.
Q

Winters, Forms, p. xiii.
^ Valery, Poems, p. 186-88.
^

Valery, Poems, p. 188.
Kaye, p . 122.

12
13
^

Winters, Function, p p . 64-65.
Winters, Collected Poems, p. 51.
Winters, Defense, p . 83.

^ Stanford, "Yvor Winters: 1900-1968," Southern
Review, NS 4 (1968), 861.
See Kaye, p. 157.
^

Kaye, p. 114.

I Q

Winters, Collected Poems, p. 189.
19
/
Valery, Monsieur Teste, p. 78.
90

Winters, Uncollected, p . 183.

^ See Winters, "Alan Swallow: 1915-1966," Southern
Review, NS 3 (1967), 798.
^

Stanford, "Yvor Winters: 1900-1968," 863.
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